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Abstract
We show new lower bounds and impossibility results for general (possibly non-black-box) zero-knowledge proofs
and arguments. Our main results are that, under reasonable complexity assumptions:
1. There does not exist a two-round zero-knowledge proof system with perfect completeness for an NP-complete
language.
The previous impossibility result for two-round zero knowledge, by Goldreich and Oren [J. Cryptol. 7(1) (1994)
1–32] was only for the case of auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proofs and arguments.
2. There does not exist a constant-round zero-knowledge strong proof or argument of knowledge (as deﬁned by
Goldreich [Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.]) for a
non-trivial language.
3. There does not exist a constant-round public-coin proof system for a non-trivial language that is resettable zero
knowledge. This result also extends to bounded-resettable zero knowledge, in which the number of resets is a
priori bounded by a polynomial in the input length and prover-to-veriﬁer communication.
In contrast,we show that under reasonable assumptions, there does exist such a (computationally sound) argument
system that is bounded-resettable zero knowledge.
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The complexity assumptions we use are not commonly used in cryptography. However, in all cases, we show that
assumptions similar to ours are necessary for the above results.
Most previously known lower bounds, such as those of Goldreich and Krawczyk [SIAM J. Comput. 25(1) (1996)
169–192], were only for black-box zero knowledge. However, a result of Barak (Proceedings of the 42nd FOCS,
IEEE, 2001, pp. 106–115) shows that many (or even most) of these black-box lower bounds do not extend to the
case of general zero knowledge.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Zero-knowledge proof systems, introduced by Goldwasser et al. [GMR], are a fundamental notion in
cryptography. Since their introduction, there have been a vast number of positive results for constructing
them. The fundamental positive result is that every language inNP has a zero-knowledge proof (assuming
one-way functions exist) [GMW]. However, there were also many works constructing zero-knowledge
proofs that satisfy some additional properties. One important example of such a property is having a small
number of rounds of interaction. Protocols with a constant number of rounds were constructed by Feige
and Shamir [FS1], Brassard et al. [BCY], Goldreich and Kahan [GK1]. Other properties that have been
considered include stronger notions of zero knowledge, such as auxiliary-input zero knowledge [GO],
concurrent zero knowledge [DNS] resettable zero knowledge [CGGM], and universally composable zero
knowledge [Can]. These stronger notions are related to whether the protocol remains zero knowledge
when executed several times sequentially (in the case of auxiliary-input zero knowledge), concurrently (in
the case of concurrent zero knowledge), under a resetting attack (in the case of resettable zero knowledge),
or within an arbitrary environment (in the case of universally composable zero knowledge).
Negative results: There are also a few negative results for zero-knowledge proofs. Goldreich and Oren
[GO] showed that any zero-knowledge proof system for a nontrivial language (i.e., for a language outside
BPP) must be interactive, and both the veriﬁer algorithm and the prover algorithm must be probabilistic.
They also showed that there does not exist a two-round auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof system
for a nontrivial language. The results of [GO] do not depend on any assumption and hold also for
zero-knowledge arguments. 3 It was also shown that it is impossible to obtain universally composable
zero-knowledge proofs for nontrivial languages (regardless of the number of rounds) [Can]. 4
Negative results for black-box zero knowledge: In addition to these results, there have been a number of
negative results for black-box zero knowledge. Loosely speaking, a protocol is black-box zero-knowledge
if the zero-knowledge condition is shown via a universal simulator that only utilizes black-box/oracle
access to the veriﬁer’s strategy. Black-box zero knowledge is a stronger condition than auxiliary-input
3 Loosely speaking, in an argument system (sometimes called a computationally sound proof), the soundness requirement is
required to hold only against cheating prover strategies that can be implemented by an efﬁcient algorithm. In contrast, a proof
system is required to be statistically sound, i.e. soundness is guaranteed even against computationally unbounded provers.
4 Loosely speaking, the reason is that the universally composable deﬁnition requires a black-box simulator that cannot rewind
the adversary [CKL]. It is not hard to show that without setup assumptions, it is impossible to obtain such a simulator for
nontrivial languages.
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zero knowledge, and it is incomparable to concurrent and resettable zero knowledge. We note that until
recently, all known zero-knowledge protocols were in fact black-box zero knowledge. Goldreich and
Krawczyk [GK2] showed that there is no black-box zero-knowledge proof or argument system for a
nontrivial language with 3 rounds. They also showed that there is no black-box zero-knowledge proof or
argument for a nontrivial language that has a constant number of rounds and is of the public-coin type. (A
public-coin proof system, also known as an Arthur–Merlin game, is one in which the veriﬁer’s strategy
in the proof merely consists of sending random strings as messages, and at the end deciding whether or
not to accept by evaluating a polynomial-time predicate on the transcript of the execution.) It has also
been shown that any black-box concurrent zero-knowledge proof or argument must have at least ˜(log n)
many rounds, where n is the input length/security parameter [CKPR] (building on [KPR,Ros]). This holds
also for the case of bounded concurrency, where the protocol needs only remain zero knowledge for an a
priori known and ﬁxed polynomial number of concurrent executions. As in [GK2], the results of [CKPR]
do not depend on any assumption and hold also for the case of arguments. Other black-box lower bounds
have also been shown in [BGGL,BL,Rey].
Non-black-box zero knowledge: The problem with black-box lower bounds is that in almost all applica-
tions of zero knowledge, standard (i.e., non-black-box) zero knowledge sufﬁces. Therefore, the question
of interest is typically whether there exist standard (i.e., non-black-box) zero-knowledge protocols with
certain properties, and not whether there exist black-box zero-knowledge protocols with these properties.
This point has become much more acute with a recent result of Barak [Bar], that proves the existence
of zero-knowledge protocols that are not black-box zero knowledge. Speciﬁcally, [Bar] constructs a
constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge argument for NP that remains zero knowledge when com-
posed concurrently any ﬁxed polynomial number of times. The results of [GK2] (and also of [CKPR])
show that such a protocol cannot be black-box zero knowledge.
This refutes the belief that a black-box lower bound indicates a non-black-box lower bound and means
that an important research direction is to try to ﬁnd non-black-box lower bounds for zero-knowledge
proofs. In particular, several natural questions are:
1. Does there exist a (non-auxiliary-input) zero-knowledge proof or argument with 2 rounds?
2. Does there exist an auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof or argument with 3 rounds?
3. Does there exist a constant-round concurrent or resettable zero-knowledge proof or argument?
4. Does there exist a constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proof system? (The protocol of [Bar]
is a constant-round public-coin argument.)
5. Does there exist a constant-round zero-knowledge strong proof of knowledge?
Strong proofs of knowledge, deﬁned by Goldreich [Gol2, Section 4.7.6], are proofs of knowledge
whereby the knowledge extractor fulﬁlls the following more stringent requirement: If a given prover
convinces the honest veriﬁer to accept with nonnegligible probability, then the knowledge extractor
runs in strict probabilistic polynomial time and outputs a witness with probability that is close to 1. 5
Recall that a 3-round, public-coin proof system for NP can be obtained from the well-known protocols
of [GMW] (for THREE-COLORING ) or [Blu2] (for HAMILTONICITY ) via parallel repetition (to make the
soundness error negligible, as required). However, it is not known whether these parallelized protocols
are zero knowledge, concurrent zero knowledge, or strong proofs of knowledge. (It is easy to see that
they are not resettable zero knowledge.) Thus it is even of interest to study Items 2–5 for these particular
5 We note that [BL] used non-black-box techniques in order to construct a constant-round zero-knowledge argument with a
strict polynomial-time extractor. However, in their protocol, the extraction probability is not close to 1.
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protocols. Indeed, this was the motivation for the black-box results of [GK2]. However, as mentioned
above, recent results show that one cannot infer from the results of [GK2] an implication on standard
(non-black-box) zero knowledge.
We remark that Item 4 has more practical signiﬁcance than may seem at ﬁrst glance. The reason is a re-
lation between the Fiat–Shamir heuristic [FS2] and zero-knowledge protocols. The Fiat–Shamir heuristic
is a way to transform a constant-round, public-coin proof or argument system into a noninteractive proof
system. It is a very popular heuristic, and its security is an intriguing open question. It is known that this
heuristic is completely insecure if it is applied to a protocol that is zero knowledge [DNRS]. Thus, the
results of [Bar] imply that there exists an argument system on which the heuristic fails completely (see
also [GT]). However, it is not known whether or not this heuristic is sound when applied to (statistically
sound) proofs. Resolving Item 4 may shed light on this question.
1.1. Our results
1.1.1. Lower bounds (impossibility results)
In this work, we pursue the question of obtaining non-black-box lower bounds for zero knowledge,
and give partial answers to the above questions. In particular, we show that:
1. Two-round zero knowledge proofs: Under a reasonable assumption, (namely, thatE = DTIME(2O(n))
has a function of nondeterministic circuit complexity 2(n); see Assumption 3.2), there does not exist
a 2-round public-coin zero-knowledge proof system for any nontrivial language. Under a somewhat
stronger assumption and assuming NP = coNP, there does not exist a 2-round (not necessarily
public-coin) zero-knowledge proof system with perfect completeness for any NP-complete language.
The previous impossibility result of [GO] held only for the case of auxiliary-input zero knowledge.
2. Strong proofs and arguments of knowledge: Under a reasonable assumption (namely, that there exists
a pseudorandom generator or one-to-one one-way function that is secure against 2(n)-sized circuits),
there does not exist a constant-round zero-knowledge strong proof or argument of knowledge for a
nontrivial language.
3. Resettable zero knowledge proofs: There does not exist a constant-round public-coin proof system for
a nontrivial language that is auxiliary-input resettable zero knowledge (or even “bounded-resettable”
zero knowledge). This result requires no complexity assumptions.
1.1.2. Protocols
Unlike previous lower bounds, some of our bounds hold only for the case of (statistically sound) proof
systems. They also use complexity assumptions, and even ones that are not common in cryptography,
such as one-way functions strong against 2n-sized (as opposed to super-polynomial or 2n-sized) circuits,
and the existence of functions in E that are hard for nondeterministic algorithms. However, we show that
such restrictions (i.e., to proofs only) and complexity assumptions are in fact inherent. Speciﬁcally, we
show that:
1. Two-round zero knowledge proofs and arguments:
(a) Ruling out 2-round zero-knowledge proofs requires some sort of a lower bound on nondeter-
ministic algorithms. Roughly speaking, if NP could simulate superpolynomial-time deterministic
algorithms, then there exists a 2-round public-coin zero-knowledge proof system forNP. This jus-
tiﬁes our use of a nondeterministic hardness assumption for proving impossibility for two-round
zero-knowledge proofs.
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(b) Under a form of the “Noninteractive CS Proofs” conjecture posed by Micali [Mic], there exists a
2-round public-coin zero-knowledge argument system for NP. Thus, if Micali’s conjecture turns
out to be true, some form of 2-round zero knowledge is possible. Viewed differently, this shows
that in order to rule out 2-round zero-knowledge arguments, one must refute Micali’s conjecture.
(c) Under the (nonstandard) “Knowledge-of-Exponent” assumption suggested by Damgård [Dam],
there exists a (private-coin) 2-round zero-knowledge proof system for a promise problem outside
ofBPP. Hence, our negative result forNP-complete languages cannot be extended to all nontrivial
problems without refuting this assumption.
2. Resettable zero-knowledge arguments: Under standard assumptions, our lower bound for resettable
public-coin proofs does not extend to arguments. Speciﬁcally, we construct a constant-round public-
coin argument forNP that is bounded-resettable zero knowledge. This result is interesting as a positive
result in its own right as it is the ﬁrst constant-round (public-coin) protocol that is bounded-resettable
zero knowledge.
3. Zero-knowledge strong proofs of knowledge: Ruling out constant-round (or even 3-round public-coin)
zero-knowledge strong proofs of knowledge requires some sort of an exponential lower bound on
deterministic algorithms (for a problem in NP). Thus, an exponential lower bound is necessary to rule
out constant-round zero-knowledge strong proofs of knowledge. Loosely speaking, we demonstrate
this by showing that if CIRCUIT SATISFIABILITY (CSAT) can be solved in subexponential time, then
the parallel HAMILTONICITY proof system [Blu2] is a zero-knowledge strong proof of knowledge.
Thus, proving that parallel HAMILTONICITY is not zero knowledge requires proving (or assuming) that
CSATcannot be solved in subexponential time.
1.2. Organization
This paper has two main parts. The ﬁrst part (Part I; Sections 3–4) contains all the lower bounds of
this paper. That is, it contains all our impossibility results for various forms of zero-knowledge. The
results are all presented under a deﬁnition of computational indistinguishability that refers to nonuniform
distinguishers (as is common in the literature); a uniform treatment is presented in the appendix. The
second part (Part II; Sections 6–8) contains several constructions of zero-knowledge protocols. All of
these results are conditional and some of them are based on assumptions that are highly nonstandard or
even unlikely to be true. Thus many of these results should be interpreted not as positive results per se,
but rather as complementing Part I by showing what obstacles one has to face in extending our negative
results. (The main exception to the above is our protocol for bounded-resettable zero-knowledge public-
coin arguments that is proven assuming only standard assumptions.) Part III (Sections 9 and 10) contains
our conclusions and open questions. In particular, it contains discussions of what we consider the main
open question of this area which is the existence of constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proofs
for NP. We present several conjectures which, if resolved, would shed light on this problem.
2. Preliminaries and deﬁnitions
2.1. Basic notations
For a ﬁnite set S ⊆ {0, 1}∗, we write x ←R S to say that x is distributed uniformly over the set S.
We denote by Un the uniform distribution over the set {0, 1}n. A function  : N → [0, 1] is called
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negligible if (n) = n−(1). We let neg(n) denote an arbitrary negligible function (i.e., when we say that
f (n) < neg(n) we mean that there exists a negligible function (n) such that for every n, f (n) < (n)).
Likewise, poly(n) denotes an arbitrary polynomial.
For a probabilistic algorithm A, we write A(x; r) to denote the output of A on input x and coin tosses
r. A(x) is a random variable denoting the output of A for uniformly selected coin tosses. PPT refers
to probabilistic algorithms (i.e. Turing machines) that run in strict polynomial time. A nonuniform PPT
algorithm is a pair (A, z¯), where z¯ = z1, z2, . . . is an inﬁnite series of strings where |zn| = poly(n), andA
is a PPT algorithm that receives pairs of inputs of the form (x, z|x|). (The string zn is the so-called advice
string for A for inputs of length n.)
Whenever we refer to reductions and NP-completeness in this paper, we assume it is with respect to
reductions f that are nonshrinking, i.e. there is a constant ε > 0 such that |f (x)| |x|ε for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
The reason is that the security properties of zero-knowledge proofs are traditionallymeasured as functions
of the input length (rather than a separate security parameter).We say that f is invertible if it is one-to-one
(not necessarily onto) and the inverse is computable in polynomial time.
For a relation R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗, the language associated with R is LR = {x : ∃y(x, y) ∈ R}.
For a value x, we denote Rx = {y : (x, y) ∈ R}. R is poly-balanced if there is a polynomial p such that
(x, y) ∈ R ⇒ |y|p(|x|). R is an NP-relation if it is poly-balanced and decidable in polynomial time.
A relation R is NP-complete if R is an NP-relation and for every NP-relation R′, there exist nonshrinking
polynomial-time computable functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and g : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such
that (x,w) ∈ R′ ⇒ (f (x), g(x,w)) ∈ R (which implies x ∈ LR′ ⇒ f (x) ∈ LR) and x /∈ LR′ ⇒
f (x) /∈ LR . Note that this implies LR is an NP-complete language in the usual sense. (This is essentially
Levin’s notion of NP-completeness [Lev].) We say R is NP-complete via invertible reductions if the
above holds with f and g both being invertible. All the classic NP-complete problems come with natural
relations that are NP-complete via invertible relations.
A relation R is an MA-relation if it is poly-balanced and there is a PPT A such that (x,w) ∈ R ⇒
Pr [A(x,w) = accept] 2/3 and x /∈ LR ⇒ ∀w Pr [A(x,w) = accept] 1/3. Note that this is more
general than requiring that R ∈ BPP, because when x ∈ LR , there may exist some w’s such that 1/3 <
Pr [A(x,w) = accept] < 2/3. MA is the class of languages of the form LR for some MA-relation R.
We note that under reasonable (but strong) complexity assumptions, it is known that MA = NP [IW] (in
fact, under Assumption 3.2 both are equal to the class AM [MV]).
A nondeterministic circuit of input length n is a standard boolean circuit C with n + m input gates,
where for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, we deﬁne C(x) to equal 1 if and only if there exists a y ∈ {0, 1}m such
that C(x; y) = 1. (We require that the partition of C’s input gates into the n standard input gates and
the m nondeterministic gates is explicit in the description of C.) Similarly, a 2-circuit of input length n
is a standard boolean circuit C with n + m + m′ input bits, where for every x ∈ {0, 1}n, C(x) = 1 iff
∃y ∈ {0, 1}m∀z ∈ {0, 1}m′ it holds that C(x; y; z) = 1.
2.2. Interactive proofs and arguments
An interactive protocol (A,B) consists of two algorithms that compute the next-message function
of the (honest) parties in the protocol. Speciﬁcally, A(x, a, 1, . . . , k; r) denotes the next message
k+1 sent by party A when the common input is x, A’s auxiliary input is a, A’s coin tosses are r, and
the messages exchanged so far are 1, . . . , k . There are two special messages, accept and reject,
which immediately halt the interaction. We say that party A (resp. B) is probabilistic polynomial time
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(PPT) if its next-message function can be computed in polynomial time (in |x| + |a| + |1| +
· · · + |k|).
For an interactive protocol (A,B), we write (A(a), B(b))(x) to denote the random process obtained
by having A and B interact on common input x, (private) auxiliary inputs a and b to A and B, respectively
(if any), and independent random coin tosses for A and B. We call (A,B) polynomially bounded if there
is a polynomial p such that for all x, a, b, the total length of all messages exchanged in (A(a), B(b))(x)
is at most p(|x|) with probability 1. Moreover, if B∗ is any interactive algorithm, then A will immediately
halt and reject in (A(a), B∗(b))(x) if the total length of the messages ever exceeds p(|x|), and similarly
for B interacting with any A∗.
The number of rounds in an execution of the protocol is the total number of messages exchanged
between A and B, not including the ﬁnal accept/rejectmessage.We call the protocol (A,B) public coin
if all of the messages sent by B are simply the output of its coin-tosses (independent of the history), and
B’s ﬁnal output (typically accept or reject) is computed as a deterministic function of the transcript.
(Such protocols are also sometimes known as Arthur–Merlin games [BM].)
Deﬁnition 2.1. An interactive protocol (P, V ) is an interactive proof system for a language L if there
is a polynomially balanced relation R such that L = LR , and functions c, s : N → [0, 1] such that
1 − c(n) > s(n) + 1/poly(n) and the following holds:
• (efﬁciency): (P, V ) is polynomially bounded, and V is computable in probabilistic polynomial time.
• (completeness): If x ∈ L and w ∈ Rx , then V accepts in (P (w), V )(x) with probability at least
1 − c(|x|),
• (soundness): If x /∈ L, then for every P ∗, V accepts in (P ∗, V )(x) with probability at most s(|x|).
We call c(·) the completeness error and s(·) the soundness error. We say that (P, V ) has negligible error
if both c and s are negligible. We say that it has perfect completeness if c = 0.
P is an efﬁcient prover if P(w) is computable by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm when
w ∈ Rx . When we wish to specify the relation R, we call (P, V ) an interactive proof with respect to R.
The purpose of the relation R is to have a meaningful notion of efﬁcient provers. If the prover’s
complexity is unbounded, then without loss of generality the prover P(w) can ignore the witness w, and
thus we may as well set R to be R = {(x, ) : x ∈ L}, where  is the empty string (we call this the trivial
relation for L). We note that the class of languages having interactive proofs with efﬁcient provers equals
MA. In cryptographic applications, we are typically interested in interactive proofs for languages in NP
with respect to their natural NP-relation.
Deﬁnition 2.2. An interactive argument system (P, V ) is deﬁned in the same way as an interactive proof
system, with the following modiﬁcation: 6
• The soundness condition is replaced with: For every nonuniform PPT P ∗ and for all sufﬁciently long
x /∈ L, the veriﬁer V accepts in (P ∗, V )(x) with probability at most s(|x|).
We note that if a language L = LR has an efﬁcient-prover argument system wrt relation R, then R
is an MA-relation and thus L ∈ MA. To see this, note that the algorithm A(x,w) which simulates
6 Some deﬁnitions of argument systems require that the honest prover P is an efﬁcient prover, but we choose to decouple the
two requirements and explicitly say “efﬁcient prover” when we need it.
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(P (w), V )(x) and outputs V’s decision constitutes a witness-checking algorithm for R. (The fact that
P(x,w′) is a PPT algorithm together with the computational soundness condition of arguments imply A
rejects with high probability when x /∈ L.)
2.3. Indistinguishability
Recall that the formulation of the “zero-knowledge” property requires that there exists a PPT simulator
whose output distribution is “indistinguishable” from the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction. There are
several choices for the notion of indistinguishable (which yield different variants of zero knowledge),
which we recall below.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (perfect and statistical indistinguishability). Two ensembles of probability distributions
{Ax}x∈I and {Bx}x∈I are statistically indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function  such that
for every x ∈ I , Ax and Bx have statistical difference at most (|x|). That is, there exists a negligible
function  such that for every function D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} and for every x ∈ I ,
|Pr [D(Ax) = 1] − Pr [D(Bx) = 1] |(|x|).
{Ax}x∈I and {Bx}x∈I are perfectly indistinguishable if the above holds with  = 0.
Deﬁnition 2.4 ((nonuniform) computational indistinguishability). Two ensembles of probability distri-
butions {Ax}x∈I and {Bx}x∈I are computationally indistinguishable if for every nonuniform PPT algo-
rithm D, there exists a negligible function  such that for every x ∈ I ,
|Pr [D(Ax) = 1] − Pr [D(Bx) = 1] |(|x|).
Even though the above deﬁnition does not explicitly say so, we note that it implies indistinguishability
even if the distinguisher D depends (arbitrarily) on the index x. That is, for all families of circuits {Dx}x∈I
such that |Dx |poly(|x|), there is a negligible  such that |Pr [Dx(Ax) = 1]−Pr [Dx(Bx) = 1] |(|x|)
for all x ∈ I . (This holds because if a family of circuits {Dx}x∈I can distinguish Ax from Bx with
nonnegligible probability for inﬁnitely many x ∈ I , then we can construct a nonuniform PPT algorithm
D whose advice tape for inputs of length n contains the best distinguishing Dx where |x| = n. It follows
that D will also distinguish Ax from Bx with nonnegligible probability for inﬁnitely many x ∈ I .)
The standard deﬁnitions of zero knowledge in the literature typically work with nonuniform indistin-
guishability as above. Goldreich [Gol1] has given a uniform treatment of zero knowledge. Unfortunately,
the uniform setting requires much more cumbersome deﬁnitions and notation, and so we present uniform
analogues of (some of) our results in Appendix A.
2.4. Zero knowledge
We write 〈A(a), B(b)〉(x) to denote B’s view of the interaction, i.e. a transcript (1, 2, . . . , t ; r),
where the i’s are all the messages exchanged and r is B’s coin tosses.
There are various notions of zero knowledge, referring to how rich a class of veriﬁer strategies are
considered. The weakest is to consider only the veriﬁer that follows the speciﬁed protocol.
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Deﬁnition 2.5 (honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge). An interactive proof system (P, V ) with respect to re-
lation R is (perfect/statistical/computational) honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge if there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator S such that the ensembles {〈P(w), V 〉(x)}(x,w)∈R and {S(x)}(x,w)∈R are (per-
fectly/statistically/computationally) indistinguishable. We will often drop the word “computational” in
reference to computational zero knowledge.
Next we consider all polynomial-time veriﬁer strategies.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (plain zero knowledge). 7 An interactive proof system (P, V ) with respect to relation R is
(perfect/statistical/computational) plain zero knowledge if for every PPT V ∗, there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator S such that the ensembles {〈P(w), V ∗〉(x)}(x,w)∈R and {S(x)}(x,w)∈R are
(perfectly/statistically/computationally) indistinguishable.
We will often drop the word “computational” in reference to computational zero knowledge.
An equivalent formulation of computational zero knowledge is that for every PPT V ∗, there exists a
PPT simulator S such that for all families of circuits {Dx,w}(x,w)∈R such that |Dx,w|poly(|x|), we have∣∣Pr [Dx,w(〈P(w), V ∗〉(x))]− Pr [Dx,w(S(x)) = 1]∣∣ neg(|x|)
for all (x,w) ∈ R. That is, indistinguishability holds for poly-sized circuits that even can have hardwired
into them (a polynomial amount of) nonuniform advice that depends arbitrarily on the input x and witness
w. We stress that this nonuniformity refers only to the distinguishers; the veriﬁer V ∗ and simulator S
are still restricted to uniform PPT algorithms. As discussed in [Gol2, Section 4.3.3], the “right” way to
incorporate nonuniformity in the veriﬁer is through an auxiliary input given to both it and the simulator,
as done below.
Deﬁnition 2.7 (auxiliary-input zero knowledge). 8 An interactive proof system (P, V ) with respect to
relation R is (perfect/statistical/computational) auxiliary-input zero knowledge if for every PPT V ∗ and
polynomial p, there exists a PPT S such that the ensembles
{〈P(w), V ∗(z)〉(x)}(x,w)∈R,z∈{0,1}p(|x|) and {S(x, z)}(x,w)∈R,z∈{0,1}p(|x|) (1)
are (perfectly/statistically/computationally) indistinguishable.
7 In the preliminary version of this paper [BLV], we referred to plain zero knowledge as “uniform zero knowledge.” However,
as argued in [Gol1], that terminology confuses two orthogonal issues—the auxiliary input of the veriﬁer and the possible
nonuniformity of the veriﬁer and distinguisher. In the main body of this paper, we always consider distinguishers that are
nonuniform algorithms. See Appendix A for discussion on the case of uniform indistinguishability.
8 Our formulation of auxiliary-input zero knowledge is slightly different than, but equivalent to, the deﬁnition in the text
[Gol2]. We allow V ∗ to run in polynomial time in the lengths of both its input x and its auxiliary input z, but put a polynomial
bound on the length of the auxiliary input. In [Gol2, Section 4.3.3], V ∗ is restricted to run in time that is polynomial in just the
length of the input x, and no bound is imposed on the length of the auxiliary input z (so V ∗ may only be able to read a preﬁx
of z). The purpose of allowing the auxiliary input to be longer than the running time of z is to provide additional nonuniformity
to the distinguisher (beyond that which the veriﬁer has); we do this directly by allowing the distinguisher to be nonuniform in
Deﬁnition 2.4.
330 B. Barak et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 321–391
The auxiliary input z in the above deﬁnition models a priori information that the veriﬁer may possess
before the interaction begins. Thus auxiliary-input zero knowledge is usually necessary when zero-
knowledge proofs are to be used as a subprotocol in a larger protocol, or even when composing zero-
knowledge proofswith themselves. Indeed, it is known that auxiliary-input zero knowledge is closed under
sequential composition [GO], but plain zero knowledge is not [GK2]. For this reason, auxiliary-input zero
knowledge is the deﬁnition typically used in the literature.
We note that, effectively, the indistinguishability is required even for distinguishers that have additional
a priori information beyond the auxiliary input of the veriﬁer. This is because this information can be
hardwired into the nonuniform distinguisher.
Wealso note that for auxiliary-input zero knowledge, there is a universal veriﬁerV ∗uni(x, z) that interprets
its auxiliary input z as a Boolean circuit Cz and uses Cz as its strategy (i.e. next-message function). If
the zero-knowledge condition holds for V ∗uni, then it holds for all PPT veriﬁer strategies V ∗. However,
we allow the simulator to depend not only on V ∗uni but also on the polynomial bound p(n) on the size of
circuit given to it as auxiliary input. Allowing this dependence makes our lower bounds stronger.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (black-box zero knowledge). We say that (P, V ) is (perfect/statistical/computational)
black-box zero knowledge if there exists a single oracle PPT Sbb, that works for every V ∗, such that
S(x, z) can be replaced in (1) by SV ∗(x,z,·;·)bb (x) (where V ∗(x, z, ·; ·) denotes the next message function of
V ∗ with a ﬁxed input x and auxiliary input z). That is, for every PPT V ∗ and polynomial p, the ensembles
{〈P(w), V ∗(z)〉(x)}(x,w)∈R,z∈{0,1}p(|x|) and {SV
∗(z,x,·;·)
bb (x)}(x,w)∈R,z∈{0,1}p(|x|)
are (perfectly/statistically/computationally) indistinguishable.
All known zero-knowledge protocols (based on standard assumptions) prior to the paper [Bar] were
black-box zero knowledge. However, in this paper, because our focus is obtaining lower bounds, we will
mainly be interested in general (i.e., not necessarily black box) zero knowledge.
In all the forms of zero knowledge above, we may assume without loss of generality that the simulator
for a veriﬁer V ∗ always outputs consistent transcripts, namely transcripts (1, 2, . . . , t ; r) such that
each V ∗-message i is computed correctly, in the sense that i = V ∗(x, 1, . . . , i−1; r). The reason
is that inconsistent transcripts can easily be distinguished from the real interaction, so instead of out-
putting an inconsistent transcript the simulator may as well output some trivial consistent transcript (e.g.
where all the prover messages are the empty string, and the veriﬁer messages are computed according
to V ∗).
Zero knowledge and NP-completeness: As argued in [GMW], a zero-knowledge proof for an NP-
complete language L implies zero-knowledge proofs for all languages L′ ∈ NP: both parties apply
the reduction from L′ to L and execute the zero-knowledge proof for L. This transformation clearly
preserves most complexity parameters (constant round complexity, negligible error, etc.). 9 Plain zero
knowledge is preserved if L isNP-complete with respect to invertible reductions as deﬁned in Section 2.1
9 Recall that we restrict to nonshrinking reductions.
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(cf. [GMW]). Invertibility is easily achieved in the reductions to most natural NP-complete languages,
such as HAMILTONICITY , SATISFIABILITY , and THREE-COLORING . However, invertibility is not needed
for auxiliary-input zero knowledge. We note that, if the zero-knowledge proof for L is with respect to
an NP-complete relation R (such that LR = L), then the reduction of [GMW] yields a zero-knowledge
proof for L′ = LR′ with respect to R′ for any NP-relation R′. Furthermore, if the zero-knowledge proof
for L has an efﬁcient prover with respect to R, then the zero-knowledge proof forL′ has an efﬁcient prover
with respect to R′.
Expected polynomial-time simulators: For simplicity, in this paperwe restrict our attention to simulators
that run in strict polynomial time. However, all of our negative results hold for expected polynomial-
time simulators, and in fact even for weak zero knowledge, where the order of quantiﬁers between the
simulator and distinguishing probability is swapped: for every polynomial p, there exists a strict poly-
time simulator S such that the simulator’s output cannot be distinguished from veriﬁer’s view except with
advantage 1/p(n) for sufﬁciently large n.
Part I
Negative results (lower bounds)
In this partwe present several impossibility results for non-black-box zero knowledge. For someof these
results we have matching (or almost matching) positive results, showing either limitations on extending
the negative results, or the necessity of the computational assumptions that we use. These positive results
are presented in Part II.
3. Two-round zero knowledge
As mentioned in the introduction, Goldreich and Oren [GO] gave the ﬁrst impossibility result for
2-round zero knowledge:
Theorem 3.1 (Goldreich and Oren [GO]). If a language L has a 2-round proof or argument system that
is nonuniform auxiliary-input zero-knowledge, then L ∈ BPP.
In this section, we present results that replace “auxiliary-input zero knowledge” with the weaker re-
quirement of “plain zero knowledge,” at the expense of relying on complexity assumptions and restricting
to proof systems. Both of these costs are addressed in Part II of the paper (speciﬁcally, Section 6).
3.1. Triviality of 2-round public-coin ZK proofs
Our ﬁrst result, for public-coin proof systems, is based on the following assumption:
Assumption 3.2. E = DTIME(2O(n)) has a function of nondeterministic circuit complexity 2(n). That
is, there exists a language L and constants c,  > 0 such that L is decidable in time 2cn, and yet for every
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nondeterministic circuit family {Cn}n∈N that decides L, the size of Cn is at least 2n for all sufﬁciently
large n.
Assumption 3.2 can be seen as a natural strengthening of the assumption thatEXPNP (by considering
nondeterministic algorithms that can use not only polynomial but even subexponential time and advice).
It has been used previously by works in the ﬁeld of derandomization [AK,KvM,MV,SU], who showed
that it implies that AM = NP. The following lemma states that Assumption 3.2 implies the existence of
pseudorandom generators that fool even nondeterministic distinguishers.
Lemma 3.3 (Shaltiel and Umans [SU]). Under Assumption 3.2, there exists a function G = ⋃n Gn :
{0, 1}(n) → {0, 1}n such that for every n, Gn maps inputs of length (n) = O(log n) to length n in time
poly(n), and for all nondeterministic circuits D of size n,
|Pr [D(Gn(U(n)))) = 1]− Pr [D(Un) = 1] |1/n.
Note that the distinguishers above have less running time than the generator; without this, it would
not be possible to fool nondeterministic distinguishers (as they could identify outputs of the generator
by guessing the seed and evaluating the generator). The pseudorandom generator in Lemma 3.3 implies
AM = NP (and also BPP = P). We can now state our ﬁrst theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumption 3.2, if a language L has a 2-round public-coin proof system that is plain
zero knowledge and has an efﬁcient prover (or alternatively, has perfect completeness), then L ∈ P.
Proof. The idea behind the proof is to use the pseudorandom generator from Lemma 3.3 to derandomize
the veriﬁer in the 2-round proof system and obtain a veriﬁer that uses only a logarithmic number of random
bits.We then claim that a simulator for such a veriﬁer must succeed for all choices of the veriﬁer’s random
tape (because there are only polynomially many such choices). We then show that using such a simulator
one can decide the language.
Let (P, V ) be a 2-round public-coin zero-knowledge proof system for language L with an efﬁcient
prover (wrt relation R). For simplicity, we assume that the completeness and soundness errors are at most
1/3, but the proof can be extended to any error bounds (such that 1− c(n) > s(n)+ 1/poly(n)). For any
input x of length n, witness w, and ﬁxed coin tosses r for the prover, the prover’s response to a veriﬁer
message  can be computed by a circuit Px,w,r () of polynomial size (notice that we use the assumption
that P is an efﬁcient prover here). In addition, there is a nondeterministic circuit Cx() of polynomial size
that decides whether there exists a prover message  such that V (x, , ) accepts. Let t (n) = poly(n) be
an upper bound on the sizes of these two circuits. Note that the generator Gt(n) given by Lemma 3.3 has
seed length  = O(log t (n)) = O(log n). Consider the following cheating veriﬁer strategy, on an input
x of length n.
Veriﬁer V∗(x):
1. Choose a seed s ← {0, 1} and send  = Gt(n)(s) (truncated to the appropriate length) to P.
2. Receive response  from P.
3. Accept iff V (x, , ) = accept.
By the pseudorandomness property of G, (P, V ∗) is still a complete and sound proof system for L
(albeit with nonnegligible error). Speciﬁcally, completeness uses the fact that the prover response to  is
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computed by the circuit Px,w,r of size at most t (n) (or the fact that (P, V ) has perfect completeness),
and soundness uses the fact that the existence of an accepting prover response is computed by the
nondeterministic circuits Cx of size at most t (n).
By the zero-knowledge property of P, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such
that for every (x,w) ∈ R, {S(x)} and {〈P(w), V ∗〉(x)} are computationally indistinguishable. We use S
to construct an RP algorithm for L as follows.
M(x): Run S(x) many times to obtain transcripts (Gt(n)(s1), 1; s1), (Gt(n)(s2), 2; s2), . . . , (Gt(n)(sq),
q; sq), where q = n · 2. Accept if {s1, . . . , sq} = {0, 1} and, for the majority of s ∈ {0, 1}, there
exists an i such that si = s and V ∗(x,Gt(n)(si), i; si) accepts.
Suppose x ∈ L. Then q independent samples of S(x) are computationally indistinguishable from q
independent samples of 〈P(w), V ∗〉(x) (because the indistinguishability holdswith respect to nonuniform
distinguishers). Thus, if we replace the samples of S(x) with samples of 〈P(w), V ∗〉(x), the probability
that M(x) accepts only changes negligibly. When we sample (Gt(n)(si), i; si) from 〈P, V ∗〉(x), then si
is distributed uniformly in {0, 1} and V ∗ accepts i with high probability. Thus, if we sample q = n · 2
such transcripts, then with probability at least 1 − 2 · (1 − 2−)q = 1 − 2−(n), the si’s will cover all of
{0, 1} and the majority of the transcripts will be accepting.
Suppose x /∈ L. Then, by the soundness of V ∗, for the majority of s ∈ {0, 1}, there does not exist an
accepting response  to Gt(n)(s). Thus, M(x) never accepts.
We conclude that L ∈ RP. Recalling that the hypothesis also implies RP = P [IW], we have
L ∈ P. 
Remark.
1. The efﬁcient prover condition can be relaxed to saying that for every input x ∈ L and every ﬁxing of the
prover’s coin tosses r, there is a nondeterministic polynomial-sized circuit Cx,r such that Cx,r() = 1
iff P(x, ; r) makes the veriﬁer accept. Under stronger complexity assumptions (like Assumption
3.5 below), we can allow Cx,r to be even more powerful, e.g. corresponding to a higher level of the
polynomial-time hierarchy.
2. The only placewemake use of the fact that computational indistinguishability is deﬁnedwith respect to
nonuniform distinguishers (see Deﬁnition 2.4) is to argue that q samples of S(x) are indistinguishable
from q samples of 〈P(w), V ∗〉(x). Thus the result can be extended to formulations of zero knowledge
with respect to uniformdistinguishers inwhichmultiple-sample indistinguishability is ensured. Indeed,
in Appendix A, we present an analogue of the above result for one formulation of “uniform zero
knowledge” (essentially that of [Gol1]).
3. We say that a proof/argument system has a publicly veriﬁable transcript if the veriﬁer’s choice to
accept is made by computing an efﬁcient predicate to the execution’s transcript. Most known proof
systems possess this property and it is useful for some applications (e.g., [BL]). It can be shown that
for 2-round proof systems with a publicly veriﬁably transcript, the veriﬁer has nothing to gain by not
sending its random tape as its ﬁrst message. Thus our lower bound holds also for such systems.
4. Assumption 3.2 is not commonly used in cryptography. However, in Section 6.2, we show that some
sort of lower bound on nondeterministic algorithms is necessary for this result.
5. Unlike the Goldreich–Oren theorem (Theorem 3.1), this result (and the private-coin one below) only
apply to proof systems. In Section 6.3, we show that if a (variant of) the “Noninteractive CS Proofs”
conjecture of Micali [Mic] is true, then there do exist 2-round, public-coin plain zero-knowledge
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arguments for NP. Thus, our result cannot be extended to argument systems without refuting Micali’s
conjecture.
6. In a concurrent work, the same derandomization technique was used to obtain a positive result, namely
the ﬁrst construction of 1-round witness-indistinguishable proofs for all of NP [BOV].
3.2. Limitations of 2-round private-coin ZK proofs
For private-coin proof systems, we require a natural strengthening of Assumption 3.2, namely the
existence of a function that is hard for circuits with two quantiﬁers (i.e., 2-circuits).
Assumption 3.5. E = DTIME(2O(n)) has a function of 2-circuit complexity 2(n).
Since the proof of Lemma 3.3 relativizes (cf. [KvM]), Assumption 3.5 implies the existence of pseu-
dorandom generators that fool 2-circuits.
Lemma 3.6. Under Assumption 3.5, there exists a function G = ⋃n Gn : {0, 1}(n) → {0, 1}n such that
for every n, Gn maps inputs of length (n) = O(log n) to length n in time poly(n), and for all 2-circuits
D of size n,
|Pr [D(Gn(U(n))) = 1]− Pr [D(Un) = 1] |1/n.
Under this assumption, we obtain the following negative result about 2-round zero-knowledge proofs.
Theorem 3.7. Under Assumption 3.5, if L is a language with a 2-round (possibly private-coin) proof
system with perfect completeness that is plain zero knowledge, then L ∈ coNP.
Note that, unlike Theorem 3.4, we only conclude L ∈ coNP rather than L ∈ P. Still, this provides
evidence thatNP-complete languages do not have such proof systems. Moreover, in Section 6.1, we show
that under the (nonstandard) “Knowledge-of-ExponentAssumption” suggested byDamgård [Dam], there
does exist a promise problem outside ofBPP (but in coNP) with a 2-round zero-knowledge proof system.
Thus, extending our impossibility result to all nontrivial problems would require disproving the KEA
Assumption.
Also unlike Theorem 3.4, here we require perfect completeness and do not have an analogous result
for efﬁcient provers, nor do we have a uniform analogue of this result in the appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let (P, V ) be the 2-round zero-knowledge proof system for L with perfect
completeness and soundness s(n)1 − 1/poly(n). Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.4, we use a
pseudorandom generator Gt(n) from Lemma 3.6 for a sufﬁciently large polynomial t (n) to obtain the
following cheating veriﬁer strategy V ∗ that uses only  = O(log t (n)) = O(log n) random bits:
Veriﬁer V∗(x):
1. Choose a seed s ← {0, 1}, and send  = V (x;Gt(n)(s)) to P.
2. Receive response .
3. Output the view (, ; s).
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Public input: x
x
↓
M A
Step M1: Choose s ←R {0, 1}. Set  = V ∗(x; s). Choose r ←R Con. s, , r−−−−−−→
Step A1: Run S(x) for n · 2 times and consider the ﬁrst transcript of the
form (, ; s) for some . If no such transcript is obtained, halt and accept.
Otherwise, accept as speciﬁed below.
Accept if  = V ∗(x; s), V (x; r) = , and V (x, , ; r) = reject.
Protocol 3.8. MA proof system for L
However, unlike the proof of Theorem 3.4, we can no longer argue that V ∗ is still a sound veriﬁer if we
use the original acceptance predicate ofVwith coin tossesGt(n)(s). (Intuitively, it may be the case that all
seeds s yield distinct messages , in which case the “private coin” aspect of the proof system is lost. More
technically, the argument used in proving Theorem 3.4 fails because in the case of non public-coin proofs,
the problem of deciding whether or not there exists a convincing prover responsemay not be inNP.) Thus,
we instead consider the acceptance predicate with respect to a random sequence ofV’s coin tosses that are
consistent with . That is, for a veriﬁer message  and prover message , deﬁne Con = {r : V (x; r) = }
to be the set of coin tosses consistent with , and Rej, = {r ∈ Con : V (x, ; r) = reject} to be those
that reject .
If x ∈ L, then by perfect completeness, if we set  = P(x, ), then Rej, = ∅ with probability 1 (over
P’s coin tosses). If x /∈ L, then there is a polynomial p(n) such that with probability at least 1/p(n) over
 ←R V (x), we have
|Rej,|
|Con| 
1
p(n)
(2)
for all prover responses . (Otherwise, the soundness error would be 1− neg(n).) We now claim that this
must also hold, with p(n) replaced by p′(n) = 2p(n), for  ←R V ∗(x). This follows from the pseudoran-
domness ofGt(n) and the fact that approximate counting can be done in the polynomial hierarchy [Sip,Sto].
More precisely, there is a BPPNP algorithm T (, ) that accepts w.h.p. if |Rej,|/|Con|1/p(n) and
rejects w.h.p. if |Rej,|/|Con|1/2p(n). Using nonuniformity to eliminate the randomness, and incor-
porating the ∀ quantiﬁer, we end up with a polynomial-sized 2-circuit that essentially tests Inequality
(2). This circuit is fooled by Gt(n) when t (n) is a sufﬁciently large polynomial.
By the zero-knowledge property of P, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such
that for every x ∈ L, S(x) and 〈P, V ∗〉(x) are computationally indistinguishable. We use S to construct
an MA proof system (M,A) for L as shown in Protocol 3.8.
We now analyze Protocol 3.8, beginning with completeness. Suppose x /∈ L and that M follows the
speciﬁed strategy. We will show that A accepts with probability at least 1/poly(n). We know that with
probability at least 1/p(n) over s, Inequality (2) holds for all possible prover responses . In particular,
it holds for the prover response  computed in Step A1. Thus, the probability that r ∈ Rej, is at least
336 B. Barak et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 321–391
1/p(n). (Note that  and r are computed from  independently of each other.) Hence, with probability at
least 1/p(n)2, we have V (x, , ; r) = reject and A accepts.
For soundness, suppose that x ∈ L and ﬁx any s,  = V ∗(x; s), and r ∈ Con. We will show that A
accepts with negligible probability (over the executions of the simulator in Step A1). First we note that
transcripts of the form (, ; s) occur with probability 1/21/poly(n) in 〈P, V ∗〉(x), and thus must
occur in the simulator’s output with probability at least 1/2 − neg(n). So, with n · 2 tries, A will obtain
such a transcript with probability at least 1− 2−(n). By perfect completeness, for every  and r ∈ Con,
V (x, , ; r) = reject with probability 0 over  ←R P(x, ). Since this condition can be tested by
a circuit Cx,r(, ) of polynomial size, the simulator must produce rejecting ’s with only negligible
probability. Thus A accepts with negligible probability.
We conclude that L ∈ AM. Recalling that the hypothesis also implies AM = NP, we have
L ∈ NP. 
4. Resettable zero knowledge
In this section, we consider the notion of resettable zero knowledge, as recently introduced by Canetti
et al. [CGGM]. Here one allows a (cheating) veriﬁer V ∗ to “reset” the prover so that it uses the same
random tape inmultiple executions. This is a strengthening of the adversarial capability of the veriﬁer, and
the requirement is that even such a veriﬁer’s view can be simulated efﬁciently. (For a formal deﬁnition,
see [CGGM].) As usual, the basic deﬁnition of plain resettable zero knowledge can be strengthened
to auxiliary-input resettable zero knowledge and black-box resettable zero knowledge. Resettable zero
knowledge is a strong requirement, and is even stronger than concurrent zero knowledge.
Under standard cryptographic assumptions, it is known how to construct (black-box) resettable zero-
knowledge proofs forNPwith O˜(log n) rounds [RK,CGGM,KP,PRS]. There is an almostmatching lower
bound, showing that ˜(log n) rounds are necessary for black-box resettable zero-knowledge proofs or
arguments [CKPR]. In this section, we obtain lower bounds that apply even to non-black-box simulation,
and show that a nonconstant number of rounds is necessary for public-coin resettable zero-knowledge
proof systems.
The central ingredient of our proof is the following lemma
Lemma 4.1. For any constant c and polynomial r(n)2, if a language L has a c · r(n)-round public-
coin resettable zero-knowledge proof system (P, V ), then L has an r(n)-round public-coin resettable
zero-knowledge proof system (P ′, V ′).
The form of resettable zero knowledge (perfect, statistical, or computational; plain, auxiliary-input,
or black-box) is preserved. Moreover, if P is an efﬁcient prover, then so is P ′. In addition, there is a
polynomial p (depending only on the constant c) such that if the total length of messages sent by P is at
most (n) and (P, V ) is zero knowledge against veriﬁers that make at most p((n)) resets, then (P ′, V ′)
is zero knowledge (for a single execution, with no resets).
Proof. The main idea behind the proof is that the Babai–Moran [BM] speedup theorem for public-coin
proof systems actually preserves resettable zero knowledge.We focus on the special case of converting 3-
round public-coin proof system to a 2-round proof system, as this already conveys the main idea.Without
loss of generality, we assume that the initial 3-round protocol is of the form in Protocol 4.2.
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Public input: x
We denote the lengths of the P ’s messages by  = poly(n), V ’s messages by
m = poly(n), and P ’s coin tosses by s.
x
↓
P V
Step P1: Choose coin tosses R ←R {0, 1}s . Compute  = P(x;R) ∈
{0, 1} −−−→
Step V2:  ←R {0, 1}m ←−−−
Step P3: Compute  = P(x, ;R) ∈ {0, 1} −−−→
The veriﬁer accepts according to V (x, , , ).
Protocol 4.2. A 3-round public-coin proof system
Public input: x
We set t = O().
x
↓
P ′ V ′
Step V′1: 1, . . . , t ← {0, 1}m 1, . . . , t←−−−−−−−−−−
Step P′1: Choose coin tosses R ← {0, 1}s , Compute  = P(x;R), 1 =
P(x, , 1;R), . . . , t = P(x, , t ;R)
, 1, . . . , t−−−−−−−−−−−→
V ′ accepts according to the majority of V (x, , 1, 1), . . . , V (x, , t , t ).
Protocol 4.3. Transformed 2-round public-coin proof system
We can convert it to a 2-round proof system via the transformation of [BM], obtaining Protocol 4.3. It
is shown in [BM] that this transformation from Protocol 4.2 to Protocol 4.3 preserves completeness and
soundness. The preservation of prover efﬁciency is clear by inspection. We argue that it also preserves
resettable zero knowledge. The reason is that any interaction with prover P ′ can be simulated by a reset
attack on prover P. This can be seen by inspecting the deﬁnition of prover P ′: Any query to P ′ on coin
tosses R can be simulated by t = O() queries to P on coin tosses R.
To reduce the number of rounds in a protocol with more than three rounds involves repeated application
of this idea. For a constant-round protocol, the above transformation can be repeatedly applied to the last
3 rounds, each time reducing the number of rounds by 1. For a nonconstant number of rounds, a more
efﬁcient version of this idea is employed. The above transformation is applied simultaneously to disjoint
3-round segments of the protocol, thereby reducing the number of rounds by a constant factor. In order
to avoid the multiplicative factor of t in the complexity from accumulating with each segment, after each
transformed segment ((1, . . . , t ), (, 1, . . . , t )), the veriﬁer (in its next message) chooses a random
i ← {1, . . . , t} and the protocol continues based on history (, i , i).A more detailed description can be
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found in [BM,GVW] (the latter speciﬁcally analyzing the complexity of the transformation in terms of the
length of the prover’s messages). The many-round transformation preserves resettable zero knowledge
for essentially the same reason as given above for the basic three-to-two round transformation. 
Combining this lemma with the impossibility of 2-round zero knowledge (Theorems 3.1 and 3.4), we
obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.4. 1. If a language L has a constant-round public-coin proof system that is auxiliary-input
resettable zero knowledge, then L ∈ BPP.
2. Under Assumption 3.2, if a language L has a constant-round public-coin proof system that is plain
resettable zero knowledge and has an efﬁcient prover (alternatively, perfect completeness), then L ∈ P.
In both cases, the resettable zero-knowledge requirement can be weakened to zero knowledge against
veriﬁers that may reset the prover at most (n)c times, where (n) is the total length of the prover’s
messages and c can be any constant. We call a protocol that satisﬁes this property a bounded-resettable
zero-knowledge protocol. 10
We remark that the proof of Lemma 4.1 directly extends to private-coin proof systems in which the
veriﬁer’s messages are computed in a history-independent manner, using independent coin tosses for each
round. (The acceptance predicate can, however, depend on all the coin tosses.) Indeed, the Babai–Moran
Speedup Theorem [BM] extends to such proof systems. Thus, combined with Theorems 3.1 and 3.7,
we obtain lower bounds on the round complexity such proof systems need to achieve resettable zero
knowledge.
However, Theorem 4.4 does not extend to arguments. That is, under standard assumptions, we construct
a constant-round public-coin argument system that is bounded-resettable zero knowledge. Since previous
such systems used both private coins and a nonconstant number of rounds, this construction, which is
described in Section 7, is interesting in its own right.
Following Remark 2 after the proof of Theorem 3.4, the proof of Theorem 4.4 does not make use of any
nonuniformity in the distinguisher (other than the input x); here even the multiple-sample indistinguisha-
bility needed follows from the resettable zero-knowledge property. Thus, the result extends to uniform
distinguishers, and indeed we present a uniform version of it in Appendix A.
5. Strong proofs of knowledge
In this section, we present lower bounds for achieving strong proofs and arguments of knowledge, as
deﬁned by Goldreich [Gol2, Section 4.7.6]. We remark that this section is structured so that later proofs
rely on ideas from earlier proofs.
10 Note that this is a somewhat stronger requirement than requiring zero knowledge against nc many resets (for any ﬁxed
constant c). This is because under our deﬁnition the number of resets may be larger than the prover’s communication complexity.
Both our lower bound (Theorem 4.4) and our upper bound (Theorem 7.1) use this stronger deﬁnition of bounded-resettable zero
knowledge . This weakens the lower bound and strengthens the upper bound.
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5.1. Deﬁnitions
Before presenting the deﬁnition of strong proofs and arguments of knowledge [Gol2, Section 4.7.6],
we informally recall the standard notion of proofs of knowledge. A proof of knowledge is an interactive
proof which convinces a veriﬁer that the prover “knows” a witness to a certain statement. This is in
contrast to a regular interactive proof, where the veriﬁer is just convinced of the validity of the statement.
The concept of “knowledge” for machines is formalized by saying that if a prover can convince the
veriﬁer, then there exists an efﬁcient procedure that can “extract” a witness from this prover (thus the
prover knows a witness because it could run the extraction procedure on itself). More formally, a proof of
knowledge has the property that for everymachineP ∗ there exists a knowledge extractorK, who “extracts”
witnesses from the prover P ∗. The requirements on this K come in two ﬂavors, that are equivalent for
NP-relations:
1. K runs in expected polynomial time and obtains a witness to the statement x with probability that
is negligibly close to the probability that P ∗ convinces V. More exactly, let p(x, y, r) denote the
probability that P ∗ convincesV upon common input x, and when P ∗ has auxiliary input y and random
tape r. Then, K obtains a witness with probability that is negligibly close to p(x, y, r). We stress that
here, K runs in expected time that is independent of p(x, y, r).
2. K runs in expected time that is inversely proportional to p(x, y, r), but must always output a witness
for x.
Informally speaking, a strong proof (or argument) of knowledge [Gol2] enjoys the best of both worlds
with respect to the above two deﬁnitions of proofs of knowledge. That is, on the one hand, K runs
in time that is independent of p(x, y, r), like in the ﬁrst deﬁnition. On the other hand, K always (or
almost always), obtains a witness for x, like in the second deﬁnition. More speciﬁcally, if the probability
p(x, y, r) that P ∗ convinces V is greater than some negligible function s(|x|), then K (running in time
independent of P ∗’s actual success probability) obtains a witness for x with high probability; the function
s is called K’s (soundness) error function. The important point is that neither K’s running time nor its
success probability are dependent on p(x, y, r). For more discussion on strong proofs of knowledge, see
[Gol2, Section 4.7.6].
We are now ready to present the formal deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5.1 (strong proofs of knowledge). An interactive protocol (P, V ) is a system of strong proofs
of knowledge for a (poly-balanced) relation R if there exist functions c, s, ε : N → [0, 1] such that
1 − c(n) > s(n) + 1/poly(n) and ε(n)1 − 1/poly(n), and such that the following holds:
• (efﬁciency): (P, V ) is polynomially bounded, and V is computable in probabilistic polynomial time.
• (nontriviality/completeness): If (x,w) ∈ R, then V accepts in (P (w), V )(x) with probability at least
1 − c(|x|),
• (strong validity/soundness): There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine K such that
for every interactive function P ∗ and every x, y, r ∈ {0, 1}∗, machine K satisﬁes the following
condition:
p(x, y, r)
def= Pr [[V accepts in (P ∗(y; r), V )(x))] > s(|x|)
⇒ Pr
[
KP
∗(x,y,·;r)
(x) = w s.t. (x,w) ∈ R
]
1 − ε(|x|).
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That is, if on input x, auxiliary input y, and coin tosses r, P ∗ makes V accept with probability greater
than s(n), then K will output a witness with probability at least 1 − ε(n), given oracle access to the
next-message function of P ∗ (with x, y, and r hardwired in). K is called a strong knowledge extractor.
We call c(·) the completeness error, s(·) the soundness error, and ε(·) the extraction error. We say that
(P, V ) has negligible error if c, s, and ε are negligible. We say that it has perfect completeness if c = 0.
P is an efﬁcient prover if P(w) is computable by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm when
w ∈ Rx .
Occasionally, we will consider a relaxation where the nontriviality/completeness condition is only
required to hold for (x,w) ∈ R0, where R0 ⊆ R is a relation such that LR0 = LR . We call this a strong
proof of knowledge for R with respect to R0.
If (P, V ) is a system of strong proofs of knowledge for relation R according to Deﬁnition 5.1, then
it is also an interactive proof system for LR (with the same completeness and soundness errors). This
is because if P ∗ convinces V with probability greater than s, then K must obtain a valid witness with
nonzero probability. However, when x ∈ L, there are no valid witnesses that can be obtained. Therefore,
in such a case, V can be convinced with probability at most s.
We are primarily interested in strong proofs of knowledge with negligible error. Such proofs guarantee
that if P ∗ convinces with nonnegligible probability, then K extracts with overwhelming probability. This
is the key property of strong proofs of knowledge which make them both interesting and useful, but is
also the source of the lower bound on round complexity that we will prove below.
Thedeﬁnition above is slightlymore general than the one in [Gol2],which requires perfect completeness
and negligible soundness and extraction errors. For NP-relations R, a strong proof of knowledge with
even 1 − 1/poly(n) extraction error is also a strong proof of knowledge with negligible extraction error
(by running the extractor poly(n) times, and outputting the ﬁrst valid witness it outputs).
We now brieﬂy discuss the relaxation mentioned at the end (of strong proofs of knowledge for R with
respect to R0). We note that such a relaxation still guarantees that if a prover makes the veriﬁer to accept
with noticeable probability, then the veriﬁer should be “convinced” that the prover “knows” an R-witness
that x ∈ L. However, not all R-witnesses will necessarily enable the prover to convince the veriﬁer,
but rather only those that are R0-witnesses. We also note that a strong proof of knowledge for R with
respect to R0 is only an interactive proof for LR = LR0 with respect to R0 (rather than R), and thus any
zero-knowledge condition only applies when the prover uses an R0-witness. All of our lower bounds will
also hold for this relaxed deﬁnition; indeed, they will only require that for every x ∈ LR , there exists at
least one w such that P(w) makes V accept with high probability. However, for simplicity, we will state
our results in terms of the stronger (and more standard) deﬁnition above.
Feasibility of (1-round) strong proofs of knowledge with no secrecy: We note that if there is no secrecy
requirement (like, for example, zero knowledge), then constant-round strong proofs of knowledge for
NP can be easily constructed by having the prover just send an NP-witness w to the veriﬁer V. The
veriﬁer V then outputs 1 if and only if (x,w) ∈ R. The reason that this constitutes a strong proof of
knowledge follows from the fact that the protocol is deterministic and noninteractive. Thus, a prover
P ∗(x, y; r) either always convincesV or never convincesV. Therefore, if p(x, y, r) > s(|x|), this means
that P ∗(x, y; r) always sends a valid witness and the extractor K can just output this witness.
Feasibility of nonconstant-round zero-knowledge strong proofs of knowledge: If one-way functions
exist, then there exist f (n)-round zero-knowledge strong proofs of knowledge with negligible error for
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any growing function f (n) = (1). This is achieved by a slight modiﬁcation of the protocol in [Gol2,
Section 4.7.6], speciﬁcally taking (f (n)) sequential repetitions of a log n-fold parallel repetition of
Blum’s basic HAMILTONICITY protocol [Blu2]. In this section, we will give evidence that this is optimal.
Variants of Deﬁnition 5.1. Deﬁnition 5.1 is (a slight generalization of) the deﬁnition as presented in
[Gol2, Section 4.7.6]. However, we will also consider a number of variants. Speciﬁcally, we will consider
the case that K may run in expected, rather than strict, polynomial time. We will also consider arguments,
where the strong validity requirement will only need to hold for polynomial-time provers P ∗. In such
a case, the extractor is not limited to black-box access to P ∗, but rather can depend on the speciﬁc
cheating prover. This is a natural relaxation of the notion of proofs of knowledge. (In fact, the only reason
to consider black-box access in the ﬁrst place, seems to be so that efﬁcient extraction from inefﬁcient
provers can also be considered.) Finally, we will consider a strengthening of strong proofs of knowledge,
which relates to how the “success probability” of P ∗ is computed. Speciﬁcally, Deﬁnition 5.1 requires
extraction when the deterministic prover P ∗(x, y; r) successfully convinces V with probability greater
than s(|x|). Another possibility, however, is to require extraction when the probabilistic prover P ∗(x, y)
successfully convinces V with probability greater than s(|x|). It turns out that this makes a very big
difference.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (variants of strong proofs of knowledge). 1. Expected instead of strict polynomial time:
Rather than restricting K to strict polynomial time, it is allowed to run in expected polynomial time (we
stress that this running time is still independent of p(x, y, r)).
2. Arguments instead of proofs and non-black-box instead of black-box extraction: We modify the
strong validity/soundness requirement as follows. For every PPT P ∗ and every polynomial q(n), there
exists a PPT K such that for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}∗, all auxiliary inputs y ∈ {0, 1}q(n), and all random tapes
r ∈ {0, 1}q(n), we have
p(x, y, r)
def= Pr [V accepts in (P ∗(y; r), V )(x)] > s(|x|)
⇒ Pr [K(x, y) = w s.t. (x,w) ∈ R] 1 − ε(|x|).
If K fulﬁlls this modiﬁed condition, then we call it a strong non-black-box knowledge extractor, and we
call the protocol a system of strong arguments of knowledge. 11
3. Fixed versus variable randomness for P ∗: Denote by p(x, y) the probability that V accepts on input
x, when interacting with the prover speciﬁed by P ∗(x, y). We stress that this probability is also over the
coins r that are used by P ∗. Then, require that if p(x, y) > s(|x|), machine K must output a witness w
such that (x,w) ∈ R with probability at least 1 − ε(|x|). That is,
p(x, y)
def= Pr [V accepts in (P ∗(y), V )(x)] > s(|x|)
⇒ Pr
[
KP
∗(x,y,·;·)
(x) = w s.t. (x,w) ∈ R
]
1 − ε(|x|).
We stress that in this case,K is allowed to set the random coins forP ∗(x, y) to be any value it wishes (even
if it has only black-box access). Thus, K asks queries of the form (1, 2, . . . ; r), which are answered
according to P ∗(x, y, 1, 2, . . . ; r).
11 It is possible to also consider arguments with black-box extractors and proofs with non-black-box extractors. However, this
combination seems to be the most reasonable.
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If K fulﬁlls this modiﬁed strong validity condition, then we call it an extra-strong knowledge extractor.
Furthermore, we call (P, V ) a system of extra-strong proofs of knowledge.
Analogous to auxiliary-input zero knowledge, for strong arguments of knowledge there is a universal
prover P ∗uni(x, z) that interprets its auxiliary input z as a circuit Cz and uses Cz as its next message
function. If the knowledge extraction condition holds for P ∗uni, then it holds for all PPT prover strategies
P ∗. Note, however, that the extractor K may depend on the polynomial bound q(n) on the size of the
circuit given as auxiliary input to P ∗uni, so this does not imply a “universal” extractor in the usual sense;
this dependence makes our lower bound stronger.
Strict versus expected polynomial time: We show that, unlike for zero-knowledge simulators and stan-
dard proof of knowledge extractors, strict polynomial-time strong and extra-strong extractors can be
constructed from expected polynomial-time strong and extra-strong extractors. That is, allowing the
more liberal notion of expected polynomial time does not add any power. This means that in our lower
bounds, it sufﬁces to rule out the existence of strong and extra-strong proofs and arguments of knowledge
with strict polynomial-time extractors, respectively.
Proposition 5.3. Let (P, V ) be a system of strong proofs of knowledge for a relation R with an expected
polynomial-time strong knowledge extractor having extraction error ε. Then, (P, V ) is a system of strong
proofs of knowledge for R with a strict polynomial-time strong knowledge extractor having extraction
error ε′ = O(ε). In particular if ε is negligible, so is ε′. The same holds for extra-strong proofs of
knowledge, and for strong and extra-strong arguments of knowledge.
Proof. We prove the proposition for strong proofs of knowledge; the other cases are proved in exactly
the same way. Let (P, V ) be a system of strong proofs of knowledge, and let K be a strong knowledge
extractor for (P, V ) that runs in expected-time q(n) and has soundness error s(·) and extraction error ε(·).
We begin by constructing a strict polynomial-time machine K ′ who runs in time 2q(n) and, when
p(x, y, r) > s(|x|), extracts with probability at most 1/2 − ε(|x|). The machine K ′ simply invokes K
and if K exceeds 2q(n) steps, then it outputs time-out. By Markov’s inequality, K outputs time-out with
probability at most 1/2. Furthermore, conditioned on this not happening, the probability that K does not
obtain a valid witness at most doubles. Thus, by the strong validity property, when p(x, y, r) > s(|x|),
machineK ′ obtains a valid witness with probability at least 1−2ε(|x|). In summary,K ′ runs in time that is
(strictly) bound by 2q(|x|), and outputs time-out with probability at most 1/2. Furthermore, conditioned
on K ′ not outputting time-out, it outputs a valid witness with probability 1 − 2ε(|x|).
Given such a K ′, a strong knowledge extractor K ′′ is obtained by invoking K ′ independently n times.
The ﬁrst time that K ′ outputs a string w and does not output time-out, the extractor K ′′ outputs w and
halts. If K ′ outputs time-out in all iterations, then K ′′ halts and outputs failure. Now, the probability
that K ′′ outputs failure is at most 2−n. Furthermore, the probability that K ′′ outputs a valid witness,
conditioned on it not outputting failure is at least 1 − 2ε(|x|). Putting this together, we have that K ′′
outputs a valid witness with probability at least (1−2−n)(1−2ε(n)) = 1−ε′(n) for ε′ = O(ε). K ′′ thus
constitutes a strict polynomial-time strong knowledge extractor for (P, V ) with extraction error O(ε), as
required. 
Remark. This method of converting an expected polynomial-time extractor to a strict polynomial-time
extractor works for strong proofs of knowledge, but does not work for extractors for standard (i.e., not
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strong) proofs of knowledge. The reason for this difference is that the running time and success probability
of strong knowledge extractors are both independent of the probability that P ∗ convinces V. This is not
the case for standard proofs of knowledge. Indeed, an actual separation between expected and strict
polynomial-time black-box extraction for standard proofs of knowledge has been shown in [BL].
5.2. Triviality
It is well known that every language in BPP has a trivial zero-knowledge interactive proof system,
where the prover sends nothing to the veriﬁer and the veriﬁer simply decides membership on its own. For
proofs of knowledge, the corresponding notion of triviality does not refer to the complexity of deciding
membership in the language, but rather the complexity of ﬁnding witnesses for the given relation. For
example, if f is a one-way permutation, then the relation R = {(x,w) : f (w) = x} deﬁnes a trivial
language LR = {0, 1}∗, but giving a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for R is quite nontrivial. We
note that zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for relations of this type are also often used in cryptographic
constructions. Thus we are led to deﬁne the following notion:
Deﬁnition 5.4. A (poly-balanced) relation R is easy to search if there exists a PPT T and a function
ε(n)1 − 1/poly(n) such that
∀x ∈ LR Pr [T (x) ∈ Rx] 1 − ε(|x|).
We call ε the error probability of the search algorithm A. We say that R is easy to search deterministically
if T is deterministic poly-time (and hence ε = 0).
Notice that according to our deﬁnition, a relation is easy to search if witnesses can be found with any
noticeable (i.e., inverse polynomial) probability. Below, we will show that if a relation is easy to search
in this weak sense, then witnesses can actually be found with all but negligible probability. It therefore
sufﬁces to consider this weaker notion.
Before proceeding,wenote that forNP- andMA-relations, this is a strengtheningof saying that deciding
membership is easy. Thus, lower bounds for relations are stronger than lower bounds for languages. (In
particular, the implication that a certain NP- or MA-relation R is easy to search also implies that its
corresponding language LR is easy to decide.)
Lemma 5.5. If R is an NP-relation and R is easy to search, then LR is in RP. If R is an MA-relation
and R is easy to search, then LR is in BPP.
Proof. By error reduction on the MA proof system for R, there is a PPT algorithm A such that if
(x,w) ∈ R then A(x,w) accepts with probability at least 1 − 2−n and if x /∈ LR , then A(x,w) accepts
with probability at most 2−n. (If R is an NP relation, then A is deterministic.) Now we can use A together
with the search algorithm T to decide LR: given x, run A(x, T (x)) many (speciﬁcally, O(1/(1−ε(|x|))))
times independently and accept if at least one of these executions accepts. If x ∈ LR , then with high
probability, at least one execution of T (x) will produce w such that (x,w) ∈ R, and hence A will accept
with high probability. If x /∈ LR , then A will reject on all executions with high probability (regardless of
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what T outputs). (If R is an NP relation, then A will reject x /∈ LR with probability one, hence we get an
RP algorithm.) 
Now we show that easy-to-search MA-relations have trivial proofs of knowledge. Thus, a lower bound
proving that strong proofs of knowledge exist only for easy-to-search MA-relations (as we indeed prove
below) is tight.
Proposition 5.6. If R is an MA-relation that is easy to search with error probability ε(·), then R has
a zero-round (perfect, auxiliary-input) zero-knowledge extra-strong proof of knowledge with extraction
error ε(·) and negligible completeness and soundness errors.
Proof. The veriﬁer decides whether to accept or reject input x using the BPP algorithm given by Lemma
5.5 (after reducing its error probability to negligible). The prover does nothing (which implies the zero-
knowledge property). The knowledge extractor ignores the prover algorithm and simply runs the search
algorithm for R. 
Since the error probability of the search algorithm translates into the extraction error of the trivial
proof of knowledge, it is desirable to be able to reduce the search error to negligible. This is easy for
NP-relations: run the search algorithm T polynomially many times and output the ﬁrst valid witness it
ﬁnds (if any). For MA-relations, it is a bit more subtle. For the sake of intuition, consider an MA-relation
for which (x,w) ∈ R if and only if Pr[A(x,w) = 1]2/3 (the deﬁnition of MA-relations only requires
that if (x,w) ∈ R thenA(x,w) = 1 with probability greater than 2/3). The problem is that when x ∈ LR ,
the search algorithm T may sometimes output a value w with, say, Pr[A(x,w) = 1] = 2/3 − 2−|x| (so
w /∈ Rx). However, it will be infeasible to distinguish such w’s from w’s in the relation, and thus it seems
we cannot reduce the search error probability for R.
Due to the above difﬁculty, we deﬁne extensions ofMA relations. Speciﬁcally, let R be anMA-relation
and let A be the PPT algorithm that checks witnesses (with error probability 1/3). Consider the relation
Rˆ = {(x,w) : Pr [A(x,w) = accept] 1/2}. Then R ⊆ Rˆ, Rˆ is an MA-relation, and L
Rˆ
= LR . (The
constant 1/2 is arbitrary, and anything strictly between 1/3 and 2/3 would do.) We call a relation Rˆ
obtained in this way an extension of R. Notice that if an extension Rˆ is easy to search, then this means
that it is easy to ﬁnd a value w such that Pr[A(x,w) = 1]1/2. Such a value may not be a witness
in the classic sense because (x,w) is not necessarily in R; however, it is a proof that x ∈ LR (because
for x /∈ LR , Pr[A(x,w) = 1] < 1/3 for every w). Also notice that if R is an NP-relation, then R is an
extension of itself. We have the following:
Proposition 5.7. If an NP-relation R is easy to search, then R is easy to search with negligible error
probability. If an MA-relation R is easy to search, then every extension Rˆ of R is easy to search with
negligible error probability.
Proof. We only deal with the MA case. Let A be a witness-checking algorithm for R and Rˆ the corre-
sponding extension. Consider an algorithm A′(x,w) that runs A(x,w) for O(|x|) executions and accepts
if at least a .6 fraction of the executions accept. Then if (x,w) ∈ R, A′(x,w) accepts with all but
exponentially small probability. If (x,w) /∈ Rˆ, then A′(x,w) rejects with all but exponentially small
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probability. Now let T be the search algorithm for R with error probability ε(n). We use T and A′ to
construct a search algorithm T ′ for Rˆ as follows. On input x of length n, T ′ runs T (x) many times to
get witnesses w1, . . . , wk ←R T (x), where k = O(n/(1 − ε(n))), and outputs the ﬁrst wi such that
A′(x,wi) = accept. If there is no such wi , then T ′ outputs fail.
If x ∈ LR , then with probability at least 1 − (1 − ε(n))k1 − 2−n, at least one wi will be in Rx and
thus will be accepted by A′ with probability at least 1 − 2−n. In addition, A′ will reject any wi not in Rˆx
with all but exponentially small probability. Thus, when x ∈ LR , the output of T ′(x) will be in Rˆx with
all but exponentially small probability. 
Proposition 5.7 shows that in order to give a triviality result for zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
for NP-relations (or MA-relations), it sufﬁces to come up with a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
that ﬁnds witnesses with probability at least 1/poly(n).
Summary of triviality: In the setting of proofs of knowledge, triviality results on languages do not
necessarily capture what is required (because, as we have shown, there exist “hard” relations that have
trivial languages). We will therefore prove the results of this section for relations, and speciﬁcally for
MA-relations (which of course, includes all NP-relations).
In order to further clarify what our results mean, we explain the ramiﬁcations of the statement that if a
type of interactive proof exists for an MA-relation R, then every extension Rˆ of R is easy to search (our
triviality results provide statements of this form):
1. First, since every NP-relation is also an MA-relation and every NP-relation is an extension of itself,
we have that the NP-relation is easy to search. Furthermore, by Proposition 5.7, it follows that the
NP-relation is easy to search with negligible error probability (in other words, witnesses can almost
always be found).
2. Next, if R is an MA-relation then so is its extension Rˆ, and furthermore L
Rˆ
= LR . Thus, by Lemma
5.5, it follows that LR ∈ BPP. Therefore, a triviality result on the extension Rˆ of an MA-relation R
implies a triviality result (in the usual “membership sense”) on the original language LR as well.
The above justiﬁes proving trivialitywith respect to extensions ofMA-relations because this only strength-
ens our results.
5.3. Tools: strong pseudorandomness
In order to prove some of our lower bounds, we need to use a very strong pseudorandom generator,
which can be constructed using the following exponential hardness assumption.
Assumption 5.8. There exists a constant 	 and a length preserving polynomial-time computable 12 one-
to-one one-way function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ that is hard to invert for 2	n-sized circuits. That is,
for every circuit family A = {An}n∈N such that each An is of size at most 2	n, and for all sufﬁciently
large n’s,
Pr[An(f (Un)) ∈ f−1(f (Un))]2−	n.
12 Actually, for our results it will sufﬁce that f will be computed in 2o(n)-time.
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As we will show in Section 8, strong assumptions of hardness are necessary for proving lower bounds for
strong proofs of knowledge; indeed, under assumptions of subexponential “easiness”, the lower bounds
do not hold. Our our non-black-box lower bounds use the following theorem, proved by Luby [Lub]
building on the techniques of Håstad et al. [HILL]. Loosely speaking, it states that for every polynomial-
time distinguisher, there exists a pseudorandom generator that receives a very shortO(log n)-length seed
and outputs a string of length n that cannot be distinguished from random by the distinguisher.
Theorem 5.9 (strong pseudorandomness, Luby [Lub, Theorem 9.1]). 13 Assuming Assumption 5.8, there
is a polynomial tG(n) such that for every polynomial q(n), there exists a constant d and a generator G :
{0, 1}d log n → {0, 1}n such that G can be computed in time tG(n), and for every nonuniform probabilistic
algorithm D running in time q(n) and all sufﬁciently large n’s,
|Pr[D(G(Ud log n)) = 1] − Pr[D(Un) = 1]| < 1
q(n)
.
The dependence of G on q(n) is only with respect to the constant d in the seed length. Furthermore, the
time it takes to compute G is independent of d and thus of q(n). That is, there exists a single machine MG
running in time tG(n), such that upon input (1n, d, s) where s ←R {0, 1}d log n, machine MG computes
G(s) that “fools” all distinguishers running in time q(n).
We note that the pseudorandom generators above imply BPP = P, and even MA = NP. In fact, they
also imply that ifR is anNP-relation that is easy to search, thenR is easy to search deterministically, and if
R is an MA-relation that is easy to search, then every extension Rˆ of R is easy to search deterministically.
5.4. Extra-strong proofs and arguments of knowledge
We begin by showing that extra-strong proofs and arguments of knowledge cannot be obtained for
nontrivial languages, even when no secrecy requirements (such as zero knowledge or witness indistin-
guishability) are imposed. This result holds for proofs and arguments with any (polynomial) number of
rounds. Note that by our deﬁnition, the impossibility result for proofs is black-box, whereas the impos-
sibility result for arguments holds even for non-black-box extractors. However, any proof system is also
an argument. Therefore, the non-black-box result holds also for proof systems.
Wepresent this result here for three reasons. First, it justiﬁes the deﬁnition of strong proofs of knowledge
as presented in [Gol2], in that this arguably natural further strengthening is impossible to achieve. Second,
13 Speciﬁcally, this theorem is a consequence of the fact that the construction of Luby [Lub, Theorem 9.1] is “poly-preserving”
in security.We note that Luby makes a distinction between “public” and “private” parts of the input to a pseudorandom generator.
Security is only measured as a function of the length of the private part, and thus polynomial changes in the length of the public
part do not affect security. We, however, measure security as a function of the entire input length, and thus must implement
Luby’s construction in a way that the length of the public part is linear in that of the private part. This is easily done by using
more randomness-efﬁcient implementations of the hardcore function (e.g. as in [Gol2, Theorem 2.5.6]) and the hash function
(e.g. [SZ, Theorem 3.2]) in Luby’s construction. This directly provides a pseudorandom generator with only small stretch, but
the stretch can be increased in a security-preserving manner in the usual way [Lub, Lec. 4]; [Gol2, Section 3.3.2] . Finally, we
mention that using [Lub, Theorem 9.3], we can relax the condition that f is one-to-one to just requiring that f is regular in the
sense that for every input length n, every element of f ({0, 1}n) has the same number 
(n) of preimages under f, and moreover

(n) is computable in time poly(n).
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it is interesting in that it rules out the possibility of obtaining protocols, irrespective of the number of
rounds of communication. Third, it serves as a good warm-up for our lower bounds for strong proofs of
knowledge in Section 5.5.
Theorem 5.10. 1. If a relation R has an extra-strong proof of knowledge with negligible soundness error,
then R is easy to search. In particular, if R is an NP-relation (resp., MA-relation), then LR ∈ RP (resp.,
LR ∈ BPP).
2. Assuming Assumption 5.8, if an MA-relation R has an extra-strong argument of knowledge with
negligible soundness error and an efﬁcient prover, then every extension Rˆ of R is easy to search (deter-
ministically). In particular, LR ∈ P.
Proof. Intuitively, extra-strong proofs of knowledge cannot be obtained because a prover may simply
refuse to cooperate with the extractor. That is, assume that the extractor’s running time is q(n). Then,
consider a “cheating” prover P ∗ who with probability 1 − 1/2q(n) does nothing, and with probability
1/2q(n) plays the honest prover strategy. Then, on the one hand, the prover convinces V with probability
1/2q(n) > s(n). On the other hand, the probability that the extractor will obtain a response from the
prover in time q(n) is at most 1/2. Since it must extract with probability 1 − ε(|x|), it must obtain the
witness with no help from the prover in almost half the cases (this intuition holds when ε is small, but the
proof holds for any ε that is noticeable smaller than 1). Thus, an efﬁcient decision procedure can be built
from this extractor. The above intuition sufﬁces for obtaining a black-box lower bound. However, if the
extractor is given non-black-box access to the above prover P ∗, the following problem arises. In order to
construct a P ∗ who convinces V with probability 1/2q(n), we need to give it an explicit witness for the
statement being proved. Otherwise, it is not clear how it can convince V in the case that it is supposed
to run the honest prover strategy. However, if P ∗ holds a witness w, then the extractor who is given
P ∗’s code and auxiliary input can immediately obtain this witness. Thus, we must somehow “hide” the
witness from the extractor. This is achieved by having P ∗ hold an encryption of the witness, where the
“encryption scheme” has the following two properties. First, the extractor, who runs in time q(n), will
only be able to decrypt with probability that is noticeably less than 1. Second, it can easily be decrypted
with probability 1/poly(n), using a random “key”. Therefore, on the one hand, P ∗’s random tape can be
used to obtain the witness and convinceV with high enough probability (i.e., with probability greater than
s(n)). On the other hand, the extractor will not be able to obtain the witness with high enough probability.
We now proceed to the formal proof.
We ﬁrst prove the theorem for the case of extra-strong proofs of knowledge, and thuswhere the extractor
K is given only black-box access to P ∗ (as in Deﬁnition 5.1).
Triviality of extra-strong proofs: Assume that (P, V ) is an extra-strong proof of knowledge, with
extra-strong knowledge extractor K, negligible soundness error s(n), and completeness and extraction
errors c(n), ε(n)1− 1/poly(n). Let t (n) be the polynomial bounding K’s running time, and let q(n) =
2t (n)/(1 − ε(n)).
We deﬁne a prover algorithm P ∗, from which K will have to successfully extract witnesses. On input
x ∈ LR of length n, we will give P ∗ an auxiliary input of the form y = (w, s), where w is a valid
witness for x and s is a (randomly chosen) string of length log q(n). Now P ∗(x, (w, s); r) works as
follows. It examines the ﬁrst log q(|x|) bits of its random tape r. If they do not equal s, then P ∗ aborts
without sending any message. Otherwise, P ∗ correctly proves the proof of knowledge, following P’s
348 B. Barak et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 321–391
strategy (using the remainder of its random tape for P’s random bits). Now, the probability p(x, (w, s))
that P ∗(x, (w, s)) convinces V equals (1/q(n)) · (1 − c(n)) = 1/poly(n). Thus, p(x, (w, s)) > s(n),
therefore, by the strong validity/soundness property, K must output a valid witness with probability at
least 1 − ε(n)1/poly(n), while utilizing oracle access to P ∗(x, (w, s), ·; ·).
Given such a K, we construct a search algorithm T for R. Upon input x of length n, machine T chooses
s ←R {0, 1}log q(n). Machine T then invokes K(x), and plays the role of P ∗(x, (w, s)), answering all of
K’s oracle queries. Speciﬁcally, when K asks a query of the form (1, 2, . . . ; r), machine T ﬁrst checks
if the ﬁrst log q(n) bits of r equal s. If yes, then T outputs fail. (In this case, T cannot continue emulating
P ∗(x, (w, s)) because it does not know a witness for x.) Otherwise, T emulates P ∗(x, (w, s)) and hence
emulates P ∗ sending abort. T continues this emulation until K concludes. If K outputs a value w, then T
outputs w.
It remains to prove that T constitutes a valid search algorithm for R. Suppose x ∈ LR . We need to
show that T outputs a valid witness with probability at least 1/poly(n). The probability that this occurs
is at least the probability that K outputs a valid witness (when interacting with P ∗(x, (w, s)) for a
random s) minus the probability that T outputs fail. The probability that K outputs a valid witness is at
least 1 − ε(n). Now, we analyze the probability that T outputs fail. Since K runs in time that is bound
by t (n), the maximum number of oracle queries that it makes is t (n). For each of these oracle calls, the
probability that the ﬁrst log q(n) bits of r equal s is at most 1/q(n). This is due to the fact that K has only
black-box access to P ∗ and so knows nothing about s which is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}log q(n). By
the union bound over all t (n) oracle calls, we have that the probability of there being some oracle call for
which the ﬁrst log q(n) bits match is at most t (n)/q(n)(1 − ε(n))/2. This means that T outputs fail
with probability at most (1 − ε(n))/2. Thus, the probability that T (x) outputs a valid witness is at least
1 − ε(n) − (1 − ε(n))/2 = (1 − ε(n))/21/poly(n), as desired.
Triviality of extra-strong arguments: The fact that the existence of extra-strong arguments of knowledge
for a relation R implies that R is easy to search is proven in a similar way to the analogous claim for extra-
strong proofs of knowledge. However, some essential changes must be made. Speciﬁcally, the extractor
K now has non-black-box access to the prover. Therefore, if we were to use the same prover strategy
P ∗(x, (w, s)), K would be able to see s and thus set r so that its preﬁx equals s. Furthermore, K would
also see the witnessw thatP ∗(x, (w, s)) uses to prove when it does not abort.Wemust therefore construct
a prover that works in a similar way to P ∗(x, (w, s)), but also “hides” s and w from the extractor K. We
do this by using the strong pseudorandom generator of Theorem 5.9. Speciﬁcally, the generator is applied
to s and the result is used to “encrypt” w.
Formally, let (P, V ) be a system of extra-strong arguments of knowledge. Then, construct a cheating
prover P ∗ as follows: First, recall that by Theorem 5.9 (which follows from Assumption 5.8), for every
polynomial q ′(n) there exists a pseudorandomgeneratorG : {0, 1}d log n → {0, 1}n, where d is a constant,
such that G fools any distinguisher running in time q ′(n). Furthermore, there exists a single machine MG
running in time tG(n), such that MG receives for input (1n, d, s) where s ∈ {0, 1}d log n and computes the
above-mentioned generator G on seed s. Now, let x ∈ LR be the statement being proven and let w be a
witness such that (x,w) ∈ R. Without loss of generality, assume that |w| = |x| = n. Then, the auxiliary
input of P ∗ is a pair y = (d, u), where u = G(s) ⊕ w and s ∈ {0, 1}d log n (an appropriate encoding
is used to differentiate between d and u). Intuitively, P ∗ will agree to prove the statement if and only if
the ﬁrst d log n bits of its random tape correctly “decrypt” y, revealing the witness w. Formally, when
P ∗(x, (d, u)) is invoked, it reads the value of d from its auxiliary input, takes the ﬁrst d log n bits of its
random tape, denoted s′, and computesw′ = G(s′)⊕u (using themachineMG). ThenP ∗ uses thewitness
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w′ and proves the proof, playing the honest prover strategy (using all but the ﬁrst d log n bits of its random
tape for P’s random bits). Before proceeding, notice that P ∗(x, (d, u)) runs in time tG(n)+ tP (n), where
tP (n) is the polynomial bounding the running time of the honest prover P upon inputs of length n. Now,
by the assumption that (P, V ) is a system of extra-strong arguments, there exists an extractor K running
in some polynomial time t (n) for this prover P ∗. Let q(n) = max{t (n) + tR(n), 2/(1 − ε(n))}, where
tR(n) is the running time of the witness-checking algorithm T that accepts (x,w) ∈ R with probability
at least 1 − 2−n and accepts (x,w) /∈ Rˆ with probability at most 2−n. 14
Consider now the case that P ∗(x, (d, u)) has auxiliary input y = (d, u), where d deﬁnes a generator
that fools all distinguishers running in time q(n) (this choice of d will become apparent below) and
u = G(s) ⊕ w for some s ∈ {0, 1}d log n. The probability that P ∗(x, (d, u)) convinces V to accept is
at least the probability that s′ = s times the probability that P(x,w) convinces V to accept. By the
uniformity of s′ (coming from P ∗’s random tape) and the completeness/nontriviality property, this equals
(1/nd) · (1− c(n))1/poly(n). (The probability that P ∗ convincesV may actually be greater if there are
numerous witnesses because a number of different strings s′ may “decrypt” u to valid witnesses.) This is
greater than all negligible functions, and in particular greater than soundness error s(n). Therefore, by the
strong validity/soundness property, for u = w⊕G(s), the extractor K(x, (d, u)) succeeds in obtaining a
valid witness w′ ∈ Rx with probability at least 1 − ε(|x|). Intuitively, we will obtain a search algorithm
for R because when s is random, the extractor K, who runs in time t (n), cannot distinguish G(s) from
Un, and thus we can run K(x, (d, Un)) and still obtain a witness.
Formally, we claim that when x ∈ LR , K(x, (d, Un)) obtains a witness w ∈ Rˆx with probability at
least (1 − ε(n))/21/poly(n). This holds due to the pseudorandomness of G. Speciﬁcally, let D be a
distinguisher, given auxiliary input (x,w) ∈ R, who receives z ∈ {0, 1}n and must distinguish the case
that z ← Un from the case that z ← G(Ud log n). Distinguisher D simply runs K(x, (d, z ⊕ w)) to
obtain a string w′, and then runs the witness-checking algorithm T (x,w′) that distinguishes the case
(x,w′) ∈ R from (x,w′) /∈ Rˆ. (D “accepts” if and only if T declares that (x,w) ∈ R.) Now, D has
running time t (n) + tR(n)q(n). We have already argued that for every z ← G(Ud log n), the extractor
K(x, (d, z ⊕ w)) obtains a witness w′ ∈ Rx with probability at least 1 − ε(n), in which case D accepts
with probability at least 1−2−n. By the pseudorandomness of G against algorithms running in time q(n),
D(Un) must accept with probability at least (1− ε(n))(1−2−n)−q(n)(1− ε(n))/21/poly(n). That
is, K(x, (d, Un)) outputs a w′ ∈ Rˆx with probability at least 1/poly(n), as desired. 
5.5. Constant-round ZK strong proofs and arguments of knowledge
In this section, we present our main result regarding strong proofs of knowledge. Speciﬁcally, we show
that underAssumption 5.8, there do not exist constant-round zero-knowledge strong proofs and arguments
of knowledge. In fact, the lower bound holds even for honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge. We note that the
difference between the ﬁrst and second items in the theorem with respect to LR ∈ BPP or LR ∈ P is due
simply to the fact that under Assumption 5.8, BPP = P.
14 Note that by the deﬁnition of the extension Rˆ, we have that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time A such that for
(x,w) ∈ R, it holds that Pr[A(x,w) = 1]2/3, and for (x,w) /∈ Rˆ it holds thatPr[A(x,w) = 1] < 1/2. The witness-checking
algorithm T is obtained from A using standard error reduction techniques.
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Theorem 5.11. Let R be an MA-relation.
1. If R has a constant-round honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge strong proof of knowledge with negligible
completeness and soundness errors, then every extension Rˆ of R is easy to search. In particular,
LR ∈ BPP.
2. Assuming Assumption 5.8, if R has a constant-round honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge strong argument
of knowledge with negligible completeness and soundness errors and an efﬁcient prover, then every
extension Rˆ of R is easy to search (deterministically). In particular, LR ∈ P.
Proof. The idea behind the lower bound is as follows. Assume that there exists a constant-round zero-
knowledge strong proof of knowledge (P, V ). Then, there must be a round in which V sends a message
with entropy (log n). Otherwise, all of V’s messages can be guessed with nonnegligible probability,
and V is “close” to being deterministic. This is a contradiction because zero-knowledge veriﬁers must be
probabilistic [GO]. Now, this message of V that has “high” entropy can be used in a similar way to the
string s that is used in the proof of Theorem 5.10. That is, it can be used to reduce the probability that
P ∗ convinces V, so that K does not have enough time to obtain any information from P ∗. The rest of the
proof then continues in essentially the same way.
There are some additional technical details that arise from the fact that this high-entropy message sent
by V is not actually uniformly distributed. However, this is solved by hashing the message to extract
its randomness. In addition, we do not actually partition the analysis into two separate cases based on
whether or not there exists a high-entropy veriﬁer message, but rather do a single analysis that combines
the ideas from the two cases. Speciﬁcally, we consider the ﬁrst veriﬁer message that has entropy (log n)
conditioned on the history. The prover strategy begins by “guessing” the veriﬁer messages in the history
(which have nonnegligible probability) and then, upon receiving the high-entropy veriﬁer message ,
switches to the strategy that uses a (hash of)  to obtain the witness.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.10, we ﬁrst prove the case of strong proofs of knowledge, and thus where
K is a black-box extractor.
Triviality of strong proofs: Let (P, V ) be a constant-round honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge strong proof
of knowledge. We add an extra pair of rounds to the proof system in which the veriﬁer sends a random
n-bit string and the prover sends nothing; this maintains both the honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge and the
strong proof of knowledge properties. Let 2k be the number of rounds in the modiﬁed proof system. We
will denote veriﬁer messages by  and prover messages by .
Let p1(n), . . . , pk(n) be polynomials to be speciﬁed later, and let p(n) = ∏i pi(n). For each x ∈ L
of length n, ﬁx a witness wx ∈ Rx . Call a sequence r of the prover’s coin tosses accepting for x if the
probability that V (x) accepts when interacting with P(x,wx; r) is at least 1 − 2c(n), where c is the
completeness error. By Markov’s inequality, at least half of the r’s are accepting. For each such r, we
claim that there exists a partial transcript h = (1, 1, . . . , i , i) such that in the interaction between
P(x,w; r) and V (x),
• h occurs with probability at least 1/pi(n), where pi(n) def=
∏i
j=1 pj (n). (The probability here is over
V’s coin tosses.)
• For every i+1, the probability that i+1 will be V’s next message given that h has occurred is less
than 1/pi+1(n). That is, conditioned on h, the (i + 1)’st message of V has min-entropy greater than
log pi+1(n).
We call such an h a good history for r.
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To prove the existence of good histories, consider an r for which the above does not hold. Since the
claim does not hold, there exists a ﬁrst veriﬁer message 1 that occurs with probability least 1/p1(n).
Set 1 to be P(x,w, 1; r). Since 1 is deterministically computed, the partial transcript (1, 1) still
has probability at least 1/p1(n). Thus, if the above does not hold for (1, 1), it must be due to the
second condition. This means that there exists a second veriﬁer message 2 (in response to (1, 1))
whose conditional probability is at least 1/p2(n). Set 2 to be P(x,w; r)’s response. We obtain that the
preﬁx (1, 1, 2, 2) appears with probability at least (1/p1(n)) · (1/p2(n)), and so we can continue.
This process must eventually stop with a good history because we modiﬁed the proof system so that
the last veriﬁer message is a random n-bit string independent of the history, and thus has min-entropy
n > log pk(n).
So ﬁx an accepting r and a good history h = (1, 1, . . . , i , i) for r. Let Vi+1 be the distribution
of the (i + 1)th veriﬁer message given history h, and let m(n) = log pi+1(n) be a lower bound on the
min-entropy of Vi+1.We will convert this high-entropy message into an almost-uniform string by hashing
(actually, any “strong randomness extractor” [NZ] would do): By the Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL], if
we choose g : {0, 1}poly(n) → {0, 1}m(n)/4 from a pairwise independent family, then with high probability
g(Vi+1) has statistical difference at most 2−m(n)/3 from uniform. Fix such a g.
Now, let K be the strong knowledge extractor for (P, V ) and let t (n) be a bound on the running
time of K. Then, similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.10, we construct a cheating prover P ∗(x, y) to
which we give an auxiliary input y = (wx, r, h, g, s), where wx is a witness, r is an accepting sequence
of coin tosses for P, h is a good transcript for r, g is the hash function as above, and s is a string of
length m(n)/4 = (log pi+1(n))/4. For the ﬁrst i messages, P ∗(x, (wx, r, h, g, s)) just sends the prover
messages in the history h. If V replies with a message that is not consistent with h, then P ∗ aborts.
Otherwise, if the transcript so far is consistent with h, then P ∗ obtains the (i + 1)th veriﬁer message i+1
and checks if g(i+1) = s. If yes, then P ∗ completes the proof, following the instructions of the honest
prover P(x,wx; r). Otherwise, P ∗ halts and outputs nothing.
We argue that for every (r, h, g) as above and every s, the probability that P ∗ convinces an honest
veriﬁerV is at least 1/poly(n). First, recall that h is chosen in such a way thatV gives consistent responses
with probability at least pi(n). Second, recall that g(Vi+1) has statistical difference at most 2−m(n)/3 from
the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m(n)/4, so it equals s with probability at least
2−m(n)/4 − 2−m(n)/3 = (2−m(n)/4) = (1/pi+1(n)1/4).
Thus P ∗ behaves exactly as P(x,wx; r) with probability at least 1/poly(n). Since P(x,wx; r) causes
V (x) to reject with probability at most 4c(n), which is negligible, we conclude that P ∗ convinces V to
accept with probability at least 1/poly(n) − 4c(n) = 1/poly(n).
Now we construct a search algorithm T for R, similar to the proof of Theorem 5.10. Upon input
x of length n, machine T chooses i ←R {0, . . . , k − 1}, generates a simulated random history h =
(1, 1, . . . , i , i) ←R S(x), chooses s ←R {0, 1}log(pi+1(n))/4, and chooses a random hash function
g. Machine T then invokes K(x), and plays the role of P ∗(x, (wx, r, h, g, s)), answering all of K’s
oracle queries. However, when K asks a query containing an (i + 1)th veriﬁer message i+1, it checks if
g(i+1) = s and if so, outputs fail. (In this case, T cannot continue emulating P ∗ because it does not
know the witness wx for x nor the coin tosses r.) Otherwise, T emulates P ∗ and hence aborts. T continues
this emulation until K concludes. If K outputs a value w, then T outputs w.
It remains to prove that T constitutes a valid search algorithm for Rˆ. Suppose x ∈ LR .We need to show
that T outputs a valid witness w ∈ Rˆx with probability at least 1/poly(n). This is at least the probability
352 B. Barak et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 321–391
that K outputs a valid witness (when interacting with P ∗(x, (wx, r, h, g, s))) minus the probability that T
outputs fail. For each choice of i, the latter probability is at most t (n)/p1/4i+1(n) (analogous to the bound
t (n)/q(n) in the proof of Theorem 5.10).
For the probability that K fails to output a valid witness w ∈ Rˆx , we note that it sufﬁces to bound
the probability that K fails to output a witness w ∈ Rx (in the original relation) under the assumption
that h is generated according to the real interaction 〈P(wx), V 〉(x) rather than by the simulator S(x).
This is because pairs (x,w) ∈ R can be distinguished from pairs (x,w) /∈ Rˆ in probabilistic polynomial
time. 15 Now, recall that at least 1/2 of all r’s are accepting. For each such r, there is an i and a good
history h for r of length 2i. This implies that there is a ﬁxed value of i such that at least 1/2k fraction of
all r’s are accepting and have a good history h of length 2i. For each such r and h, the probability that
the real interaction 〈P(wx; r), V 〉(x) yields h is at least 1/pi(n). Thus, if we generate a length 2i partial
transcript h ←R 〈P(wx), V 〉(x), then h is good history for some accepting r with probability at least
(1/2k) · (1/pi(n)) = (1/pi(n)). In such a case, we have shown that P ∗(x, (wx, r, h, g, s)) convinces
V (x) to accept with probability at least 1/poly(n) > s(n), and hence K(x) must output a valid witness
w ∈ Rx with probability at least 1 − ε(n). Thus, there is a setting of i such that K(x) outputs a witness
(when interacting with P ∗) with probability at least (1/pi(n)) · (1 − ε(n)).
Putting the above together, there is a setting of i such that T (x) will output a witness w ∈ Rˆx
with probability at least (1/pi(n)) · (1 − ε(n)) − t (n)/p1/4i+1(n). Thus, recursively deﬁning pi+1(n) =(
n · pi(n) · t (n)/(1 − ε(n))
)4
ensures that T will output a witness with probability at least 1/poly(n).
Triviality for strong arguments: As in the proof of Theorem 5.10, the only difference here is that the
witness used by P ∗ must be “hidden”. This is done in the same way. That is, given a parameter d and a
generator that takes a seed of length d log n, we give P ∗(x, y) the auxiliary input y = (r, h, g, d, u, e),
where u = G(s) ⊕ w and s ∈ {0, 1}d log n. Then, upon receiving the ith veriﬁer message i+1, P ∗
computes g(i+1), and completes the proof using the witness w′ = G(g(i+1))⊕u. The rest of the proof
is the same. 
Remark 5.12 (witness-indistinguishable strong proofs of knowledge). We note that Theorem 5.11 can
also be used to rule out the possibility of obtaining constant-roundwitness-indistinguishable strong proofs
of knowledge for any NP-complete language. This follows from the Feige–Shamir [FS1] construction
of zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge. Speciﬁcally, [FS1] show that assuming the existence of
one-way functions, a ny witness-indistinguishable proof (or argument) of knowledge for anNP-complete
language can be used to obtain a system of zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for NP. It can be
veriﬁed that if the given witness-indistinguishable proof is a strong proof of knowledge, then the resulting
zero-knowledge proof is also a strong proof of knowledge.
15 That is, we have a PPT algorithm A such that for (x,w) ∈ R, it holds that Pr[A(x,w) = 1] > 1 − 2−n, and for (x,w) /∈ Rˆ
it holds that Pr[A(x,w) = 1] < 2−n. Now, if we show that when h is generated in a real execution, K outputs a valid
witness w ∈ Rx with probability at least 1/poly(n), then it follows that A(x,w) = 1 in this setting with probability at least
(1−2−n) ·1/poly(n) = 1/poly(n). On the other hand, if p is the probability thatK succeeds in outputting a witnessw ∈ Rˆx with
probability when h is generated by S(x), then this means that A(x,w) = 1 in this setting with probability at most p + 2−n. By
the indistinguishability of the real interaction and the simulator, we must have p+ 2−n1/poly(n)− neg(n), so p1/poly(n).
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Part II
Protocols
In this part, we present several protocols that under some assumptions satisfy various forms of zero-
knowledge.Wewish to stress that not all of these assumptions are standard or even likely to be true; indeed,
some of them are even conjectured to be false. Our use of such assumptions is therefore to demonstrate
the kind of assumption one needs to make, and the kind of obstacles one faces, when trying to prove a
negative result.
6. Two-round zero knowledge
In this section we present several positive results regarding 2-round plain zero-knowledge systems.
Two of these results are proven under assumptions that, although used in previous works, are highly
nonstandard, and one of the results relies on an assumption that is widely believed to be false. Thus, we
consider these results not so much as positive results, but rather as “negative results on negative results”,
showing what must be tackled in order to extend the results of Section 3. These results also give additional
motivation to investigating the validity of these assumptions.
In Section 6.1 we present a 2-round (private-coin) plain zero-knowledge proof system for a promise
problem outside ofBPP under the “Knowledge of ExponentAssumption” suggested by Damgård [Dam].
Thus, in order to extendTheorem3.7 to hold for all problems outside ofBPP (and not just forNP-complete
languages), one must refute the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption.
In Section 6.2 we construct a 2-round public-coin plain zero-knowledge proof system for NP, under
the assumption that one can use nondeterminism to yield a super-polynomial saving in running time. 16
This assumption is a strengthening of the negation of Assumption 3.2 and is mostly believed to be false.
Thus, we do not view this result as a “true” positive result but rather as showing that assumptions similar
to Assumptions 3.2 and 3.5 are necessary for proving results such as Theorems 3.4 and 3.7.
In Section 6.3 we present a 2-round public-coin plain zero-knowledge argument system for NP under
a variant of the “Noninteractive CS Proofs Conjecture” suggested by Micali [Mic]. Thus, in order to
extend Theorem 3.4 (which currently holds only for proof systems) to hold also for argument systems,
one would have to disprove Micali’s conjecture.
6.1. A non-trivial 2-round (private-coin) ZK proof?
Theorem 3.7 gives evidence that 2-round zero-knowledge proofs (with perfect completeness) do not
exist for NP-complete problems, but does not rule out the possibility that such proof systems exist for
some nontrivial languages (i.e. ones outside of BPP). In this section, we show that the “Knowledge
of Exponent Assumption” of Damgård [Dam] implies that indeed there does exist a nontrivial promise
problem with a 2-round ZK proof.
Roughly speaking, the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption says that the only way to generate a
Difﬁe–Hellman tuple is to “know” the corresponding exponent. To make this formal, we require a family
16 See Section 6.2 for a fuller description of the assumption.
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of computational groups G = ⋃k Gk of prime order. For simplicity, Gk can be thought of as consisting
of all groups of the form QR2q+1, where QR2q+1 is the group of quadratic residues in Z∗2q+1 for a k-bit
prime q such that 2q +1 is prime. More generally, we will only require basic computational properties of
the group, e.g. it is possible to do all the following in time poly(k): given security parameter k, generate
the description of a random group G ←R Gk; given the description of G, compute the order of G; given
the description of G, carry out operations in G; etc. A full list of properties which sufﬁce for our purposes
can be found in the deﬁnition of a “computational group scheme” in [CS].
We consider the problem of distinguishing Difﬁe–Hellman non-tuples from Difﬁe–Hellman tuples.
Deﬁnition 6.1 ((Complement of) the DECISIONAL DIFFIE–HELLMAN problem).
DDHY = {(G, g0, g1, h0, h1) : G ∈ G, g0, g1, h0, h1 ∈ G\{1},DLogg0(h0) = DLogg1(h1)},
DDHN = {(G, g0, g1, h0, h1) : G ∈ G, g0, g1, h0, h1 ∈ G\{1},DLogg0(h0) = DLogg1(h1)}.
For each k, we let DDHY,k = {(G, g0, g1, h0, h1) ∈ DDHY : G ∈ Gk}.
We require two assumptions about this problem. The ﬁrst is (even weaker than) the standard DDH
Assumption.
Assumption 6.2 ((Weak) DDH Assumption). The promise problem DDH is not in BPP. Moreover, for
any PPT A such that for every x ∈ DDHN , A rejects x with probability at least 2/3 (over A’s coin tosses),
it holds that A rejects a random element of DDHY,k with probability at least 1/2 for all sufﬁciently
large k.
The second is a nonstandard assumption, which intuitively says that, given random (G, g0, g1), the
only way to generate (g1, h1) so that (G, g0, g1, h0, h1) is a Difﬁe–Hellman tuple is by raising g0 and
g1 to some known exponent. That is, for any efﬁcient A that generates Difﬁe–Hellman tuples, there is an
efﬁcient Aˆ that generates the corresponding exponent when given the coin tosses of A.
Assumption 6.3 (Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption). For every PPTA, there exists a PPT Aˆ such that
Pr
G←RGk
g0,g1←RG\{1},r
[
A(G, g0, g1; r) = (gx0 , gx1 ) for some x ∈ Z∗|G| and Aˆ(G, g0, g1; r) = x
]
= neg(k).
We do not regard this to be a “reasonable” assumption, but to date it has not been proven false, and
our result below shows that proving triviality of 2-round ZK will require such a falsiﬁcation. 17 Already
when introducing this assumption, Damgård [Dam] hinted at the possibility that it can be used to construct
2-round zero-knowledge protocols (but the protocol suggested there is an Identiﬁcation Scheme rather
than a proof of membership, and thus automatically involves a common reference string). More recently,
in [HT,BP], this assumption and some variants of it were used to construct 3-round zero-knowledge
17 See [Nao2] for a discussion of why such assumptions are difﬁcult to falsify. Nevertheless, some related assumptions,
suggested in [HT], have been falsiﬁed in [BP].
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Public input: (C0, C1), both circuits with n input gates and m output gates
(C0, C1)
↓
P V
Step V1: Choose b ←R {0, 1}, r ←R {0, 1}n. Set  = Cb(r) ←−−−
Step P1: If  ∈ Image(C0), set c = 0, else set c = 1. c−−−→
V accepts if c = b and rejects otherwise.
Protocol 6.6. Interactive Proof for DISJOINT IMAGES
arguments for NP. We use it to construct a 2-round plain zero-knowledge proof system for a nontrivial
promise problem.
Theorem 6.4. If Assumption 6.3 holds, then there is a 2-round plain zero-knowledge proof for a promise
problem not in BPP. Speciﬁcally, this promise problem is of the form DDH′ = (DDH′Y ,DDH′N), where
DDH′Y ⊂ DDHY and DDH′N = DDHN .
We actually abstract away the number theory by reducing it to the following more general problem:
Deﬁnition 6.5 (DISJOINT IMAGES). DISJOINT IMAGES is the promise problem DI = (DIY ,DIN) whose
instances consist of pairs of circuits C0, C1 : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} and
DIY = {(C0, C1) : Image(C0) ∩ Image(C1) = ∅} ,
DIN = {(C0, C1) : C0(Uk) and C1(Uk) have the same distribution } .
DISJOINT IMAGES is a restriction of STATISTICALDIFFERENCE , the complete problem for statistical zero
knowledge [SV], and is a generalization of many well-known computational problems such as GRAPH
NONISOMORPHISM and QUADRATIC NONRESIDUOSITY . Note that DDH reduces to DISJOINT IMAGES
under the reduction (G, g0, g1, h0, h1) = (C0, C1) where the circuits C0, C1 : Z∗|G| → G2 are deﬁned
by Cb(x) = (gxb , hxb). Notice that if (G, g0, g1, h0, h1) ∈ DDHN then C0(x) and C1(x) have the same
distribution. (Speciﬁcally, for some r, we have C0(x) = (gx0 , hx0) = (gx0 , grx0 ) and C1(x) = (gx1 , hx1) =
(gx1 , g
rx
1 ). Thus, for a random x, the distributions are identical.) In contrast, if (G, g0, g1, h0, h1) ∈ DDHY ,
then the discrete logs of h0 and h1 are different and so the distributions are disjoint. Note also that by
encoding the input instance into the description of the circuits, we can ensure that  is injective and can
be inverted in polynomial time (i.e. is an invertible reduction).
Protocol 6.6 is the interactive proof system for DISJOINT IMAGES from [SV]. This proof system is
easily seen to be honest-veriﬁer perfect zero knowledge, but is unlikely to be zero knowledge for cheating
veriﬁers. Intuitively, the veriﬁer can learn something by sending the prover an  for which it does not
know if  ∈ Image(C0) (e.g., the veriﬁer can determine whether C0 : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} is satisﬁable by
sending  = 1 to the prover). However, there might beYES instances of DISJOINT IMAGES for which it is
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infeasible to generate  ∈ Image(C0) without “knowing” that this is the case. The following assumption
formalizes this intuition.
Assumption 6.7. There exists a subset DI′Y ⊂ DIY such that
1. The promise problem DI′ = (DI′Y ,DIN) is not in BPP.
2. For every PPT A, there exists a PPT Aˆ such that for every (C0, C1) ∈ DI′Y
Pr
r
[A(C0, C1; r) ∈ Image(C0) ⇐⇒ Aˆ(C0, C1; r) = 0]1 − neg(n),
where n = |(C0, C1)|.
Note that, unlike the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption, here we require the “extractor” Aˆ to work
with high probability for every instance (C0, C1) ∈ DI′Y , rather than just a random instance. Nevertheless,
we can still prove that this assumption follows from the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption:
Lemma 6.8. Assumptions 6.2 and 6.3 imply Assumption 6.7.
Proof. We use the probabilistic method to choose random subset DDH′Y of DDHY , and apply the reduction
 to DISJOINT IMAGES to obtain DI′Y = (DDH′Y )which will almost surely satisfy the requirements ofAs-
sumption 6.7. Speciﬁcally, for each k, we choose x1, . . . , xk ←R DDHY,k and set DDH′Y,k = {x1, . . . , xk},
and DDH′Y =
⋃
k DDH
′
Y,k . The intuition is that the DDHAssumption ensures that the random instances xi
are “hard” (so even the restricted problem DDH′ will not be in BPP w.h.p.), and that the Knowledge-of-
Exponent assumption ensures that we can do “extraction” on the random instances xi with probability
1 − neg(k) (so we will be able to do extraction on all the xi’s by a union bound).
To show that (DI′Y ,DIN) is not in BPP, it sufﬁces to show that (DDH
′
Y ,DDHN) is not in BPP. Fix any
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine A which outputs reject with probability 2/3 when given
any element of DDHN . By the DDH Assumption, A rejects with probability at least 1/2 on a random
instance of DDHY,k for all sufﬁciently large k. Thus, for at least .1 fraction of the DDHY,k instances, A
rejects with probability at least .4 over its coin tosses. Thus, when we choose k random instances, with
probability at least 1 − exp(−(k)), A will reject at least one element of DDH′Y,k with probability at least
.4. Taking k → ∞, we see that A fails to be a BPP algorithm for (DDH′Y ,DDHN) with probability 1.
Since there are only countably many PPT algorithms A, we conclude that (DI′Y ,DIN) is not in BPP with
probability 1.
We now show that the extraction condition (Item 6.7) in Assumption 6.7 holds with probability 1,
using the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption. Given any PPT A, we wish to show that A satisﬁes the
second condition (i.e. the “extraction condition”) of Assumption 6.7 with high probability. We will do
this by constructing a related PPT A′ to which we will apply the Knowledge-of-Exponent assumption.
Intuitively, since the extraction condition Knowledge-of-Exponent holds on random instances with high
probability, we will be able to argue that we can extract from A with high probability on all k instances
of DI′Y .
Speciﬁcally, we constructA′ as follows:On input (G, g0, h0) and coin tosses (r, g1, h1) (where g1, h1 ∈
G\{1}), A′ computes (C0, C1) = (G, g0, g1, h0, h1), and outputs A(C0, C1; r). By the deﬁnition of ,
A′ outputs a pair of the form (gx0 , hx0) iff A outputs an element of Image(C0).
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Using the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption, we obtain a PPT Aˆ′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) such that
Pr
G←RGk
g0,h0,g1,h1←RG\{1},r
[
A′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = (gx0 , hx0) for some x ∈ Z∗|G|
and Aˆ′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = x
]
= neg(k).
Note that, in the above probability, the distribution on (G, g0, h0, g1, h1) is statistically close to uniform
on DDHY,k . (The only difference is that the above probability allows the possibility that DLogg0(h0) =
DLogg1(h1), but this only occurs with probability 1/|G| = neg(k).) Thus, with probability at least
1 − 1/k3 over (G, g0, h0, g1, h1) ←R DDHY,k , we have
Pr
r
[
A′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = (gx0 , hx0) for some x ∈ Z∗|G|
and Aˆ′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = x
]
k3 · neg(k) = neg(k).
Since we deﬁne DDH′Y,k to consist of k random elements of DDHY,k , the following holds with probability
at least 1 − 1/k2 over the choice of DDH′Y,k:
∀ (G, g0, h0, g1, h1) ∈ DDH′Y,k Prr
[
A′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = (gx0 , hx0) for some x ∈ Z∗|G|
and Aˆ′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = x
]
= neg(k). (3)
Theprobability (over the choice ofDDH′Y ) thatEq. (3) does not hold for some kk0 is atmost
∑∞
k=k0(1/k
2),
which tends to 0 as k0 → ∞. Thus, Eq. (3) holds for all PPT A and all sufﬁciently large k with probability
1 over the choice of DDH′Y .
Now we translate this into showing that DI′ satisﬁes Assumption 6.7. Recall that A′(G, g0, h0; r,
g1, h1) = (gx0 , hx0) iff A(C0, C1; r) ∈ Image(C0), where (C0, C1) = (G, g0, h0, g1, h1). So we need
only convert Aˆ′ into an extractor Aˆ for A. We deﬁne Aˆ(C0, C1; r) as follows: compute the instance
(G, g0, g1, h0, h1) = −1(C0, C1), run Aˆ′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) to obtain x ∈ Z∗|G|, and output 0 iff
A′(G, g0, h0; r, g1, h1) = (gx0 , hx0).
With this deﬁnition, Eq. (3) becomes:
∀(C0, C1) ∈ DI′Y Prr [A(C0, C1; r) ∈ Image(C0) ⇐⇒ Aˆ(C0, C1; r) = 0]1 − neg(n)
for all sufﬁciently large n = |(C0, C1)|, as desired. 
To complete the proof, we show that Assumption 6.7 sufﬁces for a nontrivial 2-round zero-knowledge
proof.
Theorem 6.9. If Assumption 6.7 holds, then Protocol 6.6 is a 2-round proof system for a nontrivial
promise problem (speciﬁcally, DI′ /∈ BPP) that is statistical plain zero knowledge. The protocol has
perfect completeness and soundness error 1/2. Moreover, the n-fold parallel repetition of the proof
system is also statistical plain zero knowledge (and has negligible soundness error).
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Proof. We obtain (perfect) completeness and soundness because these properties hold for all instances
of DISJOINT IMAGES . Thus we need only establish the zero-knowledge property on the subproblem DI′.
Given a uniform PPT veriﬁer V ∗, we apply Item 2 ofAssumption 6.7 to A = V ∗ and obtain PPT Aˆ. Then
our simulator S for V ∗ operates as follows on input (C0, C1): Generate random coin tosses r for V ∗, let
 = V ∗(C0, C1; r), let b = Aˆ(C0, C1; r), and output the transcript (, b; r). It follows from the deﬁnition
of Aˆ and the prover P that this simulation has negligible statistical difference from 〈P, V ∗〉(C0, C1)
whenever (C0, C1) ∈ DI′Y .
For the parallel repetition of the protocol, we must consider veriﬁers V ∗ whose ﬁrst message consists
of an n-tuple (1, . . . , n), so we deﬁne A to output one of these components at random. That is, we
deﬁne A(C0, C1; r, i) = V ∗(C0, C1; r)i , and apply Assumption 6.7 to obtain a corresponding extractor
Aˆ. Now, the simulator works as follows on input (C0, C1): Generate random coin tosses r for V ∗, let
(1, . . . , n) = V ∗(C0, C1; r), let bi = Aˆ(C0, C1; r, i) for i = 1, . . . , n, and output the transcript
((1, . . . , n), (b1, . . . , bn); r). 
6.2. Zero knowledge from the power of nondeterminism
In this section we construct a 2-round public-coin proof system that is plain zero knowledge un-
der the hypothesis that trapdoor permutations exist and (a slight strengthening of) the assumption that
Dtime(f (n)) ⊆ NP for some super-polynomial function f (·). Note that this means that every language
that can be recognized in deterministic time f (n) can be solved in nondeterministic polynomial time. We
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.10. Suppose that there exist enhanced trapdoor permutations 18 and that there is a super-
polynomial function f : N → N (i.e., f (n) = n(1)) such that Dtime(f (n)) ⊆ NP. Furthermore,
suppose that this inclusion is constructive in the following sense: given a Turing machine M and input
x ∈ {0, 1}n, if M(x) = 1 within at most t steps for tf (n), then it is possible to obtain a short (i.e.,
poly(n)-sized) NP witness for this fact within poly(t) steps.
Then, there exists a 2-round public-coin proof system for L that is plain zero knowledge, with perfect
completeness, negligible soundness error, and an efﬁcient prover. 19 In fact, it is bounded-resettable zero
knowledge (in the sense of Theorem 4.4).
Proof. Let L ∈ NP. Our 2-round proof system for L will be an implementation of Protocol 6.11, which
is suggested in the full version of [Bar].
The results of [Bar] imply that any implementation of Protocol 6.11 (satisfying a certain prover efﬁ-
ciency condition) will be plain zero knowledge (and even zero knowledge to veriﬁers who have at most
n bits of auxiliary input). The prover efﬁciency condition mentioned above is that given r ∈  and a
machine M that outputs r within tf (n) steps, it should be possible to carry out the prover strategy
18 Informally, an enhanced trapdoor permutation family [Gol4] is trapdoor permutation family where it is hard to ﬁnd a
preimage of a point y in the domain even if the adversary is given the coin tosses used to generate y. We assume the existence
of such families in order to have the existence of noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs (and hence ZAPs [DN]). See discussion
in Goldreich [Gol4, Appendix C.1,C.4.1]
19 Actually, zero knowledge is obtained even with respect to veriﬁers with “bounded auxiliary input”; i.e., veriﬁers who have
an a priori polynomial bound on the length of the auxiliary input that they receive.
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Public input: x ∈ {0, 1}n (statement to be proved is “x ∈ L”)
w
↓
x
↓
P V
Prover’s auxiliary input: w (a witness that x ∈ L)
Steps V1 (Send long random string): Veriﬁer sends r ←R {0, 1}10n. r ←R {0, 1}10n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Step P2 (WI Proof): Prover proves to veriﬁer using its input w via a
witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof/argument system that either x ∈ L
or r ∈ , where r ∈  iff there exists a Turing machine M of description
length at most |r|2 such that, on the empty input, M outputs r within f (n)
steps. The veriﬁer accepts if the proof is completed successfully.
w
↓ x, r↓
WI Proof
x ∈ L
or r ∈ 
↓
0/1
The right column contains a schematic description of the protocol as deﬁned in the left column.
Protocol 6.11. Generic bounded auxiliary-input zero-knowledge protocol.
of the WI Proof (Step P2) in time poly(t). (This is what the simulator does, taking M to be the veriﬁer
strategy V ∗, with coin tosses reduced to n via a pseudorandom generator.) In [Bar], theWI Proof is imple-
mented by a protocol that has several rounds and is only computationally sound. Thus a constant-round
zero-knowledge argument, rather than a 2-round zero-knowledge proof, is obtained.
The crucial observation in the proof is that under our assumptions, the language  is in fact in NP.
Therefore, for the second stage we can use a ZAP [DN], which is a 2-round, public-coin witness-
indistinguishable (statistically sound) proof system for NP. The resulting protocol has 2 rounds because
Step V1 of our protocol can be sent along with the veriﬁer message of the ZAP. ZAPs are known to
exist if (enhanced) trapdoor permutations exist [DN]. Because a random string r will have Kolmogorov
complexity higher than |r|/2 with very high probability, and because ZAPS are proof systems (i.e. are
statistically sound), our protocol will also be statistically sound.
The requirement that the inclusion of Dtime(f (n)) in NP be constructive is used to satisfy the prover
efﬁciency condition mentioned above. (The ZAP prover is efﬁcient given an NP witness.)
To obtain bounded-resettable zero knowledge, we have the prover use a pseudorandom function for
its randomness; the proof that the modiﬁed protocol is bounded-resettable zero knowledge is a simpler
version of the proof of Theorem 7.1 and hence is omitted here. 
6.3. A two-round zero-knowledge argument for NP?
The technique used above in the proof of Theorem 6.10 can also be used to show a connection between
the existence of 2-round plain zero-knowledge arguments and a conjecture of Micali [Mic] regarding the
existence of noninteractive (or two-round 20 ) CS proofs (or universal arguments [BG]). Speciﬁcally, we
show that if two-round universal arguments exist (i.e. if Micali’s conjecture is true), then NP has 2-round
20 Micali’s conjecture refers to CS Proofs that are noninteractive in Common Random String Model; this is equivalent to
considering two-round, public-coin protocols.
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plain zero-knowledge argument systems. 21 In other words, in order to extend the impossibility of results
of Section 3 to argument systems, one must refute Micali’s conjecture.
For our purposes we can use the following somewhat simpliﬁed and ad hoc deﬁnition of universal
arguments:
Deﬁnition 6.12 (Universal Arguments). Let f : N → N be a (polynomial-time computable) super-
polynomial function, and let Rf be the following Ntime(f (n))-hard relation: (M ◦ x,w) ∈ Rf (where
x ∈ {0, 1}∗, M is a description of a Turing machine, and ◦ denotes concatenation) if |w|f (|x|) and on
input (x,w), the machine M halts within |w| steps and outputs 1.
A universal argument system is a computationally sound argument system for the language Lf = LRf
satisfying the following requirements:
Efﬁcient veriﬁcation: The protocol is polynomially bounded and the veriﬁer runs in probabilistic poly-
nomial time. That is, there is a polynomial p(·) such that the total running time of the veriﬁer (and hence
also the total communication complexity of both parties) when interacting in a proof forM ◦x is bounded
by p(|M ◦ x|).
Efﬁcient prover: On input (M ◦ x,w) ∈ Rf the honest prover algorithm P runs in time polynomial
in |M ◦ x| + |w| (even if this is shorter than f (|x|)) and causes the honest veriﬁer to accept with
probability 1.
Computational soundness against 2n-sized circuits: There exists some  > 0 such that if M ◦ x ∈ Lf
then for every 2n-sized circuit P ∗ (where n = |M ◦ x|), the probability that V outputs 1 after interacting
with P ∗ on input M ◦ x is negligible.
Public veriﬁability: The veriﬁer decides whether to accept or reject the proof by applying a linear-
sized circuit to the protocol’s transcript of messages exchanged (which need not include the veriﬁer’s
coin tosses nor the input statement). This acceptance circuit can be constructed in polynomial time from
the input statement and the transcript. 22
A constant-round public-coin protocol satisfying Deﬁnition 6.12 (with respect to any function f (·)
such that f (n) < 2n) can be constructed under standard assumptions (namely, the existence of hash
functions that are collision resistant with respect to subexponential-sized circuits [Kil,Mic,BG]). Micali
[Mic] suggested a two-round public-coin protocol that may satisfy Deﬁnition 6.12 (in this protocol the
veriﬁer’s ﬁrst message consists of sending a hash function, which is then used to make the constant-
round protocol non-interactive by following the Fiat–Shamir heuristic). We now prove the following
theorem:
Theorem 6.13. Suppose that there exist two-round universal argument systems for Ntime(f (n)) for
some super-polynomial f : N → N and that there exist enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then, there
21 Micali himself had observed that his conjecture implies 3-round zero-knowledge arguments forNP (personal communication,
June 2003).
22 Note that the size of the acceptance circuit is linear in the length of the transcript and so if the communication complexity
of the protocol is shorter than the length of the input statement then so will be the running time. This property is not important
in this section but will be important in Section 7. The requirement of linear size is not essential, and any ﬁxed polynomial
would do.
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exists a 2-round plain zero-knowledge argument system for NP, with perfect completeness, negligible
soundness error, and an efﬁcient prover. Furthermore, if the universal argument system is public coin,
then so is the obtained zero-knowledge system.
Proof. Under the assumed trapdoor permutation family, we can construct a commitment scheme Comw
(where the superscriptw stands for “weak”) that can be broken in time 2n/2 where the universal argument
system is secure against 2n-sized circuits. (When reducing the soundness of our protocol to that of
the universal argument, we will need to break the commitment scheme. This “complexity leveraging
technique” was ﬁrst introduced in [CGGM].) We will assume for simplicity that we have a 1-round WI
system (as the one of [BOV], that requires an additional assumption), even though we can use also the
ZAP system of [DN] in its place and hence the result does hold under the stated assumptions. 23 Our
2-round zero-knowledge protocol for NP is Protocol 6.14. It is a variant of Protocol 6.11 and hence is
zero knowledge for similar reasons.
The completeness property of this protocol is fairly straightforward. To prove computational soundness,
we note that if there is a polynomial-time cheating prover P ∗ that causes the honest veriﬁer to accept
x ∈ L with nonnegligible probability then we can convert it to a 2O(n/2)-time cheating prover P ∗∗ for
the universal argument system. Indeed, with extremely high probability the random string r chosen by
the veriﬁer is not a member of , but by using brute force to extract the message committed to by P ∗, the
prover P ∗∗ can obtain a convincing UA proof that r ∈  (note that the commitment must contain such a
message since x ∈ L and the WI system is statistically (or even perfectly) sound).
The proof of plain zero knowledge is almost identical to the proof in [Bar]. Given a PPT veriﬁer strategy
V ∗, the simulator uses a pseudorandom generator to reduce the number of coins V ∗ uses to n. Since V ∗
is a uniform algorithm, and hence can be assumed to have description length of at most n, we see that
this code, along with x and the random coins, can be used as a witness that r ∈  by the simulator.
The simulator uses this witness to compute a commitment to the honest prover message of the universal
argument system in Step P2a. In Step P2b it then uses the honest prover algorithm of the WI system
to prove that either x ∈ L or z is a commitment to an accepting message. Indistinguishability follows
from indistinguishability of the commitment scheme and the WI property of the proof system used in
Step P2b. 
7. A constant-round public-coin bounded-resettable ZK argument
In this section, we show that under a strong but standard assumption (namely the existence of strongly
collision-resistant hash function and trapdoor permutations) there does exist a constant-round public-coin
bounded-resettable zero-knowledge argument system for NP. Namely, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7.1. Assume that there exist families of hash functions that are collision resistant against 2n-
sized circuits (for some constant  > 0) and that there exist enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then
23 Simply plugging in the ZAP system instead of the 1-round system in Step P2b seems to yield a 3-round protocol, as the
ZAP system takes two rounds. However, because ZAPs are public coin, the veriﬁer’s ﬁrst message in the ZAP is independent of
the statement proven, and so the veriﬁer can send this message as Step V1c.
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Public input: x ∈ {0, 1}n (statement to be proved is “x ∈ L”)
w
↓
x
↓
P V
Prover’s auxiliary input: w (a witness that x ∈ L)
Steps V1a (Send long random string): Veriﬁer sends r ←R {0, 1}10n. r ←R {0, 1}10n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Steps V1b (Send ﬁrst message of UA): Veriﬁer sends its ﬁrst message v
of a universal argument proof that r ∈ . As in Protocol 6.11, r ∈  iff
there exists a Turing machine M of description length at most |r|2 such
that, on the empty input, M outputs r within f (n) steps. Note that  is
easily reducible to Lf .
v←−−−
Step P2a (“Encrypted” UA): Prover sends z = Comw(0m) where m is
the length of the prover’s message in a universal argument proof for r .
Comw is a commitment that can be completely broken in time 2n/2 .
z = Comw(0m)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Step P2b (WI Proof): Prover proves to veriﬁer using its input w via a
one-message witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof/argument system that
either x ∈ L or z is a commitment to a message p such that (v, p) is an
accepting transcript in the universal argument system for the statement
r ∈ .
w
↓ x, r↓
WI Proof
x ∈ L
or r ∈ 
↓
0/1
Protocol 6.14. Uniform zero-knowledge using two-round universal arguments.
there exists a constant-round, public-coin bounded-resettable auxiliary-input zero-knowledge argument
for NP. Moreover, the protocol has perfect completeness, negligible soundness error, and an efﬁcient
prover.
This result is interesting for two reasons:
1. This is the ﬁrst construction of a constant-round argument system that is bounded-resettable zero
knowledge in the plainmodel.This is also theﬁrst construction of a bounded-resettable zero-knowledge
argument that is public-coin (regardless of the number of rounds).
2. This construction demonstrates that the lower bound of Section 4 for resettable proofs cannot be
extended to argument systems.
7.1. Proof of Theorem 7.1
The proof is based on using a ZAP (i.e., a 2-round, public-coin resettable-WI proof system) [DN] as
a component in the concurrent zero-knowledge protocol of [Bar]. To prove Theorem 7.1, we construct a
constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge argument that remains zero knowledge even under attack by
a veriﬁer that is allowed to reset the prover (as in the model of [CGGM]) a ﬁxed polynomial number of
times. Our construction is Protocol 7.2, which is a variant of a concurrent zero-knowledge argument of
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Public input: x ∈ {0, 1}n (statement to be proved is “x ∈ L”)
w
↓
x
↓
P V
Prover’s auxiliary input: w (a witness that x ∈ L)
b is a ﬁxed constant determined in the proof, and c is an arbitrary given constant.
(The protocol will be zero knowledge against nc resets where n is the length
of the input.)
Step V1 (Send hash function): Veriﬁer sends h which is a description of
random hash function chosen from a collision-resistant hash function
collection H. We assume that h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
h ←R H←−−−−−−−−
Step P2 (Commitment to “junk”): Prover sends z = Com(0n). z = Com(0n)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Step V3 (Send long random string): Veriﬁer sends r ←R {0, 1}nc+b+2 . r ←R {0, 1}n
c+b+2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Steps P,V4–7 (“Encrypted” universal argument): The following is re-
peated twice: the Veriﬁer sends a random string of length n to prover,
and prover sends a commitment to 0n. We denote the transcript of this
stage by 〈, , , 	〉.
 ←R {0, 1}n←−−−−−−−−−−−
 = Com(0n)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
 ←R {0, 1}n←−−−−−−−−−−−
	 = Com(0n)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Step P8 (rWI Proof): Prover proves to veriﬁer using its input w via a
resettable-witness-indistinguishable (rWI) proof system that either x ∈ L
or the decommitted messages of the transcript 〈, , , 	〉 in Steps P,V4–7
form an accepting transcript in a universal argument system for the state-
ment 〈h, z, r〉 ∈ . The language  is deﬁned as follows: 〈h, z, r〉 ∈ 
iff there exists a Turing machine M and strings s and y such that |y| |r|2 ,
z = Com(h(M); s) and M(z, y) outputs r within nlog n steps.
w
↓ x, r↓
rWI -proof
x ∈ L
or
〈, , , 	〉
proves that
〈z, h, r〉 ∈ 
↓
0/1
Protocol 7.2. bounded-rZK public-coin argument
Barak [Bar]. Let c be any constant. We will design a protocol that is zero knowledge against any veriﬁer
that resets the prover at most nc times, where n is the length of the statement to be proven. We will also
ensure that the prover communication complexity of the protocol is at most nb for a ﬁxed constant b
(independent of c).
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Remarks on implementation of Protocol 7.2.
• We note that under our the assumed hash functions, there exists a constant-round public-coin universal
argument system (as per Deﬁnition 6.12) for the language  [Kil,Mic,Bar,BG].
• We will use the fact that under our assumptions, for every constant  > 0 we can obtain a universal
argument system for  in which the total communication complexity is of length at most m, where
m is the length of the statement proven, and hence the veriﬁer decides its acceptance also by applying
a O(m)-time circuit (which can be constructed in time poly(m) from the statement being proven and
the transcript). By choosing  < 1/(c + b + 2), we ensure that the communication complexity of the
universal argument is at most n. This allows for the communication complexity of the rWI proof to
be a ﬁxed polynomial in n. Thus the total prover communication of the entire Protocol 7.2 is O(nb)
for a ﬁxed constant b (independent of c). In fact, all messages of the protocol except for the veriﬁer
message of Step V3 will be of size O(nb).
• The commitments used in this protocol are perfectly (or statistically) binding and computationally
hiding. For simplicity we assume that these commitments are noninteractive; such commitments can
be constructed based on one-to-one one-way functions [Blu1] or based on one-way functions and
Assumption 3.2 [BOV]. However, our protocol will be secure if the noninteractive commitments
are replaced with the 2-round scheme of Naor [Nao1], which can be based on any 1-way function.
Also, for simplicity, we will assume that the WI proof used in Step P8 consists of a single message.
Such a system can be constructed based on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations and
Assumption 3.2 [BOV]. However, our construction will remain secure even if we use the 2-round WI
proof of [DN], which is based only on enhanced trapdoor permutations. 24
• The subexponentially hard hash functions imply subexponentially hard 1-way functions, and hence a
subexponentially hard commitment scheme via [Nao1]. We set the security parameter of the commit-
ment scheme in such a way that for all the commitments used in the protocol, recovering the plaintext
by brute force can be done in time 2o(n). (As in the proof of Theorem 6.13, this is used in proving
soundness via the “complexity leveraging technique” of [CGGM].)
• To obtain the bounded-resettable zero-knowledge condition, the prover should choose a pseudorandom
function, and in each step obtain the random coins needed by applying the pseudorandom function on
the message history of the protocol.
7.2. Analyzing Protocol 7.2
In this section we prove that Protocol 7.2 is a bounded-rZK argument. As in [Bar], completeness
follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the protocol. The soundness condition also follows as in
[Bar], with one variant. There, theWI system used in Step P8 is a proof of knowledge, and the knowledge
extractor for this proof is used to obtain from a cheating prover an accepting transcript for the universal
arguments. Later, a collision for the hash function is obtained from this transcript. Here we use only a
proof of membership in Step P8. However, we can still recover an accepting transcript in time 2o(n), by
using brute force on the commitment scheme. This implies that we can treat the WI system as a proof of
24 We can replace the noninteractive commitments and WI proofs with the schemes of [Nao1,DN] by simply having the
receiver/veriﬁer send the ﬁrst messages of these schemes (which are independent of the input) as the ﬁrst message of
Protocol 7.2.
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knowledge (albeit with a 2o(n)-time extractor) and hence soundness is obtained by the analysis of [Bar]
(since the hash function we use is collision-resistant even against 2o(n)-time adversaries).
Bounded rZK : We now show why Protocol 7.2 remains zero knowledge against a veriﬁer that is
allowed to reset the prover at most nc times. Let V ∗ be such a resetting veriﬁer. Our simulator will
compute V ∗’s view by executing the veriﬁer, giving it access to a modiﬁed version of the honest prover
strategy. Speciﬁcally, it will deviate from this strategy in the following way:
• In Step P2 it will compute z = Com(h(desc(V ∗))), where desc(V ∗) denotes the description of the
veriﬁer’s strategy, with its auxiliary input and coin tosses hardwired in.
• In the ﬁrst time that the simulator receives a string r as veriﬁer message of Step V3 of some session,
the simulator will record the history r = (p1, . . . , pk) of all messages the veriﬁer has received so
far across all executions (where kO(nc), since the protocol has a constant number of rounds). Note
that since each prover message in the protocol is of size at most O(nb), we have |r | = O(nc+b) =
o(nc+b+2) (and hence we can assume |r | nc+b+22 ). (Note that even if the simulator receives r again
as a veriﬁer message of a later session, it still keeps the original recorded sequence r .)
• When computing themessages of Steps P,V4–7, the simulatorwill run the honest prover of the universal
argument scheme to prove the (true) statement that 〈h, z, r〉 ∈ . It uses the recorded sequence of
messages r as auxiliary input to the universal-argument prover algorithm.
We note that the simulator will also use a random function for randomness in each step, that is applied
to the message history (of the current session) so far. The simulator can use a truly random function, by
choosing the function incrementally, tossing fresh coins whenever it needs to compute the function on a
new input.
Proving that the simulator’s output is indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view: The proof that the
simulator’s output is indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view uses the hybrid argument. We consider
the following sequence of hybrids, and claim that each one of them is computationally indistinguishable
from the preceding one.
Hybrid H0. Hybrid H0 denotes the veriﬁer’s view when mounting a bounded reset attack on the honest
prover.
Hybrid H1. This hybrid denotes the veriﬁer’s view when the honest prover uses a truly random function.
Indistinguishability from H0 follows from the security of the pseudorandom function ensemble.
Hybrid H2. We modify H1 by having the prover use a commitment to h(V ∗) instead of to 0n in Step
P2 of all sessions. Indistinguishability from H1 follows from the security of the commitment scheme.
Note that a commitment of Step P2 of some session in Hybrid H1 is either identical to a commitment
of some previous session (if the history up to that point is identical in both session) or uses completely
independent coins from the ones used in all previous sessions. For commitments that use completely
independent coins, security follows in a straightforward way from the hiding property of the commit-
ment scheme. However, we need to show that if a commitment in Step P2 in some session i is identical
to a commitment in Step P2 for some previous session j in Hybrid H1, then these commitments would
remain identical also in Hybrid H2 (where we commit to h(V ∗) instead of 0n). However, this will
indeed be the case since the history includes the hash function h that is used in the commitment (and
the veriﬁer’s code V ∗ is identical across all sessions).
Hybrid H3. We modify H2 by having the prover use commitments to messages computed by the honest
universal argument prover in Steps P,V4–7. Indistinguishability from H2 follows from the security
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of the commitment scheme. Once again we need to verify that identical commitments in Hybrid H2
remain identical in Hybrid H3. However, commitments in Hybrid H2 can be identical only if the history
of messages up to the point where the commitment was made was identical. However, in this case the
simulator will use exactly the same prover strategy to compute its messages in the two sessions 25 and
hence the commitments to the prover messages will remain identical.
Hybrid H4. We modify H3 by having the prover use the second case in the WI proof of Step P8.
Indistinguishability follows from the WI property. Note that in this case, because we assume the rWI
proof consists only of a single message (as in the system of [BOV]), which is the last message of
the session, we can assume that every two different sessions differ in the history up to this point (as
otherwise they are completely identical and hence redundant). We note that H4 is identical to the
simulator’s output. 26
8. Zero knowledge from a CIRCUIT SAT algorithm
In this section we construct a constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge strong proof of knowledge
for NP, under the assumption that there exist 1-way functions 27 and that there is a nontrivial algorithm
for the CIRCUIT SATISFIABILITY problem (CSAT). By nontrivial we mean an algorithm for CSAT that on
input a circuitC : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, runs in time 2o(k) ·poly(|C|).Again, this assumption is a strengthening
of the negation ofAssumption 5.8 and seems likely to be false. However, we note that it seems compatible
with the assumption that factoring is hard for sub-exponential-sized circuits, and thus does not directly
contradict most known cryptographic construction. Thus, this result shows that assuming some sort of
exponential (and not just subexponential) lower bound is necessary to rule out zero-knowledge strong
proofs of knowledge (as we indeed do). Also, the protocol that we construct is in fact the parallel version
of Blum’s protocol for HAMILTONICITY . The question of whether or not this protocol is zero knowledge or
not has been a long-standing open question, and this result shows that to resolve it negatively will require
making some strong assumptions. See Section 9 for more discussion on this and related questions.
In the course of the proof, we prove that if such a nontrivial CSAT algorithm exists, then it is possible
to generate in polynomial time an (almost) uniformly distributed witness for every NP problem that has
at least a (n)-fraction of witnesses, where (·) is some ﬁxed negligible function (i.e., (n) = 2−(log n)).
This result may be of independent interest.
Notations
Circuit satisﬁability problem: We use the standard deﬁnitions for boolean circuits. We will identify
a boolean circuit C with its representation as a string in {0, 1}∗. We deﬁne |C| to be the length of this
representation. The language CSAT consists of all the circuits C that have a satisfying assignment (i.e.,
an input x, such that C(x) = 1). The trivial exhaustive-search algorithm decides if C is in CSAT in time
25 This is the reason we insisted that the simulator uses the ﬁrst sequence r = (p1, . . . , pk) of prover messages that yields r,
so that this sequence, which is used as auxiliary input to the prover strategy, will be identical in the two sessions.
26 The same reasoning works also if the rWI system consists of two messages, as in the case of the ZAP system of [DN].
27 Actually, we will need to use a “nice” 1-way function; i.e., a 1-way function that cannot be inverted in time h(·), where h(n)
is a super-polynomial function that is computable in poly(n) time (e.g., h(n) = nlog log n).
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2k ·poly(|C|), where k is the input length ofC.We say that CSAT has a nontrivial algorithm if there exists
a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that decides CSAT in time T (k) · poly(|C|), where T (k) = 2o(k) and
T (k) is computable in time 2o(k). By the usual reduction from search to decision, this implies that it is
possible to ﬁnd a satisfying assignment toC in time T (k) ·poly(|C|).We note that the existence of such an
algorithm is inconsistent withAssumption 5.8 (used in our lower bound for strong proofs of knowledge):
for any poly(n)-time computable function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ and string y, we can ﬁnd a preimage
of y under f in time 2o(n) by ﬁnding a satisfying assignment of the circuit Cy deﬁned by Cy(x) = 1 iff
f (x) = y.
An equivalent formulation to the hypothesis that CSAT has a nontrivial algorithm is that, for some
k(n) = (log n), there exists a PPT A such that for every circuit C with at most k(n) variables (i.e. input
gates), A(1n, C) outputs a satisfying assignment for C in time poly(n, |C|). Another formulation is that it
is possible to simulate Turingmachines with k(n)-bounded nondeterminism (i.e., polynomial-timeTuring
machines that can have access to at most k(n) nondeterministic bits) in probabilistic polynomial time,
for some function k(n) = (log n).
Nice one-way functions: A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is one-way if for nonuniform polynomial-
time algorithm C (i.e. family of polynomial-sized circuits), there is a negligible function  such that
Pr
y←Rf (Un)
[C(y) ∈ f−1(y)] = (n),
where  : N → [0, 1] is some negligible function. An equivalent condition (cf. [Bel]) is that there exists
some function h : N → N such that h(·) is super-polynomial (i.e., h(n) = n(1)) and such that for every
circuit C of size at most h(n), it holds that
Pr
y←Rf (Un)
[C(f (y)) ∈ f−1(y)] < 1
h(n)
.
We say that f (·) is a nice one-way function if this condition holds for some super-polynomial function
h(·) such that h(n) is computable in poly(n) time (e.g., h(n) = nlog log n).
The main theorem of this section is Theorem 8.1, whose proof is given in the next subsection
(Section 8.1).
Theorem 8.1. Suppose that CIRCUIT SATISFIABILITY has a nontrivial algorithm and that there exists a
nice one-to-one one-way function. Then, for every NP relation R, there exists a zero-knowledge proof for
LR with the following properties:
1. It has 3 rounds.
2. It is a (statistically sound) proof with negligible soundness error.
3. It is a public-coin protocol.
4. It is a strong proof of knowledge for R (with a non-black-box knowledge extractor).
5. It is auxiliary-input zero knowledge (with a non-black-box simulator).
Before describing the protocol, we ﬁrst state the main implications of our assumptions that will be
used in the proof.
Lemma 8.2 (noninteractive commitments [Blu1]). If there exists a nice one-to-one one-way function,
then there exists a nice noninteractive commitment scheme Com. That is, there is a poly(n)-time com-
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putable function h(n) = n(1) such that for every n, circuit C of size at most h(n), and every two messages
m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}n, 28
|Pr [C(Com(m0)) = 1]− Pr [C(Com(m1)) = 1] | 1h(n) .
We call h(n) the security of the commitment scheme.
The “one-to-one” constraint on the one-way function is only needed to ensure that the commitment
scheme is noninteractive, which is needed for our ﬁnal zero-knowledge proof system to have 3 rounds.
We can also obtain a 3-round proof system using the noninteractive commitment scheme of Barak et al.
[BOV], which is based on incomparable assumptions. Assuming just the existence of a (nice) one-way
function, it is possible to obtain a 4-round proof system with the same properties, using the commitment
scheme of Naor [Nao1].
The other implication of our assumptions is given in the following lemma,whichmay be of independent
interest. Loosely speaking, this lemma says that if we can solve CSAT for k-variable circuits of size
poly(n), then we can sample a random satisfying assignment for any circuit of size poly(n) (with any
number of variables) whose fraction of satisfying assignments is larger than 2−k .
Lemma 8.3 (witness generation from a CSAT algorithm). Suppose there exists a nontrivial algorithm
for CSAT. Then there exists a poly(n)-time computable function k(n) = (log n) and a PPT algorithm A
such that the following holds. For every n and every circuit C that accepts more than a 2−k(n) fraction of
inputs, the randomvariableA(1n, C)has statistical difference atmost2−(n) from the uniformdistribution
on C’s satisfying assignments.
Lemma 8.3 is proven in Section 8.1.1.
8.1. The protocol and its analysis
The idea behind the proof is to use the k-times parallel composition of Blum’s zero-knowledge protocol
for proving HAMILTONICITY [Blu2], for k = (log n). The resulting protocol is well known to be a 3-
round public-coin proof system for HAMILTONICITY , with negligible soundness error. However, this
protocol is not known to be zero knowledge, or to be a strong proof of knowledge. Nonetheless, we show
that under the assumptions of Theorem 8.1, it is in fact a zero-knowledge strong proof of knowledge.
We prove Theorem 8.1 by fully describing the zero-knowledge protocol that we use and analyzing its
properties.
Given input length n, we choose k = k(n) such that:
1. It is possible to ﬁnd satisfying assignments to circuits C that have at most 2k variables in time
poly(n, |C|).
2. It is possible to almost-uniformly generate satisfying assignments for circuits C (with any number of
variables) that accept at least a 2−2k fraction of inputs in time poly(n, |C|).
3. There exists a nice noninteractive commitment scheme (for messages of length up to n) with security
22k .
28 To commit to shorter messages, simply pad them to length n.
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Public input: x = (xi,j ), the adjacency matrix of an undi-
rected graph on n vertices.
Prover’s auxiliary input:w, a hamiltonian cycle in the graph
x
w
↓
x
↓
P V
Step P1 (Commitment to permuted graph): Prover selects
a random permutation  on the vertices, and computes a
commitment to the permuted graph. That is, prover sends
the matrix of commitments C = (Ci,j ) where Ci,j =
Com(x(i),(j)).
C = (Com(x(i),(j)))i,j∈[n]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
StepV2 (Send random query): The veriﬁer selects a random
bit b ←R {0, 1} and sends it.
b ←R {0, 1}←−−−−−−−−−−−
Step P3 (Open commitments): If b = 0 then the prover
sends decommitments for all the commitments sent in Step P1
and in addition sends the permutation  chosen in that step.
Otherwise (if b = 1) the prover sends decommitments only
for the commitments that correspond to the edges of (w)
(i.e., the edges of the permuted Hamiltonian cycle).
decommitments−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If b = 0 then the veriﬁer accepts iff all decommitments are valid
and form a graph x′ such that x′ = (x) (i.e., x′i,j = x(i),(j)
for all i, j ∈ [n]).
If b = 1 then the veriﬁer accepts iff the decommitments sent are
for a Hamiltonian cycle and all the opened commitments are to
the value 1.
Protocol 8.4. Blum’s basic protocol [Blu2]
By our assumptions and Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3, it is possible to choose such a k(n) so that k(n) can be
computed in poly(n)-time and k(n) = (log n).
Blum’s HAMILTONICITY protocol. We let HAM denote the NP-complete language of all Hamiltonian
graphs (i.e., n vertex graphs that contain the n-cycle as a subgraph). Blum’s basic protocol for proving
membership in HAM is Protocol 8.4. It is a 3-round public-coin proof for HAM with soundness error
equal to 12 .
Our protocol. Our protocol is the k = k(n)-times parallel composition of Protocol 8.4. That is, to prove
that x ∈ HAM, the veriﬁer and prover run k independent copies of Protocol 8.4 in parallel, where in each
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copy x is the common input. The veriﬁer accepts iff all the copies are accepting. The combined protocol
is clearly a 3-round public-coin proof system for HAM with soundness error 2−k(n) (which is negligible
since k = (log n)). Thus, all that remains is to prove that it is zero knowledge and a strong proof of
knowledge. This is proven in Claims 8.5 and 8.8.
Claim 8.5. Under the assumptions of Theorem 8.1, the k(n)-times parallel composition of Protocol 8.4
is zero knowledge.
Proof. We prove the claim in two stages. First, we show a “slow” simulator (i.e., a simulator than runs in
roughly 2k steps) for this protocol whose output is computationally indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s
view; this simulator will use the fact that the commitment scheme is secure against 25k-sized circuits. We
will then show that using the almost-uniform generation (via Lemma 8.3), it is possible to “speed up”
this simulator and obtain a new simulator that runs in polynomial time, and whose output is statistically
indistinguishable from the output of the original simulator.
The “slow” simulator: Our 2k-time simulator is the natural extension of the simulator of the basic
protocol (Protocol 8.4) to the parallel composed protocol. Loosely speaking, the simulator works by
choosing b1, . . . , bk ←R {0, 1}, and simulating the protocol under the assumption that the veriﬁer’s
query in the lth copy will be bl . If this guess was correct, the simulator manages to simulate the entire
transcript. Otherwise, the simulator fails (or tries again). We now give a more precise description of the
simulator’s operation:
Algorithm 8.6 (A “slow” simulator). Input:
• x : a graph over n vertices.
• A circuit specifying a (deterministic) veriﬁer strategy V ∗. 29 (Actually, this “slow” simulator only
requires black-box access to V ∗).
1. Choose b1, . . . , bk ←R {0, 1}
2. For every 1 lk do the following:
• If bl = 0 then choose l to be a random permutation over [n] and let Cl = Com(l(x)) (i.e., Cl
is a matrix of commitments such that Cli,j = Com(x(i),(j))).
• If bl = 1 then choose cl to be a random cycle on n vertices and compute Cl to be a commitment
to the cycle cl (i.e., Cli,j = Com(1) iff (i, j) is an edge in cl).
3. Feed C1, . . . , Ck to the veriﬁer V ∗ and obtain its response 1, . . . , k .
4. If l = bl for some 1 lk, halt and output fail. (In this case, we say that the simulator has failed,
and otherwise the simulator has succeeded.)
5. For every 1 lk compute Dl as follows:
• If bl = l = 0 then Dl is a string that contains l and all the decommitments of the matrix Cl .
29 A simulator for deterministic veriﬁers implies a simulator for randomized veriﬁers, because the simulator can randomly
choose coin tosses for the veriﬁer and hardwire them into the circuit.
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• If bl = l = 1 then let Dl be a string that contain only the decommitments of Cl that correspond
to edges in the cycle cl . (That is, decommit to all the 1’s in Cl .)
6. The output of the simulator is the view (〈C1, . . . , Ck〉, 〈D1, . . . , Dk〉).
The properties of this simulator are given in the following claim:
Claim 8.6.1. For every polynomial-sized veriﬁer V ∗ and x ∈ HAM, on input (x, V ∗)Algorithm 8.6 suc-
ceeds with probability at least 2−2k . Furthermore, conditioned on success, the output of
Algorithm 8.6 is computationally indistinguishable from the view of V ∗ in an interaction with the honest
prover on input x.
Thus, we can obtain a simulator that succeeds with high probability by running Algorithm 8.6 up to
n·22k times and taking its ﬁrst successful output. But, since k = (log n), this takes superpolynomial time.
(This is why we call it a “slow” simulator.) However, we will now show how we can use it to construct a
polynomial-time simulator (and give the proof of Claim 8.6.1 afterwards.) Our polynomial-time simulator
is the following algorithm:
Algorithm 8.7 (A “fast” simulator). Input:
• x : a graph over n vertices.
• A circuit specifying a (deterministic) veriﬁer strategy V ∗.
1. Using Property 2 of the choice of k, generate an almost-uniformly distributed random tape r such
that Algorithm 8.6 on input (x, V ∗) and random tape r is successful.
2. Output the output of Algorithm 8.6 on input (x, V ∗) and random tape r.
By Claim 8.6.1, a fraction of at least 2−2k of the random tapes for Algorithm 8.6 result in a successful
iteration. Thus the procedure of Property 2 will indeed work, and the output of Algorithm 8.7 will be
statistically indistinguishable from the output of Algorithm 8.6. By Claim 8.6.1, this means that this
output is computationally indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view.
We see that all that is left to do is to prove Claim 8.6.1
Proof of Claim 8.6.1. Let x ∈ HAM and let w be a hamiltonian cycle in the graph x. We let Shyb denote
the following “hybrid simulator”: Shyb gets as auxiliary input x, V ∗ and the witness w, and follows the
strategy ofAlgorithm 8.6 on inputV ∗, x with onemodiﬁcation: In Step 2, it computesCl for each 1 lk,
to be a commitment of a random permutation of the input graph x, regardless of the value of bl . However,
if bl = 1 then let cl denote the image of the cycle w under the permutation. Note that cl is a random
n-cycle.
We now make several claims involving this hybrid simulator.
• The output of Shyb, conditioned on success, is identical to the view of the veriﬁer in a real execution.
This can be veriﬁed by inspection.
• Shyb succeeds with probability exactly 2−k . This is because the hybrid simulator generates the message
〈C1, . . . , Ck〉 independently of the choice of b1, . . . , bk , and so this message contains no information
on this choice.
• The output of Shyb cannot be distinguished (by a poly-sized distinguisher) from the output of S with
advantage greater than poly(n) · 2−2k . (Here we do not condition on success.) This is because the
commitment scheme has security 22k (by Property 3 of the choice of k). Speciﬁcally, note that the
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only difference between the output of the “hybrid simulator” and the output of the real simulator is
that in the real simulator’s output, some of the Cl’s contain commitments to a random n-cycle (instead
of to a random permutation of the input x). The commitments which differ (namely those for edges
outside of l(w)) are never opened. Thus any distinguisher between the output of these simulators can
be converted into a distinguisher for the commitment scheme.
• The original simulator S has a success probability of 2−k ± 2−2k . This follows from the previous two
items.
• The output of Shyb conditioned on success, is computationally indistinguishable from the output of S
conditioned on success. This follows from the previous three items. When we condition on success,
the advantage of any distinguisher can increase by a factor of at most 1/(2−k − 2−2k). Therefore, any
poly-sized distinguisher has advantage at most poly(n) ·2−2k/(2−k −2−2k) < 2 ·poly(n) ·2−k , which
is negligible.
Combining the ﬁrst item and the last item, we conclude that the output of S conditioned on success
is computationally indistinguishable from the V ∗’s view of the interaction, completing the proof of the
claim. 
This concludes the proof of zero knowledge; we now proceed to show that Protocol 8.4 is also a strong
argument of knowledge.
Claim 8.8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 8.1, the k(n)-times parallel composition of Protocol 8.4
is a strong argument of knowledge, with soundness error s(n) = 2−k(n).
Proof. Let P ∗ be any polynomial-time prover strategy, with its coin tosses and auxiliary input
hardwired in. Suppose that for some x, P ∗ manages to cause the honest veriﬁer in all k iterations of
Protocol 8.4 to accept with probability larger than 2−k . Because the prover P ∗ is deterministic, so is its
ﬁrst message 〈C1, . . . , Ck〉. This means that there exist at least two different choices of veriﬁer messages
 = ′ ∈ {0, 1}k , such that if P ∗ is given either  or ′, then its response is valid. Finding  and ′
can be formulated as a CSAT problem for a poly(n)-sized circuit with 2k variables, and thus can be
solved in polynomial time by Property 1 of our choice of k. Once we ﬁnd such  and ′, we let l be a
coordinate in which they differ. From the prover’s response in the lth instance of the protocol we can
obtain a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph x (because we obtain both the permutation and the permuted
cycle). 
8.1.1. Proof of Lemma 8.3
Our starting point is the fact that it is possible to almost-uniformly generate satisfying assignments to
a circuit in probabilistic polynomial time with an NP oracle [JVV,BGP]. The key observation is that if
the circuit accepts at least a 2−k fraction of inputs, then all the oracle queries can be made instances of
CSAT on O(k) variables.
Speciﬁcally, we start with the algorithm byBellare et al. [BGP] (see also [Gol3, Lec. 6]), which actually
achieves perfect uniform generation. We modify the algorithm and implement some steps in a different
way, in order to ensure that all the queries are on circuits of a small number of variables.
Given a CSAT algorithm A(1n, C) that ﬁnds satisfying assignments when C has at most k = k(n)
variables, we will construct a sampler B(1n, C) that generates almost-uniform satisfying assignments
when C has at most k/2 variables.
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Let n and C be given, and let m be the number of variables in C. By adding dummy variables, we may
assume that m max{k, n}. We denote by SC the set C−1(1) (i.e., the set of satisfying assignments for
C). We assume that Pr[Um ∈ SC]2−k/2, or in other words that |SC |2m−k/2.
t-wise independent hash functions: Recall that a t-wise independent hash function collection is a
collectionH of functions from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}i such that for every t distinct values x1, . . . , xt ∈ {0, 1}m,
the random variables h(x1), . . . , h(xt ) (for a random choice of h ∈ H) are independently and uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}i . The standard construction of such a family H consists of all polynomials of
degree at most t − 1 over the ﬁeld GF(2m), truncated to the ﬁrst i bits. We will use not only the fact that
the functions in this family can be evaluated efﬁciently (as in [BGP]), but also that it can be inverted
efﬁciently. Speciﬁcally, given a polynomial p of degree at most t−1 over GF(2m) and a point  ∈ GF(2m),
all the elements of p−1() can be found in time poly(m, t) [Ber].
We now give an outline of the [BGP] algorithm:
Algorithm 8.9 (Uniform generation with an NP oracle [BGP]).
1. Test if |SC |10m5. If so, uniformly generate an element out of SC .
2. Find i ∈ {0, . . . , m} such that |SC | ∈ (2im5, 2i+2m5).
3. Choose h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}i at random from an m-wise independent hash function collection.
4. If there exists  ∈ {0, 1}i such that |h−1() ∩ SC | > 6m5 then abort.
5. Choose  ←R {0, 1}i .
6. Find all the (at most 6n5) elements of h−1() ∩ SC . Output each such element with probability 16m5 .
Otherwise abort (i.e., abort with probability 1 − |h−1()∩SC |6m5 ).
Bellare et al. [BGP] show how to implement Algorithm 8.9 using an NP-oracle and show that this
algorithm does not abort with high probability. Furthermore, they show that conditioned on the algorithm
not aborting, the algorithm’s output is exactly the uniform distribution over SC . Note that this algorithm
works for every circuit C (and not just circuits with |SC |2m−k/2). We will show that a variant of this
algorithm can be implemented for circuits C such that |SC |2m−k/2 using only an oracle for CSAT for
k-variable poly(m)-sized circuits. We now show how we implement (and sometimes modify) each step
of Algorithm 8.9:
Step 1: Note that we assume that km. Thus |SC |2m/2 and we can skip this step.
Step2:Wewill try to run the algorithmwith all possible choices for i.We startwith i = m−k/2−6 log m
(as |SC |2m−k/2 > 2m−k/2−6 log n · n5) and try to run the algorithm described below (i.e., in Steps 3–6).
We will see below (in Step 6), that if the chosen value i fails some check then we let i ← i + 1 and try
again. Note that since k = (logm) we always have that im − 2k/3.
Step 3: This step can be done without using any oracle. We will choose h to be a random polynomial
of degree m − 1 over the ﬁeld F2m , where we truncate the output of this polynomial to its ﬁrst i bits.
Step 4: We skip this step and do not check h for this condition.
Step 5: This step can be done without using any oracle.
Step 6: We ﬁrst show that we can ﬁnd a single element of the set S def= h−1()∩ SC using an oracle for
CSAT for k-variable poly(n)-sized circuits. We then show how to ﬁnd all of S’s elements.
Finding a single element of S: Recall that we used for the hash function h the i-bit truncation of a degree
n − 1 polynomial. Let p denote the untruncated polynomial. Then, each element x of h−1() satisﬁes
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that p(x) =  for some  ∈ {0, 1}m−i . As mentioned earlier, given , it is possible to ﬁnd all the (at
most m − 1) elements in p−1(). Given h and , we construct a circuit C′ that on input  computes
all elements of p−1() and outputs 1 if one of these elements is a satisfying assignment for C. Note
that since im − 2k/3, the number of inputs of C′ is at most 2k/3 < k. Thus, we can ﬁnd a satisfying
assignment  for C′ using our presumed CSAT algorithm. Given such  we can check all elements of
p−1() and at least one of these will be a element of h−1() ∩ SC .
Finding all the elements of S: Once we found one element x of S we can apply the same process to
the set h−1()∩ (SC\{x}) and ﬁnd another element x′. Note that the set SC\{x} can also be decided by a
polynomial-sized circuit. We continue this process for at most 6m5 steps. If after 6m5 steps we are still
not ﬁnished then we abort.
Additional check: We perform the above procedure for the set SC ∩ h−1(0i) and verify that it is of size
at most 4m5. Otherwise, we let i ← i + 1 and go back to Step 3.
Analysis: The analysis of [BGP] shows that if |SC | > 2im5 then with 1 − 2−(m) probability it will
hold that |h−1() ∩ SC | ∈ (1 ± 15) |SC |2i for all  ∈ {0, 1}i . Note that as i gets larger, the quantity |SC |2i gets
smaller, and for the ﬁrst value of i we try in the algorithm (i.e., i = m− k/2− 6 logm), this quantity is at
least m6 (since |SC |2m−k/2). From this it can be shown that very high probability, the ﬁrst i for which
we pass the check |h−1(0i)∩ SC |4m5 will also satisfy m5 |h−1()∩ SC |6m5 for all . 30 Thus, we
will assume that this event always happens (this assumption can cause a statistical difference of at most
2−(m) in the algorithm’s output). This means that our algorithm outputs an element with probability
at least 16 (since it aborts with probability 1 − |h
−1()∩SC |
6m5 ). If an element is output then it is distributed
exactly according to the uniform distribution on SC , since each x ∈ SC has the same probability (i.e. 16m5 )
of being output. Using repetition, we can ensure that we output an element with 1 − 2(m) probability.
Thus, we see that the output of the algorithm is of statistical distance at most 2−(m) from the uniform
distribution over SC .
Part III
Conclusions and open problems
9. Constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proofs
A long-standing open problem is whether there exist constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proof
systems. (Recall that [GK1] has constructed constant-round private-coin zero-knowledge proof systems,
and [Bar] has constructed constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge argument systems.) It is not even
known whether the 3-round proof systems obtained by parallel repetition of classic protocols, such as the
ones for QUADRATIC RESIDUOSITY [GMR], GRAPH ISOMORPHISM [GMW], THREE-COLORING [GMW],
and HAMILTONICITY [Blu2], are zero knowledge.
Dwork et al. [DNRS] have shown that the above open problem is closely related to the sound-
ness of the Fiat–Shamir heuristic [FS2]. The latter is a popular heuristic for eliminating interaction in
30 Consider the ﬁrst i for which we pass the check. Then we have 4m5 |h−1(0i )∩SC |(4/5)|SC |/2i , so for all , |h−1()∩
SC |(6/5)|SC |/2i 6m5. Also, since we did not pass the check at i − 1, we have 4m5 < |h−1(0i−1)∩ SC |(6/5)|SC |/2i−1,
which implies that at stage i we have |h−1() ∩ SC |(4/5)|SC |/2i > (20/12)m5 > m5.
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(public-coin) protocols, whereby the veriﬁer’s messages are replaced by a cryptographic hash of the
conversation history. In particular, it is used to convert identiﬁcation schemes (typically based on zero-
knowledge proofs) into digital signature schemes, and many practical digital signature schemes have
been obtained in this way (e.g. [Sch,GQ,Oka]). This technique can be proven sound in the random oracle
model [PS], but it has no known proof of security in the standard model, where the hash function is
implemented by an efﬁciently computable (and publicly known) algorithm.
The work of Dwork et al. [DNRS] shows that proving that a protocol is not zero-knowledge (at least in
some weak sense) is essentially equivalent to exhibiting a family of efﬁciently computable hash functions
(“magic functions”) with which the Fiat–Shamir heuristic is sound when applied to that protocol. Thus
by constructing constant-round public-coin zero knowledge argument, Barak [Bar] gave an example of a
constant-round argument system under which the Fiat–Shamir heuristic is completely unsound (for any
family of efﬁciently computable hash functions). Goldwasser and Tauman [GT] subsequently presented a
3-round computationally sound identiﬁcation scheme (i.e., argument system) for which the Fiat–Shamir
heuristic is completely unsound. The above results both apply to the setting of computational soundness.
They therefore still leave open the possibility that the Fiat–Shamir heuristic is sound for any proof system
(for an appropriate family of “magic functions”). Not only would this be signiﬁcant for the Fiat–Shamir
heuristic itself (which is typically applied to proof systems), it would imply that no constant-round
public-coin proof system (e.g. the parallel versions of [GMR,GMW,Blu2]) is zero knowledge.
In this section, we observe that there is a very clean and plausible property of a family of hash functions
which implies the soundness of the Fiat–Shamir heuristic when applied to any proof system. We do not,
however, know how to construct such hash functions based on more standard complexity assumptions,
and leave this as an intriguing open problem.
We begin by formalizing the syntactic properties of a family of hash functions.
Deﬁnition 9.1. For functions k(n),m(n)poly(n), a family of hash functions with input length m(n)
and output length k(n) is a collection H = ⋃n{hi : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}k(n)}i∈In , such that
• There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that given 1n, outputs i ←R In. (This distribution
need not be uniform.) We require |i|n.
• There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that given i ∈ In and x ∈ {0, 1}m(n), outputs
hi(x).
The security property we will formulate is based on the notion of conditional entropy. Recall that the
entropy of a random variable X is deﬁned as H(X) = Ex←RX[log(1/Pr[X = x])]. For jointly distributed
random variables (X, Y ), the conditional entropy ofY given X is deﬁned to be Ey←RY [H(X|Y=y)], where
X|Y=y denotes the conditional distribution of X given that Y = y.
Deﬁnition 9.2. Let E be a collection of functions e : N → N. We say that a family of hash function
H = ⋃n{hi : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}k(n)}i∈In ensures conditional entropy (greater than) E if for every
nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, there exists an e ∈ E such that
H(hI (A(I))|A(I)) > e(n),
where the probabilities are taken over I ←R In and the coin tosses of A, and A(I) denotes the ﬁrst m(n)
bits of the output of A on input I.
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Examples of entropy bounds we will consider below are E = {0}, E = {1/nc : c ∈ N} def= 1/poly(n),
and E = {k(n) − c log n : c ∈ N} def= k(n) − O(log n). (The reason for working with families instead
of a single function e(n) is to allow the constant c in the latter two cases to depend on the choice of the
algorithm A.)
Why is it plausible that such function families exist? Note that the length of the function-index i can be
a larger polynomial than m(n). Thus, even conditioned on A(I), I still has a lot of entropy, and hence we
can hope that hI (A(I)) contains some of this entropy. This would be trivial if k(n) were larger than the
length of the function-index, because we could just deﬁne hi(x) = i for all i. However, we are typically
interested in the case that k(n) is much smaller than m(n), which must be smaller than the length of the
function-index. (Note that if m(n) is larger than the length of the function-index, then A(i) = i makes
the conditional entropy H(hI (A(I))|A(I)) zero.) We observe that the largest conditional entropy we
can hope for is k(n) − O(log n): if all the hi’s are regular functions (i.e. hi(Um(n)) = Uk(n)), then by
evaluating hi(x) on poly(n) random inputs, a PPTA can with high probability ﬁnd an input x such that the
ﬁrst c log n bits of hi(x) are zero, making H(hI (A(I))|A(I)))H(hI (A(I)))k(n) − c log n + O(1),
where c is any constant. Our (strongest) conjecture in this section is that there are hash functions for
which this attack is essentially the best possible.
Conjecture 9.3. For every two functions m(n), k(n)poly(n), there exists a family of hash functions
with input length m(n) and output length k(n) that ensures conditional entropy k(n) − O(log n).
Before seeing the implications of this conjecture, we establish the following useful lemma:
Lemma 9.4. If there exists a family of hash functions H = ⋃n{hi : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}k(n)}i∈In that
ensures conditional entropy E , then there exists such a family where for every  ∈ {0, 1}m(n), hI () is
distributed uniformly in {0, 1}k(n) when I ←R In.
Proof. Deﬁne h′(i,z)(x) = hi(x)⊕z. Then, since  is ﬁxed before I is chosen, we immediately obtain that
h′(i,z)() is uniformly distributed. It remains to show that h′ still ensures conditional entropy E . Now, for
every nonuniform PPT A′(i, z), we can deﬁne a collection of nonuniform PPT Az(i) = A(i, z) so that
when I and Z are uniform, we have
H(h′I,Z(A′(I, Z))|A′(I, Z))  H(h′I,Z(A′(I, Z))|A′(I, Z), Z)
= Ez←RZ[H(h′I,z(A′(I, z))|A′(I, z))]
= Ez←RZ[H(hI (Az(I )) ⊕ z|Az(I))]
= Ez←RZ[H(hI (Az(I ))|Az(I))]
 e(n). 
Now we show that the above conjecture implies that there do not exist constant-round public-coin
zero-knowledge proof systems.
Theorem 9.5. AssumingConjecture 9.3, if a language L has a constant-round public-coin auxiliary-input
zero-knowledge proof system, then L ∈ BPP.
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More generally, assuming Conjecture 9.3 only for input length m(n) and output length k(n), if L has
a constant-round public-coin auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof system in which the total communi-
cation is at most m(n) bits and the veriﬁer’s messages are of length at most k(n) on inputs of length n,
then L ∈ BPP.
Proof. We begin with the special case of 3-message protocols. Let (P, V ) be a 3-round public-coin
auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof for a language L. We denote the three messages by , , , and
consider a family of hash functions H which has input length m = m(n) || and output length k =
k(n) ||, and ensures entropy k(n)−O(log n). By Lemma 9.4, we may assume that hI () is uniformly
distributed for every . Intuitively, if the veriﬁer chooses its message  by applying hI to the prover
message  then we are guaranteed two properties: (1) the veriﬁer’s message is uniformly distributed and
so is a valid message (recall that this is a public-coin proof system); (2) even given I, whatever message
 = A(I) a cheating prover (or simulator) generates, the entropy of the veriﬁer’s reply hI () is still high.
In such a case, it is “hard” to simulate. We now formally prove the theorem.
Consider a cheating veriﬁer V ∗(x, i, ) that on input x, auxiliary input i, and prover message , sends
message  = hi(). By auxiliary-input zero knowledge, there is a PPT simulator S such that for every x
and i, S(x, i) is computationally indistinguishable from V ∗’s view. We consider the output distribution
of S(x, I ) where I and the coin tosses of S are chosen uniformly.
When x ∈ L, we claim thatS(x, I ) outputs an accepting transcript (i.e. (, , ) such thatV (x, , , ) =
accept) with probability at least 1 − neg(n). The reason is that when I is chosen uniformly, then, for
every , hI () is uniformly distributed, so 〈P, V ∗(I )〉(x) is distributed identically to 〈P, V 〉(x), which is
accepting with probability 1 − neg(n) by completeness.
When x /∈ L, we claim that S(x, I ) outputs an accepting transcript with probability at most 1/2.
Consider a nonuniform algorithm Ax(i) that runs S(x, i) and outputs the ﬁrst message . Then, by the
magic function property, H(hI (Ax(I ))|Ax(I))k − c log n for some constant c. In other words, when
(A,B,C) ←R S(x, I ), we have H(B|A)k− c log n. This implies that with probability at least 3/4 over
 ←R A, H(B|A=)k − 4c log n. For each , let Acc be the set of  ∈ {0, 1}k for which there exists
 such that (, , ) is an accepting transcript. By soundness, for every  ∈ {0, 1}m, |Acc|s(n) · 2k ,
where s(n) is the (negligible) soundness error, k is the length of the veriﬁer message . Thus, if H(B|A=)
has entropy at least k −O(log n), then Pr [B|A= ∈ Acc] 1/4. (Otherwise B|A= has entropy at most
(1/4) · log2 |Acc| + (3/4) · k + 1 = k − (log n).) 31 To conclude, we can upper bound the probability
that S(x, I ) outputs an accepting transcript by
Pr [B ∈ AccA]  Pr
[
B ∈ Acc|H(B|A=)k − 4c log n
]+ Pr [H(B|A=) < k − 4c log n]
1/4 + 1/4 = 1/2.
Thus, we can decide L in BPP by choosing I uniformly, running S(x, I ), and deciding according to
whether S outputs an accepting transcript.
31 Let C = B|A= and let I be the indicator for the event C ∈ Acc. Then H(C)H(I ) + H(C|I )1 + H(C|I ), where
H(·|·) denotes conditional entropy. By deﬁnition, H(C|I ) = Pr[I = 1] · H(C|I = 1) + Pr[I = 0] · H(C|I = 0) Pr[I =
1] · (log2 |Acc|) + (1 − Pr[I = 1]) · k. The above calculation then follows by noting that this last expression is decreasing in
Pr[I = 1].
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For general constant-round proof systems, we use a different hash function for each veriﬁer message.
Replace Acc with sets Acct for each partial transcript t ending in a prover message. If t ends before the
ith veriﬁer message, deﬁne Acct to be the set of veriﬁer messages for which the maximum conditional
acceptance probability is at least s1/2i , where s = s(n) is the soundness error. Reﬁning the above analysis,
it can be argued that if the conditional acceptance probability given t is smaller than s1/2i−1 , then with
probability 1 −  over the history generated by the simulator, the next veriﬁer message (computed by
the ith magic function) lands in Acct with probability at most , where  is an arbitrarily small constant.
Choosing  to be smaller than 1/(4 · #rounds), we obtain an accepting transcript with probability at most
1/2. 
Following [DNRS], the above proof actually gives a positive result for the Fiat–Shamir heuristic under
Conjecture 9.3. Speciﬁcally, it shows that for any polynomial-time P ∗ and any x /∈ L, the probability that
P ∗(x, i) produces an accepting transcript (, hi(), ) is at most 1/2 when i is chosen randomly: simply
replace the simulator SwithP ∗ in the above proof. This success probability (of 1/2) can probably be made
negligible by requiring the prover generate accepting transcripts for polynomially many hash functions
chosen randomly from the family (rather than just a single hash function). Also, in typical applications
of the Fiat–Shamir heuristic, the prover is typically allowed to choose the instance x; in such a case one
should include x in the input to the hash function as well.
The above theorem rules out all constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge proofs (under the con-
jecture), but many protocols of interest (from the perspective of both zero knowledge itself and the
Fiat–Shamir heuristic) possess additional properties that may make ruling out zero knowledge easier
(e.g. we may use a weaker conjecture). For example, many popular protocols have 3 rounds, perfect
completeness, and soundness that is optimal in the following sense. 32
Deﬁnition 9.6. A 3-round public-coin proof system (P, V ) for a language L has optimal soundness if
for every x /∈ L and every ﬁrst prover message , there is at most one veriﬁer message  such that
V (x, , , ) = accept for some second prover message .
Examples of protocols with optimal soundness are the classic proof systems for QUADRATIC-
RESIDUOSITY [GMR], GRAPH ISOMORPHISM [GMW], and HAMILTONICITY [Blu2] and the parallel
versions of these protocols. (The THREE-COLORING protocol of [GMW] does not have optimal
soundness.)
For protocols with this property, a weaker version of the conjecture sufﬁces.
Conjecture 9.7. For every two functions m(n), k(n)poly(n) such that k(n) = (log n), there exists a
family of hash functions with input length m(n) and output length k(n) that ensures conditional entropy
1/poly(n).
To gain some intuition for this version of the conjecture, note that two jointly distributed random
variables X, Y of length poly(n) satisfy H(X|Y )1/poly(n) iff for every function f, Pr [f (Y ) = X] 
32 Our deﬁnition of optimal soundness is weaker than the notion of special soundness, introduced in [CSD], which requires
that one can actually recover the witness from accepting responses to any two different veriﬁer messages.
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1/poly(n). Thus, a family of functions ensuring conditional entropy 1/poly(n) implies that for every PPT
A and every (not necessarily PPT) function f, Pr [f (A(I)) = hI (A(I))] 1/poly(n).
Theorem 9.8. Assuming Conjecture 9.7, if a language L has a 3-round public-coin auxiliary-input zero-
knowledge proof system with optimal soundness, then L ∈ BPP.
More generally, assuming Conjecture 9.7 only for input length m(n) and output length k(n), if L has
a 3-round public-coin auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof system with optimal soundness where the
prover’s ﬁrst message is length at most m(n) and the veriﬁer’s message is of length at most k(n), then
L ∈ BPP.
Proof. The proof proceeds similarly to that of Theorem 9.5, with the only modiﬁcations being in the
case x /∈ L. Here, we observe that optimal soundness means that for every , |Acc| = 1. We denote the
unique element of Acc by f (). Now, note that the probability that S outputs a rejecting transcript is at
least Pr [B = f (A)], where the random variables A and B are as in the proof of Theorem 9.5. Since the
hash functions ensure conditional entropy at least 1/poly(n), we have Pr [B = f (A)] 1/poly(n). On
the other hand, when x ∈ L, S outputs a rejecting transcript with negligible probability as before. Thus,
we obtain a BPP algorithm for L. 
The “ultimate” weakening of the conjecture is to require that the hash function only ensure conditional
entropy greater than zero. It turns out that this has the following equivalent formulation:
Conjecture 9.9. For every two functions m(n), k(n)poly(n) such that k(n) = (log n), there exists a
polynomial p such that the followingholds.For every nonuniformdeterministicpolynomial-timealgorithm
A and all sufﬁciently large n, there exist circuits C1, C2 : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}k(n) of size at most p(n)
such that A(C1) = A(C2) but C1(A(C1)) = C2(A(C2)).
To see how this conjecture follows from the existence of hash functions with input lengthm(n) and out-
put length k(n) that ensure conditional entropy greater than 0, note that the conditionH(hI (A(I))|A(I)) >
0 is equivalent to the existence of i, j such that A(i) = A(j) but hi(A(i)) = hj (A(j)), and that giving
A the index i is equivalent to giving A the circuit that computes hi . For the converse, consider Hn which
is the uniform distribution on all circuits of size at most p(n) mapping {0, 1}m(n) to {0, 1}k(n).
We ﬁnd Conjecture 9.9 to be very plausible: When p(n)?m(n), many different circuits C must map to
the same input z = A(C). When the range {0, 1}k(n) is of superpolynomial size, it is difﬁcult to imagine
how a polynomial-time algorithm A can ensure that all such circuits have the same value on z. Moreover,
we note that this conjecture only refers to worst-case complexity, and thus has hope of being related to
other conjectures in complexity theory. Still, even this weak form of the conjecture implies a negative
result for zero-knowledge proofs.
Theorem 9.10. Assuming C onjecture 9.9, if a language L has a 3-round public-coin auxiliary-input
zero-knowledge proof system with optimal soundness and perfect completeness, then the complement of
L is in AM.
More generally, assuming Conjecture 9.9 only for input length m(n) and output length k(n), if L has
a 3-round public-coin auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof system with optimal soundness and perfect
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Public input: x
x
↓
M A
Step A1: Choose r ←R {0, 1}s . r←−−−
Step M1: Find C of size at most p(n) such that S(x, C; r) is a rejecting
transcript.
C−−−→
Accept if C is of size at most p(n) and S(x, C; r) is a rejecting transcript.
Protocol 9.12. AM proof system for L
completeness in which the prover’s ﬁrst message is length at most m(n) and the veriﬁer’s message is of
length at most k(n), then the complement of L is in AM.
Corollary 9.11. If Conjecture 9.9 holds only for output length k(n) and input lengthm(n) = nc for a suf-
ﬁciently large constant c andNPcoAM, then the k(n)-fold parallel repetition of Blum’sHAMILTONICITY
protocol is not auxiliary-input zero knowledge.
Proof. Let (P, V ) be a 3-round public-coin auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof system with optimal
soundness and perfect completeness in which the prover’s ﬁrst message is of length at most m = m(n)
and the veriﬁer’s message is of length at most k = k(n). Let p(n) be the polynomial guaranteed by
Conjecture 9.9. Analogously to the above proofs, we consider the cheating veriﬁer V ∗(x, C, ) that on
input x, auxiliary input C (interpreted as a circuit mapping {0, 1}m → {0, 1}k), and ﬁrst prover message
, sends message  = C(). Let S(x, C) be the simulator for V ∗. We may assume wlog that S(x, C)
always outputs transcripts of the form (, C(), ). We call such a transcript accepting if it would make
the honest veriﬁer V accept.
By perfect completeness, for every x ∈ L and every circuit C, S(x, C) outputs an accepting transcript
with probability 1 − neg(n). By taking polynomially many trials, we can increase this probability to be
at least 1 − 2−p(n)−n. Let s = s(n) be the number of random bits used by the resulting simulator.
Protocol 9.12 contains the AM proof system for the complement of L. We now analyze this proof
system, beginning with soundness. When x ∈ L, then for every ﬁxed C, the simulator S(x, C; r) outputs
a rejecting transcript with probability at most 2−p(n)−n when r ←R {0, 1}s . Thus, by a union bound, the
probability over r that there exists a C of size at most p(n) such that S(x, C; r) is rejecting is at most
2p(n) · 2−p(n)−n = 2−n.
For completeness, let x ∈ L, ﬁx any r ∈ {0, 1}s , and consider the (deterministic) polynomial-sized
circuit A(·) which outputs the ﬁrst message in S(x, ·; r). By Conjecture 9.9, there exist C1, C2 of size at
most p(n) such that A(C1) = A(C2) =  but C1() = C2(). By optimal soundness, there exists at most
one veriﬁer message  ∈ {0, 1}k such that (, ) can be completed to an accepting transcript. At least one
of C1() or C2() is not equal to , and thus the prover M can send a circuit C such that S(x, C; r) is
rejecting.
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10. Conclusions
New results on zero knowledge put in question the usefulness of black-box lower bounds for under-
standing the power of general (non-black-box) zero knowledge. Thus, non-black-box lower bounds and
upper bounds are required to close the gaps in our understanding of this ﬁeld. In this work, we have
shown several such lower bounds. Beyond the lower bounds themselves, our work implies new differ-
ences between the power of zero-knowledge proofs versus arguments. It also implies that in some cases
complexity assumptions can and should be used to obtain zero-knowledge lower bounds. Sometimes we
will need to use assumptions, such as Assumption 3.2, that are not commonly used in cryptography.
In our opinion, one of the most important open questions is whether there exists a constant-round
public-coin zero-knowledge proof system for NP and the special case of 3-round proof systems obtained
by parallel repetition of [GMW,Blu2]. In Section 9, we provided several plausible conjectures that would
imply that the answer is no. It is an open problem to establish one of these conjectures based on more
standard complexity-theoretic assumptions.
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Part IV
Appendices
Appendix A. Uniform zero knowledge
The standard deﬁnition of zero knowledge, as presented in Section 2, refers to computational indistin-
guishability with respect to nonuniform distinguishers. Goldreich [Gol1] has given a treatment of zero
knowledge that makes sense for uniform distinguishers. In this section, we give analogues of some of our
results in this uniform setting.
A.1. Deﬁnition
Following [Gol1], for uniform indistinguishability, we incorporate a distribution on the input x.We call
an ensemble {Xn}n∈N of probability distributions polynomial-time samplable if there is a PPT algorithm
M such that M(1n) is distributed according to Xn for all n.
Deﬁnition A.1 (uniform computational indistinguishability). For an index set I ⊆ {0, 1}∗, two ensem-
bles of random variables {Ax}x∈I and {Bx}x∈I are uniformly indistinguishable if for every (uniform) PPT
algorithm D and every polynomial-time samplable {Zn = (Xn, Yn)}, there exists a negligible function 
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such that for all n,
|Pr [D(Xn, Yn,AXn) = 1, Xn ∈ I ∩ {0, 1}n]− Pr [D(Xn, Yn, BXn) = 1, Xn ∈ I ∩ {0, 1}n] |(n).
Intuitively, this deﬁnition says that it is infeasible to generate x ∈ I such that Ax and Bx are distin-
guishable (by a uniform algorithm D, even if it is given additional information y that is correlated with
x). Note that y is auxiliary input, but unlike the nonuniform case, this auxiliary input is required to be
polynomial-time samplable.
The deﬁnition (implicit) in [Gol1] restricts to distributions (Xn, Yn) such that the support of Xn is
contained in I (and thus omits the Xn ∈ I condition in the probabilities). The deﬁnition above is stronger,
but we believe it to be more natural. In particular, Goldreich’s deﬁnition becomes vacuous in case I does
not contain any inputs of certain lengths.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, in this section, we will work with relations that are strongly
poly-balanced in the sense that there is a polynomial p with nonnegative integer coefﬁcients such that
(x,w) ∈ R ⇒ |w| = p(|x|) (instead of just |w|p(|x|)). The point is that the length of x can be
determined from the length of the pair (x,w).
Deﬁnition A.2 (uniform plain zero knowledge). An interactive proof system (P, V ) with respect to a
strongly poly-balanced relationR is uniform plain zero knowledge if for every PPTV ∗, there exists a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that the ensembles {〈P(w), V ∗〉(x)}(x,w)∈R and {S(x)}(x,w)∈R
are uniformly indistinguishable.
The above deﬁnition says that for every PPT V ∗, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all PPT
D and all samplable distributions (X′n, Y ′n) = ((Xn,Wn), Yn), we have
|Pr [D(Xn,Wn, Yn, 〈P(Wn), V ∗〉(Xn)) = 1 &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)]
−Pr [D(Xn,Wn, Yn, S(Xn)) = 1 &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)] |neg(n).
Note that a direct application of the deﬁnition of uniform indistinguishability would give the condition
X′n = (Xn,Wn) ∈ R ∩ {0, 1}n rather than (Xn,Wn) ∈ R ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗). The two deﬁnitions are
equivalent due to the fact that R is strongly poly-balanced.
Observe that the distinguisher is given not only the input Xn, but also the witness Wn and some
additional auxiliary information Yn that may be correlated with Xn and Wn, but the veriﬁer and the
simulator are only given the input Xn. Intuitively, this models a situation where the veriﬁer starts with
no a priori information other than the input Xn, but we want to ensure that receiving the zero-knowledge
proof would not help the veriﬁer attack a system whose behavior depends not just on Xn but also on the
witness Wn and possibly on some other correlated information Yn.
We note that the relation R has greater signiﬁcance for uniform zero knowledge than the other forms,
because uniform zero knowledge only requires the simulation to be indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s
view on inputs x that can be efﬁciently sampled together with a witness w. In case R is the trivial relation
for some language L (i.e. R = L × {}), then uniform zero knowledge simply says that the simulator’s
output is indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view for all samplable distributions on the input x.
Deﬁnition A.3 (uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge). An interactive proof system (P, V ) with re-
spect to a strongly poly-balanced relation R is uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge if for every PPT
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V ∗ and polynomial p with nonnegative integer coefﬁcients, there exists a PPT S such that the ensembles
{〈P(w), V ∗(z)〉(x)}(x,w)∈R,z∈{0,1}p(|x|) and {S(x, z)}(x,w)∈R,z∈{0,1}p(|x|)
are uniformly indistinguishable.
It is known that uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge with an efﬁcient prover is closed under
sequential composition [Gol1].
As with the nonuniform version, here the indistinguishability is required even for distinguishers that
have additional a priori information beyond the auxiliary input of the veriﬁer. In this case, it is because we
consider efﬁciently samplable distributions (Xn,Wn,Zn, Yn), where Xn is the input, Wn the witness, Zn
the veriﬁer’s auxiliary input, and Yn the distinguisher’s additional auxiliary input, and the entire 4-tuple
(Xn,Wn,Zn, Yn) is provided to the distinguisher.
Also as in the nonuniform case, there is a universal veriﬁer V ∗uni(x, z) that interprets its auxiliary input
z as a Boolean circuit Cz and uses Cz as its strategy (i.e. next-message function); if the zero-knowledge
condition holds for V ∗uni, then it holds for all PPT veriﬁer strategies V ∗.
A.2. Triviality
It iswell known that every language inBPP has trivial zero-knowledgeproofs (where the veriﬁer decides
the language on its own, and the prover sends nothing). For uniform zero knowledge, this triviality can
be extended to a larger class of languages.
Deﬁnition A.4. For a language L and a poly-balanced relation R such that L = LR , we say that L is
uniformly trivial with respect to R if there is a PPT algorithm A such that the following two conditions
hold:
• For every samplable distribution {Dn = (Xn,Wn)}n∈N, it holds that
Pr
[
A(Xn) = accept &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)
]
neg(n).
• For all x /∈ L, Pr [A(x) = reject] neg(n).
In other words, the algorithm A is correct with high probability on all NO instances, and it is hard
to generate YES instances (together with witnesses) on which A errs with nonnegligible probability. An
equivalent formulation is to require that for all x /∈ L, A(x) rejects with probability at least 2/3, and
with probability 1 − neg(n) over (x,w) ←R Dn, A(x) accepts with probability at least 2/3 or (x,w) /∈
R∩({0, 1}n×{0, 1}∗). (Equivalence is seen by amplifying via independent repetitions and majority vote.)
Proposition A.5. Let R be a strongly poly-balanced relation and L = LR . If L is uniformly trivial wrt
R and L ∈ IP, then L has a uniform auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof wrt R. Moreover, if R is an
NP-relation (or even an MA relation), then the prover is efﬁcient.
Proof. Uniform triviality guarantees that the veriﬁer can decide L on its own on “most” instances just by
running the algorithm A in the deﬁnition, but this algorithm may have arbirarily high error probability for
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x ∈ L that are hard to generate in polynomial time. However, the completeness and soundness conditions
of zero-knowledge proofs are universally quantiﬁed over all instances x. Thus, we have the prover check
whether x is an instance where the algorithm A would fail to decide correctly, and in such a case, provide
V with a (non-zero-knowledge) proof. (In particular, A may decide incorrectly when x is not polynomial-
time samplable.) These rare instances will not hurt the uniform zero-knowledge property because, by
deﬁnition of uniformly trivial, they are hard to generate.
Let A be the PPT algorithm given by the deﬁnition of uniformly trivial. Consider the following inter-
active proof:
(P (w), V )(x):
1. P runs A(x) for n executions, where n = |x|. If less than 3/4 of these executions are accepting, then
P initiates the (non-ZK) interactive proof for L on input x. (If R is an NP or MA relation, the non-ZK
proof simply amounts to sending w.)
2. V runs A(x) for n executions. If A(x) accepts in a majority of these executions, then V halts and
accepts. Otherwise, V accepts according the (non-ZK) interactive proof for L (rejecting if P does not
initiate it).
Negligible soundness follows from the deﬁnition of uniformly trivial and the soundness of the non-ZK
proof. For completeness, let B = {x ∈ L : Pr [A(x) = accept] 2/3}. If x ∈ B, then with probability
1− 2−(n), P will initiate the non-ZK proof for L, and thus A will accept by completeness of the non-ZK
proof. If x /∈ B, then with probability 1 − 2−(n), the majority of V’s executions of A will be accepting,
and thus V will accept.
For uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge, letV ∗(x, z) be any veriﬁer and let S(x, z) be the simulator
that simply simulates V ∗’s view as if the prover sends nothing. We argue that the simulation produced
by S is good on any samplable distribution (Xn,Wn,Zn, Yn). Let B ′ = {x : Pr [A(x) = accept] 7/8}.
From the deﬁnition of uniformly trivial, it follows that
Pr
[
Xn ∈ B ′ &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)
]
neg(n).
Now consider any ﬁxed (x,w, z, y) such that x /∈ B ′. With probability 1 − 2−(n), at least 3/4 of P’s
executions of A(x) will accept, and P sends nothing to V. 
It turns out that one-way functions imply non-trivial languages in NP.
Proposition A.6. If one-way functions exist, then there exists a strongly poly-balanced NP-relation R
such that LR is not uniformly trivial wrt R.
Proof. Assume one-way functions exist. By Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [HILL], there ex-
ists an pseudorandom generator [HILL] G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n (i.e. the analogue of a pseudorandom
generator where the indistinguishability condition only holds for inﬁnitely many n’s). Consider the NP-
relation R = {(x,w) : G(w) = x}, so LR = Image(G). Suppose LR were uniformly trivial wrt
R. Let W2n be a random variable distributed uniformly over {0, 1}n and let X2n = G(W2n). Since
Pr
[
(X2n,W2n) ∈ R ∩ ({0, 1}2n × {0, 1}∗)
] = 1, we have
Pr [A(X2n) = accept] 1 − neg(n).
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On the other hand, since LR contains at most a 2−n fraction of {0, 1}n, we have
Pr [A(U2n) = accept] 2−n + neg(n) = neg(n).
This contradicts the fact that G is an pseudorandom generator. 
In fact, the above proposition only needs the existence of one-way functions which are hard to invert
for inﬁnitely many input lengths, referred to as io-OWF. In fact, if we modify the deﬁnition of trivial so
that the PPT A may depend on the distribution (Xn,Wn), then the existence of nontrivial NP-relations
becomes equivalent to the existence of io-OWF. (However, with thismodiﬁcation, the proof of Proposition
A.5 fails.)
A.3. Two-round zero knowledge
We begin by presenting an analogue of the Goldreich–Oren result (Theorem 3.1).
TheoremA.7. Let R be a strongly poly-balanced relation and L = LR . If L has a 2-round proof or
argument systemwrt R that is uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge, then L is trivial wrt R. In particular,
if one-way functions exist, then for every (strongly poly-balanced) NP-complete relation R, LR does not
have a 2-round uniform auxiliary-input zero-knowledge argument system wrt R.
Proof. Suppose (P, V ) is a 2-round zero-knowledge argument for L = LR wrt relation R. Consider the
veriﬁer V ∗(x, z) that sends its auxiliary input z as its ﬁrst message, and let S be the simulator for V ∗.
Deﬁne a PPT algorithm A as follows:
A(x), for |x| = n:
1. Choose y ←R {0, 1}m, where m = m(n) is the number of coin tosses used by V.
2. Let z = V (x; y).
3. Run S(x, z) and let m be the prover message in the simulated transcript.
4. Accept if V (x; y) would accept prover message m.
We now prove that A satisﬁes the conditions of uniform triviality. When x /∈ L, then we can view S
deﬁning a PPT prover strategy, and thus A(x) accepts with probability at most 1/3 by the soundness of
(P, V ). Now, let (Xn,Wn) be any samplable distribution, and consider the PPT distinguisherD deﬁned by
D(x, y, t) = 1 iff t = (x, z,m) such that V (x; y) would accept prover message m. Let Yn be distributed
uniformly in {0, 1}m and Zn = V (Xn;Yn). Then,
Pr[A(Xn)| = accept &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R]
= Pr [D(Xn, Yn, S(Xn, Zn)) = 0 &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R]
 Pr
[
D(Xn, Yn, 〈P, V ∗(Zn)〉(Xn)) = 0 &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R
]+ neg(n)
 neg(n),
where the second-to-last inequality follows from uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge, and the last
inequality from completeness of (P, V ). (Note that although V ∗ is not the honest veriﬁer, its auxiliary
input/message Zn is distributed according to the honest veriﬁer instructions on coin tosses Yn. Therefore,
completeness holds.) 
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Now we present uniform analogues of some of our lower bounds.
TheoremA.8. Under Assumption 3.2, if a language L has a 2-round public-coin proof system that is
uniform plain zero knowledge wrt a relation R and has an efﬁcient prover, then L is uniformly trivial wrt
to R.
Proof. Most of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 3.4. Given the 2-round proof (P, V ), we use
a pseudorandom generator G against nondeterministic circuits to obtain a derandomized veriﬁer V ∗, we
let S be its simulator, and construct an algorithm M based on S and V ∗ in the same way:
M(x): Run S(x) many times to obtain transcripts (G(s1), 1; s1), (G(s2), 2; s2), . . . , (G(sq), q; sq),
where q = n · 2. Accept if {s1, . . . , sq} = {0, 1} and, for the majority of s ∈ {0, 1}, there exists an
i such that si = s and V ∗(x,G(si), i; si) accepts.
The proof that M rejects all x /∈ L with probability at least 2/3 is the same as in the nonuniform case.
The only difference in the proof is in analyzing M’s behavior on x ∈ L. Speciﬁcally, we want to show that
for any samplable distribution (Xn,Wn), with probability 1 − neg(n) over (x,w) ←R (Xn,Wn), M(x)
accepts with probability at least 2/3 or (x,w) /∈ R.
First, we argue that it sufﬁces to prove this if we replace the runs of S(x) in the deﬁnition of M with
samples of 〈P(w), V ∗〉(x). If M only used one sample of S(x), this would follow from the uniform
indistinguishability of the ensembles {〈P(w), V ∗〉(x)}(x,w)∈R and {S(x)}(x,w)∈R . However, since M uses
many samples of S(x), it is also important that both ensembles are polynomial-time samplable given
(x,w) (for the single-sample indistinguishability to implymultiple-sample indistinguishability, cf. [Gol2,
Theorem 3.2.6]). This holds because P is an efﬁcient prover.
Now, once we replace the runs of S(x) with samples of 〈P(w), V ∗〉(x), it follows that M(x) accepts
with probability 1 − 2−(n), just as in the proof of Theorem 3.4. 
TheoremA.9. 1. If a language L has a constant-round public-coin proof system wrt relation R that is
uniform auxiliary-input resettable zero knowledge, then L is uniformly trivial wrt R.
2. Under Assumption 3.2, if a language L has a constant-round public-coin proof system wrt relation
R that is uniform plain resettable zero knowledge, then L is uniformly trivial wrt R.
Proof (sketch). The proof is identical to that of Theorem 4.4, noting that the reduction from a constant-
round public-coin proof system to a 2-round public-coin proof system preserves uniform resettable zero
knowledge, and appealing to Theorems A.7 and A.8 at the end. We can drop the efﬁcient-prover condi-
tion because the multiple-sample indistinguishability of 〈P(w), V ∗〉(x) and S(x) holds by virtue of the
resettable zero-knowledge property. 
A.4. Proofs of knowledge
The uniform notion of triviality for search problems is a combination of Deﬁnitions 5.4 and A.4.
For some of our results, we will need to allow the samplable distribution to be over a smaller rela-
tion R0 than the relation R in which witnesses are being found. (But, for now, the reader can think
of R0 = R.)
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Deﬁnition A.10. Let R ⊇ R0 be strongly poly-balanced relations such that LR = LR0 . We say that
R is uniformly easy to search with respect to R0 if there exists a PPT T such that for every samplable
distribution {Dn = (Xn,Wn)}n∈N, it holds that
Pr
[
T (Xn) /∈ RXn&(Xn,Wn) ∈ R0 ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)
]
neg(n).
A weaker formulation would be to require that for some function ε(n)1 − 1/poly(n), with prob-
ability at least 1 − neg(n) over (x,w) ←R Dn we have either (x,w) /∈ R0 ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗) or
Pr [T (x) ∈ Rx] 1− ε(n). For NP relations, the weaker formulation is equivalent to DeﬁnitionA.10, by
running the search algorithm polynomially many times and taking the ﬁrst valid witness obtained. For
MA relations R, the weaker formulation implies that every extension Rˆ of R is easy to search in the sense
above.
Analogously to Proposition 5.5, we have:
LemmaA.11. Let R ⊇ R0 be strongly poly-balanced MA-relations such that LR0 = LR . If R is
uniformly easy to search with respect to R0, then LR is uniformly trivial with respect to R0.
Analogously to Propositions 5.6 and A.5, we see that MA-relations that are easy to search have trivial
uniform zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge:
Proposition A.12. Let R ⊇ R0 be strongly poly-balanced MA-relations such that LR0 = LR . If R
is uniformly easy to search with respect to R0, then every extension Rˆ of R has a uniform auxiliary-
input zero-knowledge extra-strong proof of knowledge with respect to R0 with negligible completeness,
soundness, and extraction errors.
Proof. Let T be the PPT algorithm given by the deﬁnition of uniformly trivial. Let Rˆ be an extension of
R. We can ﬁnd a relation R′ such that R′ is an extension of R and Rˆ is an extension of R′. (For example,
let R′ consist of the pairs (x,w) that are accepted by the MA-veriﬁer with probability at least .6.) Then
there is a PPT A1 such that A1 accepts every pair (x,w) ∈ R with probability at least 1− 2−n and rejects
every pair (x,w) /∈ R′ with probability at least 1 − 2−n. There is also a PPT A2 such that A2 accepts
every pair (x,w) ∈ R′ with probability at least 1−2−n and rejects every pair (x,w) /∈ Rˆ with probability
at least 1 − 2−n.
Consider the following proof of knowledge:
(P (w), V )(x):
1. P runs T (x) to obtain a string w′, and runs A1(x,w′). If A1 accepts, then P sends w′ to the veriﬁer.
Otherwise, P sends w to the veriﬁer.
2. V receives w∗ from the prover, runs A2(x,w∗), and accepts if A2 accepts.
The completeness of this protocol as a strong proof of knowledge when w ∈ R0x ⊆ Rx follows because
P will send a stringw∗ inR′x with all but exponentially small probability (A1 is very unlikely to acceptw′
if w′ /∈ R′x), and thus will be accepted by A2 with all but exponentially small probability. The soundness
follows from noting that a deterministic prover strategy that convinces the veriﬁer with probability greater
than 2−n must be sending a string w∗ in Rˆx .
388 B. Barak et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (2006) 321–391
For uniform auxiliary-input zero knowledge with respect to R0, we observe that the only way the
prover’s strategy that cannot be easily simulated by the veriﬁer is if A1 does not accept w′ = T (x),
which occurs with exponentially small probability in case w′ ∈ Rx . Moreover, the deﬁnition of R being
uniformly easy to search with respect to R0 says that for any samplable distribution (Xn,Wn), there
is only a negligible probability that T (Xn) /∈ RXn and (Xn,Wn) ∈ R0. Thus, under any samplable
distribution (Xn,Wn), the veriﬁer’s view can be simulated when (Xn,Wn) ∈ R0 except with negligible
probability. 
Nowwepresent a uniformanalogue of our lower bound for zero-knowledge strong proofs of knowledge.
TheoremA.13. Let R ⊇ R0 be strongly poly-balanced MA-relations such that LR0 = LR .
1. If R has a constant-round honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge strong proof of knowledge with respect to
R0, with negligible completeness and soundness errors and an efﬁcient prover, then every extension Rˆ
of R is uniformly easy to search with respect to R0. In particular, LR is uniformly trivial with respect
to R0.
2. Assuming Assumption 5.8, if R has a constant-round honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge strong argument
of knowledge with respect to R0, with negligible completeness and soundness errors and an efﬁcient
prover, then every extension Rˆ of R is uniformly easy to search with respect to R0. In particular, LR
is uniformly trivial with respect to R0.
Proof. Most of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 5.11. In that proof, we construct a PPT search
algorithm T (x, h) such that for every witness w ∈ R0x ,
Pr [T (x, 〈P(w), V 〉(x)) ∈ Rx] 1/q(n)
for some polynomial q, where n = |x|. Now, let A be a PPT algorithm that accepts pairs (x,w) ∈ Rx
with probability at least 1−2−n and rejects pairs (x,w) /∈ Rˆx with probability at least 1−2−n. Consider
the algorithm T ′(x, h1, . . . , ht ) that runs T (x, h1), . . . , T (x, ht ) to obtain w1, . . . , wt , and outputs the
ﬁrst wi accepted by A or outputs fail if none of the wi’s are accepted by A. Then, when w ∈ R0x ,
Pr
[
T (x, 〈P(w), V 〉(x)t ) = fail] = 2−(n),
where 〈P(w), V 〉(x)t denotes t independent samples of 〈P(w), V 〉(x). In particular, for every samplable
distribution (Xn,Wn), we have
Pr
[
T (Xn, 〈P(Wn), V 〉(Xn)t ) = fail &(Xn,Wn) ∈ R0 ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)
] = 2−(n).
Thus, by uniform zero knowledge with respect to R0x , for every samplable distribution (Xn,Wn), we have
Pr
[
T (Xn, S(Xn)
t ) = fail&(Xn,Wn) ∈ R0 ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)
] = 2−(n) + neg(n) = neg(n).
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On the other hand, by the properties of A, the probability that T (x, h1, . . . , ht ) does not fail but outputs
a string not in Rˆx is at most t · 2−n = neg(n). Therefore,
Pr
[
T (Xn, S(Xn)
t ) /∈ Rˆx&(Xn,Wn) ∈ R0 ∩ ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗)
]
= neg(n).
Thus, T ′(x) = T (x, S(x)t ) is a valid search algorithm according to Deﬁnition A.10. 
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